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Abstract 
 
 
The continental shelf of the islands was a controversial issue for the states which 
attempted to delimit their maritime boundaries. The International Court of Justice and the other 
Arbitral Tribunals which undertook the task to resolve various bilateral maritime disputes didn’t 
manage to consolidate in the international jurisprudence those fixed rules that would govern the 
delimitation of the continental shelf, but quite the opposite they farther perplexed the issue with 
their ambiguous judgments. They infringed systematically upon the islands’ rights and in most of 
the cases they saw them, merely as a means to conciliate the claims of the litigant states. Through 
the study of the case law from 1969 up to 2009 is attempted to be traced in detail the practice of 
the courts as regards the delimitation of the continental shelf of the islands and at the same time 
to be accessed their contribution to the development of both the conventional and customary law 
in this field. 
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Özet 
 
 
Adaların kıta sahanlığı, deniz sınırlarını sınırlandırmaya çalışan devletler için tartışmalı 
bir konu olmuştur. Uluslararası Adalet Divanı ve çeşitli ikili denizcilik uyuşmazlıklarını çözme 
görevini üstlenmiş diğer Tahkim Mahkemeleri, uluslararası içtihatlarda kıta sahanlığının 
sınırlandırılmasını yönlendirebilecek sabit kuralları pekiştirememiş, fakat tam aksine muğlak 
kararlarıyla konuyu daha da karmaşık hale getirmişlerdir. Mahkemeler sistematik olarak adaların 
haklarını ihlal etmiş ve çoğu olayda onları yalnızca davacı devletlerin iddialarını uzlaştırma aracı 
olarak görmüşlerdir. Dava incelemesi aracılığıyla -1969’dan 2009’a kadar olan hukuk- 
Mahkemelerin adaların kıta sahanlığının sınırlandırılmasıyla ilgili uygulaması ayrıntılı olarak 
çıkarılmaya çalışılmış ve aynı zamanda bu alandaki gerek sözleşmesel gerekse geleneksel hukuk 
gelişimine katkılarına da ulaşılmıştır.      
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Introduction 
 
The term “Continental Shelf” is used by geologists1 generally to mean that part of the 
continental margin which is between the shoreline and the shelf break or, where there is no 
noticeable slope, between the shoreline and the point where the depth of the superjacent water is 
approximately between 100 and 200 meters.2  
However, as a legal term the continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea, to a specific distance where 
the coastal state has the right to exploit the natural resources, to the exclusion of others.3 
Therefore, although the states have no sovereignty rights beyond their territorial waters, they 
have the exclusive exploitation rights all over their continental shelves. 
The continental shelf started to interest the international community relatively recently. 
The first important assertion of exclusive rights over the marine resources beyond the territorial 
waters was made by the USA in the Truman Proclamation of 1945 on the Continental Shelf.4 The 
Proclamation states that “having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its 
natural resources, the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the 
subsoil and sea – bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of 
the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control”.5  
                                               
1 For a graphic display of the term “Geological Continental Shelf”, see figure 1 of Annex A.   
2 Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/continental_shelf_description.htm.  
3 For the exact definitions of the legal term “Continental Shelf” see chapter 1.  
4 An earlier document, “The Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria (Annexation) Order” was issued by the United 
Kingdom, in 1942. It appropriated the sea – bed area of the Gulf of Paria and maintained freedom of navigation. 
However, the Truman Proclamation contained a rationale for the continental shelf and must be considered to be the 
most important, if not the first, legal instrument dealing with the subject. Available at: http://www.fao.org/ 
docrep/s5280T/s5280t0p.htm#TopOfPage, accessed on December 6, 2010.  
5 Available at:  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12332, accessed on December 6, 2010. 
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Gradually, the concept of the maritime zones found many supporters. In 1947, Chile6 and 
Peru7 were the first Latin American states to establish maritime zones of 200 miles. Chile 
proclaimed “national sovereignty over submarine areas, regardless of their size or depth, as well 
as over the adjacent seas extending as far as necessary to reserve, protect, maintain, and utilize 
natural resources and wealth”.8  
The Truman Proclamation had an effect not only in Latin America, but also among many 
Arab states. A succession of unilateral declarations was adopted by ten Arab states and emirates 
within a two – month period in 1949.9 The declarations proclaimed sovereignty particularly over 
the petroleum resources on the continental shelf. 
Back then though, the various states conceptualized the notion of the continental shelf 
with divergent views and proceeded to a number of unilateral acts regarding the delimitation and 
the jurisdictional rights of their maritime zones. As a result, in 1956 the United Nations (UN) 
held its first Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), in Geneva. The UNCLOS I resulted 
in four treaties10 concluded in 1958. Among them was the Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf (GCCS), which clarified the issue of the continental shelf, as much as possible. 
                                               
6 Presidential Declaration Concerning Continental Shelf of 23 June 1947, El Mercurio, 29 June 1947. Available at: 
www.fao.org/docrep/s5280T/s5280t0p.htm. See also: C. Selak, “Recent Developments in High Seas Fisheries. 
Jurisdiction under the Presidential Proclamation of 1945”, 44 AJIL, No. 4, October 1950, p. 673.   
7 Presidential Decree No. 781 of 1 August 1947,107 El Peruano: Diario Oficial, No. 1983, 11 August 1947. 
Available at: www.fao.org/docrep/s5280T/s5280t0p.htm. See also: C. Selak, op. cit. p.673. 
8 Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/s5280T/s5280t0p.htm, accessed on December 6, 2010. 
9 The dates of adoption of the declarations are as follows: Saudi Arabia 28 May 1949, Bahrain 5 June 1949, Qatar 8 
June 1949, Abu Dhabi 10 June 1949, Kuwait 12 June 1949, Dubai, 14 June 1949, Sharjah 16 June 1949, Ras al 
Khaimah 17 June 1949, Umm al Qaiwain 20 June 1949, Ajman 20 June 1949. From: D. Dahak, Les Etats Arabes et 
le Droit de la Mer, Tome 1, 1986, p. 123 (In French). 
10 They were signed totally four conventions and an optional protocol: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone (CTS), the Convention on the High Seas(CHS), the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas (CFCLR), the Convention on the Continental Shelf (GCCS) and the Optional 
protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (OPSD). The CTS entered into force in 
1964, the CHS in 1962, the CFCLR in 1966, the GCCS in 1964 and the OPSD in 1962. States bound by the 
Conventions and the Protocol, are as at 2008, for the CTS: 52, for the CHS: 63, for the CFCLR: 38, for the GCCS: 
58 and for the OPSD: 38. Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html, accessed on December 6, 
2010.   
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In 1960, the UN held in Geneva the second Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
II), but the six – week conference didn’t result in any new agreements. Nonetheless, the 
discussions went on for years along with some courts decisions and many bilateral agreements 
between various states which contributed to the formation of some general rules that started to be 
accepted by the majority of the states. In 1973 the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) was convened in New York, with the participation of more than 160 nations. The 
conference lasted until 1982 and the resulting convention was the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This convention established in detail the rules governing all the 
uses of the seas and their resources. Hence, it dealt also with all the continental shelf related 
issues. 
While the majority of the coastal states include a number of islands in their territory, there 
are also many islands – states, which are consisted merely of one or more islands, as it is the case 
for example for Cyprus, Malta, Philippines, Jamaica and so on. As expected, in the 
aforementioned process of determining the states’ maritime zones in general and that of the 
continental shelf in particular, the regime of the islands had a special position. The two 
conventions, the bilateral agreements, the decisions of the courts and at the same time the 
emerging customary law have tried to provide for their status. 
I come from one of those coastal countries that have many islands under their dominion. 
In fact, Greece is surrounded by more than two thousand islands, islets and rocks.11 They are 
scattered mainly in the Aegean Sea which extends from the coasts of the mainland to the eastern 
Aegean Islands and beyond that to the coasts of Turkey.12  
                                               
11 USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, available at: www.cia.gov/library/publications 
/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html, accessed on December 12, 2010.  
12 See figure 5 of Annex A. 
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The study of the Greek – Turkish relations in the relevant graduate program of Bilgi 
University highlighted the fact that the delimitation of the continental shelf is one of the most 
important problems13 in the Aegean archipelago. Apart from its economic dimension, the 
delimitation of the Aegean’s continental shelf is significant because it would be the final step of 
the solution of the dispute between the two states, as it requires that almost all the other problems 
would have been settled. For example, the continental shelf can’t be delimited if the two states 
haven’t agreed on the breadth of the territorial waters or the sovereignty over all the disputed 
islets and rocks. 
The Aegean Sea’s continental shelf lingering dispute, or in other words, the Aegean 
Islands’ right to have a continental shelf of their own, may be resolved by the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ)14 or by another ad hoc arbitral tribunal. To date, the ICJ and the various other 
arbitral tribunals have issued numerous decisions regarding the delimitation of the islands’ 
continental shelf.   
It seems that the judicial settlement of the islands’ continental shelf dispute is the most 
appropriate approach for two main reasons. Firstly, the authority of the international courts will 
make any given solution more palatable to the public opinion of the interested countries and 
secondly, the delimitation of the continental shelf is a purely legal/technical issue rather than a 
political one and the international courts have the expertise to deal efficiently with it.15 
                                               
13 The other points of friction in Greek – Turkish relations include: The sovereignty over a number of islets and rocks 
(Grey Zones), the extent of the Greek air – space, the limits of the Athens FIR, the search and rescue regions, the 
breadth of Greece’s territorial waters and the military status of the eastern Aegean Islands. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Greece, available at: http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern 
+Europe/Turkey/. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa? 
cdcc8168-4dfb-46f6-8589-fbed9909c49b.  
14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, available at: http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/enUS/Policy/Geographic 
+Regions /South-Eastern+Europe/Turkey/Differences/Continental+Shelf/, accessed on December 7, 2010. 
15 Turkey argues that the issue of the continental shelf is mainly a political difference between the two countries. 
Ibid.  
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However, a lot of scholars support the proposition that the decisions of the courts have 
rather complicated the issue of the islands’ right to have a continental shelf of their own than 
have they clarified it further.16 Thus, the aim of this thesis is to examine the case law regarding 
the delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts and to 
focus on those parts of the decisions that have to do with the continental shelf of the islands, in 
order to pore over the problem and understand the logic behind every judgment. 
My intension is to find out if there are fixed and explicit criteria that the courts take into 
consideration before issuing their decisions. Moreover, I intend to examine the consistency of the 
judgments throughout the time, the dynamic that the issue has acquired over the years and the 
degree of predictability of any future case. Finally, my main goal is to answer the following 
question: were the courts’ decisions pertaining to the continental shelf unfair for the islands? 
The study will obtain the necessary information mainly from primary sources such as the 
official archives of various organizations (UN, ICJ, PCA etc) which are available on the web, but 
also from books, articles and a number of other relevant web – pages. It will start by reviewing 
the international legal framework concerning the continental shelf of the islands, as well as the 
existing continental shelf delimitation principles, methods and practices. In this regard, the 
provisions of both the conventional and the customary international law are going to be presented 
briefly, in the following chapters. Then, all the relevant cases which submitted to various 
international courts (ICJ, Arbitration Courts and Conciliation Commissions), will be presented in 
chronological order, starting with the North Sea continental shelf delimitation case in 1969, up to 
the last court decision concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between Romania and 
Ukraine, in 2009.  
                                               
16 H. Dipla, “The Judicial Evolution of the Principles of Maritime Delimitation and their Effect on the Greek – 
Turkish Dispute over the Aegean Continental Shelf”, in S. Perrakis (ed.) The Aegean Sea and the New Law of the 
Sea,  1996, p. 166 (in Greek).   
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In the last part, the study will provide a number of general observations and will draw 
conclusions stemming from the analysis of the previously presented cases. The annexes, at the 
end of the study, include maps, drawings and sketches aiming to give a visual illustration of the 
various cases and a complete picture of the topic under discussion. 
To conclude, the contribution of this thesis aspires to be the collection of all the relevant 
cases in a single study, providing therefore a general overview of the subject matter. However, it 
will not merely present the decisions of the courts but it will keep a critical approach on them. 
Moreover, it will provide the separate and the dissenting opinions of various judges, as well as 
the views of numerous other researchers. 
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Chapter 1 
Conventional and Customary Law 
 
The international law which is known as the “jus gentium” meaning “law of nations”, 
governs and regulates the interrelationship between sovereign states and their rights and 
obligations in the event of a conflict with one another. According to the Statute of the ICJ the 
sources of the international law are:  
“a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
 b. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
 c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations…”. 17 
Thus in effect, there are two formal sources of international law as the courts have 
outlined also in their numerous decisions. These parallel and sometimes overlapping sources of 
international law are the international conventions and the international customs.18   
The conventional international law as regards the continental shelf, apart from the general 
principles of the international law, is mainly expressed by: the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
According to article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties,19 when 
there are successive treaties relating to the same subject matter, the provisions of the later prevail 
to those of the earlier, when these provisions are incompatible between them. Thus, the earlier 
                                               
17 Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the ICJ. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1 
=4&p2=2&p3=0.  
18 M. Koskenniemi, Sources of International Law, 2002, p.77. 
19 The Convention was done at Vienna on 23 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980.  
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treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.20 
Moreover, the UNCLOS explicitly stipulates that it shall prevail over the Geneva Conventions on 
the Law of the Sea of 195821 and therefore over the GCCS.  
However, the GCCS will continue to be valid between states that have ratified it, but not 
the UNCLOS. In addition, most of the provisions of the GCCS are considered as reflecting 
customary law rules. 
The customary international law finds its existence from the extensive, consistent and 
uniform practice of states. It comprises all those rules that have been developed “from the 
ground”, as customs and practices of the states evolve. Most of the times, it is finally 
incorporated to the conventional law, due to its widespread acceptance and recognition.  
Below, the law relating to the continental shelf in general and that of the islands in 
particular will be presented briefly. 
 
 
1.1 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
 
The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted in 1958 the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, which contains totally twelve articles. According to the 
Convention the term “Continental Shelf” is used as referring:22 
                                               
20 Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.  
21 The paragraph 1 of article 311 of the UNCLOS states: “This Convention shall prevail, as between states parties, 
over the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958.” 
22 Article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. For a graphic display of the definition see figure 2 of 
Annex A.  
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 “(a) To the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside 
the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of 
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas 
  (b) To the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of 
islands.” 
Thus, according to the Convention there are two criteria for the delimitation of the 
continental shelf: the criterion of the 200m isobath and the criterion of exploitation. The criterion 
of the depth had appeared much earlier in the Truman’s Declaration. That of exploitation though, 
was new and from the first moment it was criticized strongly, because of the advantage it gave to 
the developed states with their advanced technological means, by which they could extend their 
continental shelf indefinitely, contrary to the developing nations. For this reason, this criterion 
was later annulled and ceased to exist in the UNCLOS. 
Furthermore, the Convention established the notion of the sovereignty rights of the coastal 
states far beyond their territorial waters, but merely as exclusive rights for exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources. In addition, it explicitly recognized the coastal states’ rights 
over their continental shelf independently of any declaration or claim. So, the convention directly 
connected the sovereignty rights with the proximity of the coastal states to their continental shelf. 
Finally, the convention set some rules for the continental shelf delimitation between states with 
opposite or adjacent coasts, as we will see in charter 2. 
The GCCS came into force in 1964 and although it tried to merge almost all the divergent 
views about the continental shelf that had been expressed during the previous decade, it has had 
limited support by the nations. Up to now, it has been ratified by only 58 states23 but, the 
customary nature of many of its provisions, consequently binding on all the states, as well as its 
                                               
23 Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html, accessed on December 6, 2010. 
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influence to the international jurisprudence and to various bilateral agreements between the 
states, is something that will be discussed in the next chapter below. 
Finally, noteworthy especially for the present study, are also the provisions of convention 
as regards the islands. As stated before, the article 1, paragraph b, stipulates that the islands have 
equal rights with the continental lands, regarding the continental shelf. The GCCS therefore 
equates the islands with the mainland without any exceptions.   
 
 
1.2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
The new conventional regime of the continental shelf is regulated under the part VI and 
the Annex II of the UNCLOS, as well as the Annex II of the Final Act of the Convention. The 
relevant articles include a new legal definition of the continental shelf, lay down rules for its 
delimitation and establish a commission on the limits of the continental shelf. The Convention, 
which is often referred to as the “Constitution of the Seas”,24 was opened for signature at 
Montego Bay, Jamaica, in 1982 and came into force in 1994, after its ratification by 60 countries. 
Details of its signature and ratification status are shown in Annex B. 
The new legal definition of the continental shelf, according to the convention is as 
follows:25 “The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its 
land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles 
                                               
24 International Judicial Monitor, available at: http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_0706/spotlight.html. See also 
Time Magazine, available at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,924405-1,00.html, and Canadian 
Coast Guard, available at: http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/e0004254, accessed on December 24, 2010.   
25 Article 76, para. 1.  
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from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge 
of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.”26 
As stipulated in the convection, a coastal state can delimit its continental shelf taking into 
account two criteria: the criterion of the distance or the geomorphological criterion. In any case, 
the minimum breadth of the continental shelf is 200 nautical miles (minus the breadth of the 
territorial waters), but it can extend beyond that limit if the morphology of the seabed is suitable. 
Then, the continental shelf can extend up to the outer edge of the continental margin but again, it 
shall not exceed either 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured, or 100 nautical miles from the 2500 meter isobath. There is one 
exception though to the 350 miles range limit of the continental shelf: when there are submarine 
elevations such as plateaus, rises, caps, banks and spurs which extend beyond the 350 miles, they 
are considered parts of the continental margin and the continental shelf ends beyond the 350 
miles limit, until these special geomorphological features cease to exist.27 
 The new convention as the previous, grant to the islands with the same rights as the 
continental lands as regards to the continental shelf, with the exception of the rocks which cannot 
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own. Rocks can have only a zone of territorial 
sea around them. The article 121 of the convention stipulates for the islands: 
 “1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide.  
  2. The territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of the Convention 
applicable to other land territory.  
                                               
26 For a graphic display of the definition see figure 3 and 4 of Annex A. 
27 According to article 76, paragraphs 4 – 7. 
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  3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall 
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” 
 Thus, when it comes to the continental shelf, the conventional law makes no difference 
between continental lands and islands. 
 
 
1.3 Customary Law 
 
In the case of the international customary law the legal picture is more complex. The last 
paragraph of UNCLOS’s preamble states that “matters not regulated by this convention continue 
to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law”. This means that even 
between states that have signed the UNCLOS the international customary law will 
complementarily apply. The customary international law is however of special importance when 
it comes to regulating relations between countries which are not bound together by the GCCS, or 
the UNCLOS. 
Generally, the customary law rules and those contained in the international conventions 
are not clear cut separated between them. There are many provisions in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of the Treaties which refer to the close relation between the two forms of the 
international law. Thus, according to article 38 of the aforementioned convention the provisions 
of the international treaties don’t exclude “….a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding 
upon a third state as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such”.  
Moreover, according to article 43 of the same convention there are obligations for the 
states imposed by international law independently of a treaty: “The invalidity, termination or 
denunciation of a treaty, the withdrawal of a party from it, or the suspension of its 
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operation…shall not in any way impair the duty of any state to fulfill any obligation embodied in 
the treaty to which it would be subject under international law independently of the treaty”. 
In addition, according to article 317 of the UNCLOS, in case that a state denounces the 
convention this “…shall not in any way affect the duty of any state party to fulfill any obligation 
embodied in this convention to which it would be subject under international law independently 
of this convention”.  
Still, in the field of the international law of the sea, tracking the international custom isn’t 
an easy task, because most of the customary law rules have already been incorporated in the 
existing international conventions dealing with the law of the sea. For example, as we will see 
below, the ICJ in 1969 considered that certain provisions of the GCCS were the crystallization of 
customary law rules.  
Of a great importance is the rationale of the ICJ in its judgment for the Libya – Malta 
continental shelf case, in 1985. It stated: “The two parties agree that the dispute is to be governed 
by customary international law. Malta is a party to the 1958 GCCS, while Libya is not; both 
parties have signed the 1982 UNCLOS, but that convention has not yet entered into force. 
However, the parties are in accord in considering that some of its provisions constitute the 
expression of customary law, while holding different views as to which provisions have this 
status. In view of the major importance of this convention – which has been adopted by an 
overwhelming majority of states – it is clearly the duty of the court to consider how far any of its 
provisions may be binding upon the parties as a rule of customary law.”28  
At another part of its decision the court reaffirmed the role of the customary law: “It is of 
course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in 
the actual practice and opinio juris of states, even though multilateral conventions may have an 
                                               
28 Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/6417.pdf, p. 148.  
Chapter 1                                                                                                                     Conventional and Customary Law 
 
14 
 
important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or indeed in 
developing them.”29 
Most of the provisions of the two conventions which refer to the continental shelf are the 
codification of the customary law rules. For instance, the islands right to have a continental shelf 
of their own was firstly recognized as a customary law rule and later it was incorporated initially 
in the GCCS and later in the UNCLOS. The ICJ in its decision for the North Sea continental shelf 
delimitation in 1969 reaffirmed that the islands’ right to have a continental shelf, apart from 
being a conventional law rule, is guaranteed in addition by the customary law.30  
It is concluded therefore that the customary law, although not always clear and well 
defined, it is equally important as the conventional law, and as we will see further below, it 
played a key role in many cases regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf of the islands. 
To finish, another issue that is going to be discussed in the next chapter of the present 
study is that of the existing principles of delimitation (methods, practices and rules) between 
states with opposite or adjacent coasts, which are stemming from the two conventions and it is 
going to be traced to what degree they can be considered as representing customary law rules. 
 
 
                                               
29 Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf, p. 27.  
30 “…these three articles (i.e. articles 1, 2 and 3 of the GCCS) being the one which, it is clear, when then regarded as 
reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at list emergent rules of customary international law relative to the 
continental shelf…”. ICJ Judgment of 20 February 1969, para. 63. Available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/51/5535.pdf.  
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           Chapter 2 
Principles of Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between States with Opposite or 
Adjacent Coasts 
 
 2.1 Median/Equidistance Line Principle 
 
A median/equidistance line is one for which every point on the line is equidistant from the 
nearest points on the baselines being used. The term “median line” refers to states with opposite 
coasts while the term “equidistance line” refers to adjacent states.31 By the application of the 
median line two opposite states can divide the sea area between them while using the equidistant 
line two adjacent states can extend their land boundary into the sea creating therefore their 
common maritime boundary.    
The UNCLOS I established the median/equidistance line principle as the main method for 
the delimitation of the maritime zones between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, with the 
exception of the special circumstances. Especially, for the continental shelf the relevant provision 
is depicted in the article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf: 
 “1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more states 
whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such 
states shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless 
another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, 
                                               
31 For a graphical example of a maritime boundary delimitation between states with opposite or adjacent coasts by 
applying the principle of median/equidistance line, see figures 1 and 2 of Annex C. 
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every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured.  
 2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent 
states, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In 
the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, 
the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest 
points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured.”32 
The median/equidistance line was the outcome of the perception that this method was the 
best delimitation technique for the demarcation of the maritime zones (including that of the 
continental shelf), because it was regarded as the most fair and the safest method. 
The significance of the median/equidistance line principle was initially reduced with the 
introduction of the term “special circumstances” in the Geneva Convention and later it was 
downgraded further by the 1969 ICJ decision, for the case concerning the North Sea continental 
shelf delimitation. Then, the court didn’t accept that the median/equidistance line constitute a 
customary law rule and indicated that it was just a conventional rule, fund only in the GCCS and 
therefore, not a generally accepted rule that should be necessarily followed.33 
The court though stressed the significance of the median/equidistance line method stating 
that “…no other method of delimitation has the same combination of practical convenience and 
certainty of application.”34 The next court decisions were in line with the 1969 ICJ judgment, as 
                                               
32 The median/equidistance line was also established during the UNCLOS I for the territorial waters by the article 12 
of the “Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone”.  
33 “…the Court reaches the conclusion that the Geneva Convention did not embody or crystallize any pre – existing 
or emergent rule of customary law, according to which the delimitation of continental shelf areas between adjacent 
States must, unless the Parties otherwise agree, be carried out on an equidistance – special circumstances basis. A 
rule was of course embodied in Article 6 of the Convention, but as a purely conventional rule. Whether it has since 
acquired a broader basis remains to be seen…”. ICJ Reports 1969, para. 69. Available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/51/5535.pdf. 
34 Ibid. para. 23.  
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the tribunals accepted the median/equidistance line principle merely as the one out of the many 
existing demarcation methods or factors. Moreover, in some cases it was considered that the 
median/equidistance line principle couldn’t even be used as a provisional line (starting point) of 
the delimitation process.35 According to the court this method could be adopted only if after the 
assessment of all the relevant circumstances this method would lead to an equitable solution.36 
The practice of the states however seems indifferent to the courts decisions. A number of 
bilateral agreements have adopted the median/equidistance line as the primary demarcation 
method. During the Libya – Malta continental shelf case were identified over 70 of such bilateral 
agreements but the court stated that the states’ practice “…falls short of proving the existence of 
a rule prescribing the use of equidistance, or indeed of any method, as obligatory.”37 
The UNCLOS didn’t even refer to the median/equidistance line principle within its 
provisions, emphasizing on the equitable result rather than on the method applied.38  
The most recent court decisions though, started to recognize the value of the 
median/equidistance line as the most appropriate delimitation method since it ensure prima facie 
an equitable result. Consequently, in many cases the judges started the demarcation process by 
drawing a provisional median/equidistance line and subsequently adjusted it or not, according to 
                                               
35 Libya – Malta continental shelf delimitation judgment, para. 77: “The fact that the Court has found that, in the 
circumstances of the present case, the drawing of a median line constitutes an appropriate first step in the 
delimitation process, should not be understood as implying that an equidistance line will be an appropriate beginning 
in al1 cases, or even in all cases of delimitation between opposite States.” Available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf.  
36 Tunisia – Libya continental self delimitation judgment, para. 13: “…the delimitation is to be effected in 
accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all relevant circumstances.” Available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/71/6527.pdf.   
37 Libya – Malta continental shelf delimitation judgment, supra note 35. para. 44.  
38 The median/equidistance line principle remained valid in the UNCLOS, but only for the delimitation of the 
territorial waters. According to article 15: “Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, 
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea 
beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, 
where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two 
States in a way which is at variance therewith.” 
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the special/relevant circumstances of each particular case, aiming to achieve an equitable solution 
(Two – Step Approach or Corrective Equity Approach).39 The latest decisions however adopted 
an additional step: that of proportionality test. The whole delimitation line (equidistant or 
adjusted equidistant) is checked under the prism of the coastal length ratio and might be 
readjusted accordingly.40 
Taking into account the last courts decisions, the states’ practice and hence the opinio 
juris, it is safe to conclude that the median/equidistance line principle seems to have been 
reinstated to its initial position. At least, it should be assumed as constituting a customary law 
rule which functions complementarily in the international law of the sea.41 
The median/equidistance line is of vital importance for the islands: what if the law or the 
international tribunals recognize the islands’ right to have a continental shelf of their own but in 
practice they attribute them partial or even no effect at all?  The median/equidistance line 
principle therefore protects the islands from arbitrary interpretations of the law and secures their 
rights. 
Unfortunately, further below we are going to see that in many cases the islands were 
sacrificed on the special/relevant circumstances altar and that of the equitable result, and 
therefore they were considered as a reason for deviation from the median/equidistance line 
principle. 
 
 
 
                                               
39 The court applied this practice for example in the Libya – Malta case in 1985 and in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case 
in 1993.  
40 The Three – Step Approach or Corrective Equity Approach or Adjusted Equidistance/Median Line adopted in the 
most recent decisions, including: Eritrea/Yemen (1999), Qatar/Bahrain (2001), Cameroon/Nigeria (2002) and 
Romania/Ukraine (2009).  
41 I. Krateros, A. Strati, The Law of the Sea, 1998, p. 313 (in Greek).   
Chapter 2                                                                                                                                       Delimitation Principles 
 
19 
 
 2.2 Special/Relevant Circumstances  
 
The terms “Special/Relevant Circumstances” have been used very often in the 
international jurisprudence in cases related to the continental shelf delimitation. They are 
essential components of the equitable result42 and they should be considered today as part of the 
customary law. Nonetheless the two terms are not identical and they don’t bear the same 
connotation. 
The notion of the “special circumstances” was introduced during the UNCLOS I, as we 
saw before.43 In general, the spirit of the Geneva Conventions was that the median/equidistance 
line constitutes the rule for all the delimitation cases, except for some exceptions. For these 
exceptions that may come up, it was also introduced the idea of the “special circumstances”, 
basically serving as a safeguard to the rigid rule. So, in case of the existence of special 
geographical features, where the application of the median/equidistance line might create 
inequalities and injustice, it was possible to be a deviation from the rule and it could be drawn a 
different boundary from that of the median/equidistance line. 
In other words, the special circumstances were initially closely related to the 
median/equidistance line principle. Their disconnection from this principle and their application 
as an independent demarcation rule was a posterior phenomenon not originally planned in the 
1958 Conventions. Thus, the interpretation of the term “special circumstances” and its practical 
use has created a lot of problems, most of them related with the islands. In many cases as we will 
see in the next chapter the islands per se were arbitrarily regarded as “special circumstances”, 
attributing them partial effect as regards their continental shelf. 
                                               
42 See UNCLOS: articles 74 for the Exclusive Economic Zone and article 83 for the Continental Shelf.  
43 Article 6 of the GCCS and article 12 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 
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The international jurisprudence adopted the term “relevant circumstances” in 1969, after 
the decision of the ICJ concerning the North Sea continental shelf delimitation. The court didn’t 
apply the GCCS, because Germany hadn’t ratified it, and therefore the ICJ couldn’t refer to 
article 6 of the Convention and consequently to the term “special circumstances”. The 
geographical features of the area however couldn’t be ignored by the court. So the term “relevant 
circumstances” came up to describe all those geographical and other factors that ought to be 
assessed in order to be achieved an equitable solution. 
The later court decisions followed the precedent set by the judgment of the ICJ in 1969. 
For the case concerning the Libya – Malta continental shelf delimitation the ICJ declared: “There 
can be no doubt that it is virtually impossible to achieve an equitable solution in any delimitation 
without taking into account the particular relevant circumstances of the area.”44 
Thus the “relevant circumstances” concept was employed as something broader of that of 
the “special circumstances”. “Relevant circumstances exist in al1 cases; special circumstances 
exist only in some.”45 
But the ICJ comparing the two terms stated: “Although it is a matter of categories which 
are different in origin and in name, there is inevitably a tendency towards assimilation between 
the special circumstances of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention and the relevant circumstances 
under customary law, and this if only because they both are intended to enable the achievement 
of an equitable result.”.46 
The relevant circumstances that should be taken into account are not however explicitly 
determined by the courts or the conventional law. Up to now the courts have decided for the 
                                               
44 Libya – Malta continental shelf delimitation judgment, supra note 35, para. 72. Available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/63/6267.pdf.  
45 Separate opinion of the judge Shahabuddeen, Greenland – Jan Mayen maritime boundary delimitation, ICJ 
judgment 1993, p. 114. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/78/6759.pdf. 
46 Greenland – Jan Mayen, ICJ judgment 1993, para. 56. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/78/ 
6743.pdf.  
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relevant circumstances on a case by case basis. Next, will be provided some examples of what the 
courts have considered as relevant circumstances so far: The general configuration of the coasts 
and the presence of any special or unusual features,47 the available natural resources,48 the 
proportionality of the coastal lengths,49 the geopolitical situation and the vicinity of some islands 
to another country,50 the presence of oil – wells51 and the position of the islands in the wider 
geographical context, particularly their position in a semi – enclosed sea52 (but the ICJ in 1969 
declared that only islets, rocks and minor coastal projectors can be considered as special 
circumstances).53 In addition, the courts have admitted that the delimitation of the maritime zones 
may create security/defense considerations to a state.54   
On the contrary, the courts haven’t considered the following as relevant circumstances: 
the relative socioeconomic position/development of the states,55 the geological characteristics of 
the sea – bed and the landmass of the states.56 
To sum up, we note that the term “relevant circumstances” covers a wide range of factors 
taken into account each and every time, aiming to achieve an equitable result. The term “special 
circumstances” is connected with those geographical factors that require an adjustment of the 
                                               
47 North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ Judgment 1969, para. 101/D/1.Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files 
/52/5561.pdf. 
48 Ibid. para. 101/D/2 and Libya – Malta Continental Shelf delimitation, ICJ judgment 1985, supra note 35, para. 50, 
available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf.  
49 Libya – Malta Continental Shelf delimitation, ICJ judgment 1985, op. cit. para. 54, and Greenland – Jan Mayen 
maritime boundary delimitation, ICJ judgment 1993, supra note 46, para. 68.  
50 Aglo – French Continental shelf Arbitration, para. 197. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 20692032. 
51 Tunisia – Libya Continental Shelf delimitation, ICJ judgment 1982, para. 107. Available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/63 /6267.pdf.  
52 Libya – Malta Continental Shelf delimitation, ICJ judgment 1985, supra note 35, para. 53.  
53 North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ Judgment 1969, supra note 47, para. 57.  
54 Libya – Malta Continental Shelf delimitation, ICJ judgment 1985, supra note 35, para 51 and Greenland – Jan 
Mayen maritime boundary delimitation, ICJ judgment 1993, supra note 46, para 8. See also Anglo – French 
Continental Shelf delimitation, supra note 50, para. 161, 163 and 188. 
55 Libya – Malta Continental Shelf delimitation, ICJ judgment 1985, supra note 35, para. 50, and Greenland – Jan 
Mayen maritime boundary delimitation, ICJ judgment 1993, supra note 46, para. 80.  
56 Libya – Malta Continental Shelf delimitation, ICJ judgment 1985, supra note 35, para. 39. 
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median/equidistance line, in order again to reach an equitable solution. The recent jurisprudence 
however tends to equate the two terms.        
 
 
 2.3 Equitable Principles/Equity 
 
The conceptual origin of the term “equitable/equity” dates back to the ancient Greek law. 
Aristotle supported that the laws are too general to cover every particular situation, so the 
application of the law should be done in a way that every time an equitable result is achieved. 
Equitable result to a case is therefore, the solution that the lawmaker should have proposed if he 
had known the particularities of that unique case. 
By and large, there are three forms of equity: First, the equity that functions infra legem, 
which is that resulting from the interpretation of the existing law, secondly the equity that 
functions praeter legem, which complements the existing law rules, and thirdly the contra legem 
equity, which is the equity awarded against the law. The ICJ has excluded the application of the 
praeter legem and the contra legem equity and has explicitly declared on many occasions that the 
equity that will be applied to the cases submitted to it, is the infra legem equity. “The justice of 
which equity is an emanation, is not abstract justice but justice according to the rule of law.”57  
In the Law of the Sea the equitable principles were firstly appeared in the Truman 
Proclamation of 1945: “In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another state, 
                                               
57 Ibid. para. 45. See also North Sea Continental shelf delimitation, ICJ Judgment 1969, supra note 47, para. 85 and 
Honduras – El Salvador, ICJ judgment 1992, para. 262, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/75/6671.pdf.   
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or is shared with an adjacent state, the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the 
state concerned in accordance with equitable principles.”58  
The UNCLOS and the international jurisprudence concerning the delimitation continental 
shelf have put the equitable principles/equity in the heart of every delimitation process. As 
regards the delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, 
the article 83 (1) of the UNCLOS stipulates: “The delimitation of the continental shelf between 
states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international 
law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to 
achieve an equitable solution.” 
According to the ICJ, equity as a legal concept is directly emanating from the idea of 
justice and the courts whose task is by definition to administer justice are bound to apply it. 
Equity however was often contrasted with the rigid rules of positive law, the severity of which 
had to be mitigated in order to do justice. But, when it comes to the continental shelf 
delimitations, equity is applied directly as law, apparently because there is no specific rule 
dictating the delimitation process (apart from the median/equidistance line provision of the 
GCCS). Thus, regarding the continental shelf delimitation the ICJ deemed that equity can be 
applied directly as law.59  
When applying positive international law, a court may choose among several possible 
interpretations of the law the one which appears, in the light of the circumstances of the case, to 
be closest to the requirements of justice. Application of equitable principles is to be however 
distinguished from a decision ex aequo et bono. The ICJ can take such a decision only on 
                                               
58 Available at: http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/gov_oceans/truman.pdf, accessed on December 18, 
2010.  
59 Tunisia – Libya Continental Shelf delimitation, ICJ judgment 1982, supra note 51, para. 71. 
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condition that the parties agree (Article 38, para. 2, of the ICJ Statute), and the court is then freed 
from the strict application of legal rules in order to bring about an appropriate settlement.60 
The ICJ decision in 1969 was again determinative for the later international jurisprudence. 
In that case, the court decided that the continental shelf delimitation should be done on the basis 
of the equitable principles taking into account all the relevant circumstances. The equitable 
principles/equity emerged therefore as the primary rule of all the delimitation processes. 
The next court decisions followed this rationale and stressed the importance of equity in 
every dispute between the states. In some cases the court tried to define the abstract concept of 
“equitable/equity”, but as the court admitted during the case concerning the maritime boundary 
delimitation in the gulf of Maine: “There has been no systematic definition of the equitable 
criteria that may be taken into consideration for an international maritime delimitation, and this 
would in any event be difficult a priori, because of their highly variable adaptability to different 
concrete situations. Codification efforts have left this field untouched.”61  
The court though gave some examples as to what may be considered as equitable criteria: 
the classic principle that the land dominates the sea; the  criterion advocating, in cases where no 
special circumstances require correction thereof, the equal division of the areas overlapping the 
maritime and submarine zones appertaining to the respective coasts of neighboring states; the 
criterion that, whenever possible, the seaward extension of a state’s coast should not encroach 
upon areas that are too close to the coast of another state; the criterion of preventing, as far as 
possible, any cut – off of the seaward projection of the coast or part of the coast of either of the 
states concerned.62 
                                               
60 Ibid.  
61 Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Maine Area, ICJ judgment 1984, para. 157. Available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket /files/67/6369.pdf.   
62 Ibid. 
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In a later decision, the ICJ tried to specify more the term “equitable/equity”. Thus 
according to the court equitable criteria may also be: the principle that there is to be no question 
of refashioning geography, or compensating for the inequalities of nature; the related principle of 
non – encroachment by one party on the natural prolongation of the other, which is no more than 
the negative expression of the positive rule that the coastal state enjoys sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf off its coasts to the full extent authorized by international law in the relevant 
circumstances; the principle of respect of all the relevant circumstances; the principle that 
although all states are equal before the law and are entitled to equal treatment «equity does not 
necessarily imply equality», nor does it seek to make equal what nature has made unequal; and 
the principle that there can be no question of distributive justice.63 
Another equitable criterion that is closely related with the continental shelf of the islands 
is that of proportionality. This means that the proportion of the continental shelf appertaining to 
each state, will be related to the proportion of the lengths of the coastlines of the two states. For 
the Libya – Malta continental shelf delimitation the ICJ stated: “The significant difference in 
lengths of the respective coastlines is an element which may be taken into account at a certain 
stage in the delimitation process”.64   
In fact, it can be concluded that there is no legal limit to the considerations that the courts 
may take into account for the purpose of making sure that they reach an equitable result. In 
addition, according to the ICJ, the term “equitable/equity” characterize both the result to be 
achieved and the means to be applied to reach this result. In order to describe this obscure 
situation the judge and later president of the ICJ Schwebel noted in his dissenting opinion for the 
                                               
63 Libya – Malta Continental Shelf delimitation, ICJ judgment 1985, supra note 35, para. 46.  
64 Ibid. para. 58. See also North Sea Continental Shelf Delimitation, ICJ Judgment 1969 supra note 47, para. 
101/D/3, Canada – France Continental Shelf delimitation, arbitration 1992, para. 93 and Anglo – French Continental 
Shelf delimitation, arbitration 1977, supra note 50, para. 99 and 100.   
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case concerning the maritime delimitation of the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen: “what 
is equitable is as variable as the weather of The Hague”.65  
It remains to be seen in the next chapter if the courts stayed within the limits of the infra 
legem equity or if they applied also the praeter legem and even the contra legem equity as 
regards to the parts of their decisions concerning the continental shelf of the islands. 
 
 
 
                                               
65 Separate opinion of the judge Schwebel, Greenland – Jan Mayen, ICJ judgment 1993, p. 86. Available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/78/6757.pdf 
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Chapter 3 
Court Decisions 
 
3.1 North Sea Continental Shelf Delimitation (ICJ 1969) 
 
On February 20, 1969 the ICJ delivered its judgment, by 11 votes to 6, for the case 
concerning the North Sea Continental Shelf Delimitation.66 The dispute, which had been 
submitted to the court two years earlier, related to the delimitation of the continental shelf 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark on the one hand, and between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands on the other.67 The parties asked the court to 
state the principles and rules of international law applicable, and they undertook thereafter to 
carry out the delimitations on that basis. 
The court rejected the argument that the delimitations in question had to be carried out in 
accordance with the equidistance principle as defined in article 6 of the 1958 GCCS, because 
Germany hadn’t ratified it and therefore wasn’t legally bound by its provisions. In addition, the 
court pointed out that the equidistance principle wasn’t a customary law rule. 
The court also rejected Germany’s claim that the continental shelf should be apportioned 
into just and equitable shares. It held that each party had an original right to those areas of the 
continental shelf which constituted the natural prolongation of the states’ land territory into and 
under the sea and it added that it wasn’t a question of apportioning or sharing out those areas, but 
                                               
66 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/52 
/5561.pdf. 
67 See figure 1 of Annex D. 
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of delimiting them.68 The court found that the boundary lines in question were to be drawn by 
agreement between the Parties and in accordance with equitable principles and it indicated certain 
factors to be taken into consideration for that purpose. 
The North Sea continental shelf delimitation judgment was the first court decision 
regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf and therefore it created a legal precedent, 
affecting all the later courts decisions and to a degree even the same the UNCLOS. Moreover, it 
affected directly or indirectly the issue of the continental shelf of the islands. 
In the North Sea, there are many islands belonging to the three litigant countries. The 
islands of Borkum, Juist, Norderney, Langeoog, Pellworm, Nordstrand, Wyko and Sylt belong to 
Germany, the islands Romo, Mando and Fano to Denmark and the Frisian Islands belong to the 
Netherlands. Most of these islands are close to the mainland, up to a distance less than 12 miles 
from the coasts of the continent.69  
In this case the presence of numerous islands wasn’t though the main consideration for 
the court. In fact, the islands didn’t play any important role at all, to the delimitation process. This 
was partly for the reason that none of the parties was very keen to raise the issue of the islands, 
maybe because almost all of them were parallel to the coasts, constituting an insular line not far 
away from the mainland, hence not affecting much the final demarcation line and the states’ 
access to the oil reserves of the area. Nevertheless, this doesn’t justify the court as it was its duty 
to take into account the fact that the area was dotted with many islands which should have had an 
effect on the delimitation of the continental shelf. Actually, the German islands of Borkum, 
Helgoland and Sylt could have had a considerable effect on the delimitation of the maritime 
boundaries. 
                                               
68 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, supra note 66, para. 18. 
69 See figure 2 of Annex D. 
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The islands could have constituted the outer points of the baselines and the points from 
which the equidistance line of the delimitation could have been measured, or otherwise the court 
should have explained the reasons for ignoring the existence of the islands. The court even 
though didn’t take into account the islands, it failed also to give the reasons for its stance. 
Thus, it is difficult to be understood the rationale of the court which ignored big and 
important islands such as Borkum, which was then a significant fishing harbor and it was 
inhabited by around three thousand people. “While some insular features may have little claim 
for extending substantially their metropolitan state’s natural prolongation those with communities 
upon them, or an economic life of their own, or having prime economic significance in maritime 
affairs, severally present quite different bases for continental shelf delimitations.”70 
The court avoided any discussion about the islands and the only reference to them made 
in paragraph 57 of its judgment where it stated that the maritime boundary could be delimited by 
means of the median line, “ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal projections, 
the disproportionally distorting effect of which can be eliminated by other means”. This 
statement though proves that the court didn’t consider the islands as belonging to the category of 
the “special/relevant circumstances”, considering them as having the same rights over the 
continental shelf as the mainland. 
So, contrary to its practice, the court nowhere in its judgment explicitly questioned the 
islands’ right to have a continental shelf of their own, but quite the opposite, its positive stance on 
the issue is proved from its position on the GCCS and especially the articles 1 – 3 of it. 
According to the court these three articles regarded as reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at 
                                               
70 E. Goldie, “The International Court of Justice “Natural Prolongation” and the Continental Shelf Problem of 
Islands”, 4 NYIL, 1973, p. 245.    
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least emergent rules of customary international law relative to the continental shelf.71 In addition, 
the court treated the article 1 as a unity, accepting therefore the rights of the islands over the 
continental shelf, a right which is binding for all the states, not only for those which had signed 
the GCCS, since it stems from the customary law. 
The customary nature of the articles 1 – 3 was supported also by many judges through 
their separate or dissenting opinions. The judge Padilla Nervo in his separate opinion supported 
the view that the three first articles of the GCCS were broadly declaratory of the existing 
international customary law.72 The customary law character of these articles is defended also by 
the judge Tanaka who stated in his dissenting opinion that “even those states which have not 
ratified or acceded to the convention (GCCS) could not deny the validity of these provisions 
against them. Denying the principles enunciated in Articles 1 – 3 would deprive the non – 
contracting states of the basis of all rights over their continental shelves”73. 
The customary nature of these articles and therefore the islands’ right to have a 
continental shelf of their own was supported also by other judges of the ICJ. The judge Lachs 
stressed the international states’ practice over the issue,74 while the vice – president Koretsky said 
that the principles and the rules of the GCCS had become general principles of the law75. Finally, 
the judge Sorensen concluded that “…as a result of a continuous process over a quarter of a 
                                               
71 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, supra note 66, para. 63. 
72 Separate Opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 96. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/52/5573.pdf 
73 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 179. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
docket/files/52/5579 .pdf?PHPSESSID=fc96a714e7809ba1075015a48d29f09f. 
74 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lachs, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 229. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/52/5583.pdf 
75 Dissenting Opinion of Vice – President Koretsky, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 157. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
docket/files/ 52/5577.pdf 
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century, the rules embodied in the GCCS have now attained the status of generally accepted rules 
of international law”76.  
It worth mentioning that during the presentation of the German – Denmark memorandum 
in the German parliament, the government of Germany stated that the maritime boundary 
between the two states is equidistant from the German island of Sylt and the Denmark 
promontory of Blaavandshik.77 This means that the two litigant parties intended to treat the 
islands in the same way as the continental lands, and in accordance with the conventional and 
customary law. 
Further elements of great importance for the islands’ continental shelf and for the 
median/equidistance line principle are found again in the separate and the dissenting opinions of 
the judges of the court. The judge Fouad Ammoun in his separate opinion supported that the 
delimitation could be done applying an equidistance line and taking into account a baseline 
starting from a point out of the island of Borkum up to a point out of the island of Sylt, 
undoubtedly supporting the article 6 of the GCCS and the islands’ right to have a continental self 
of their own.78 
In the same direction was also the dissenting opinion the judge Tanaka, who argued that 
the provision of the special circumstances in the delimitation processes, should be limited to such 
cases as the existence of insignificant islands, promontories, etc., which should be ignored in 
                                               
76 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sorensen, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 247. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/52/5585.pdf? PHPSESSID=fc96a714e7809ba1075015a48d29f09f 
77 J. Andrassy, “Application of the Geneva Convention, 1958, in Delimiting the Continental Shelf of the North Sea 
Area”, 23 REDI, 1967, p. 10. 
78 Separate Opinion of Judge Fouad Ammoun, ICJ Reports 1969, para 56 and attached map. Available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/51/5549.pdf?PHPSESSID=c216bbcf361633c404ea0fb03be0ea1a.   
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drawing the equidistance line.79 Thus, he supported also that the islands should be taken into 
account for the delimitation of the continental shelf.  
The judge Morelli held the same position. In his dissenting opinion he defended the 
median/equidistance line principle and the islands’ right to have a continental shelf of their own 
by saying that: “Even the case of the existence of an island or promontory which has an abnormal 
influence on the equidistance line, does not by any means constitute an exception, because such a 
circumstance does not in itself prevent the equidistance rule from operating.”80 
Finally, it’s obvious that also the judge Sorensen backed the islands’ right to have a 
continental shelf by asserting that the equidistance line principle should be applied in a 
mechanical manner. He went on saying that a narrow interpretation of the term “special 
circumstances” should be preferred because of its vagueness.81 We conclude therefore that 
geographical features such as the islands couldn’t be included in the judge’s “special 
circumstances” list, because otherwise it should be decided each and every time if an island 
belongs to the category of the “special circumstances” according to its size, location, population, 
etc., making the process not mechanical. 
As discussed before, in this case were introduced the equitable principles while at the 
same time the article 6 of the GCCS regarding the median/equidistance line principle, was 
degraded by the court. But how the court, even if it didn’t explicitly say it, left practically out of 
the delimitation process the islands, in the name of the equity?  
                                               
79 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, ICJ Reports 1969, supra note 73, p. 186. He also supported the value of the 
equidistance line principle because “…the equidistance principle is imperative to the concept of the continental shelf 
and no State can depart from it any more than it can from the concept itself. The equidistance rule is, alike the 
concept, a part of customary international law”, Ibid. p 184.  
80 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morelli, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 11, p. 207. Available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files /52/5581.pdf?PHPSESSID=fc96a714e7809ba1075015a48d29f09f.  
81 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sorensen, ICJ Reports 1969, supra note 76, p. 257 – 257.  
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The court accepted that the delimitation of the maritime boundaries couldn’t be a process 
of “completely refashioning nature” or “totally refashioning geography”82 but it seems that it did 
so by ignoring the existence of the islands by its judgment. In addition, the number, the location 
and the arrangement of the islands in the region can’t be described as “incidental special 
features”83 with strongly disruptive effects, as to be ignored by the court. Additionally, the court 
stated that the continental shelf constitutes the natural prolongation of the land into the sea and 
the rights of the coastal state over it exist ipso facto and ab initio,84 so how could the islands be 
deprived arbitrarily and without any justification of their rights? 
For the abovementioned reasons the decision of the court has been characterized as 
controversial, a kind of “distributive justice”85 and as “a decision ex aequo et bono, under the 
guise of interpretation”86. Even the vice – president of the court questioned the court’s practice as 
regards the issue of equity and he added that introducing “so vague a notion into the 
jurisprudence of the international court may open the door to making subjective and therefore at 
times arbitrary evaluations, instead of following the guidance of established general principles 
and rules of international law in the settlement of disputes submitted to the court.”87   
To conclude, the ICJ in the first judicial settlement of the continental shelf, failed to stay 
within the limits of the existing law rules and to consolidate them in the international 
jurisprudence. It confirmed the validity only of some existing provisions of the law, such as the 
articles 1 – 3 of the GCCS, recognizing therefore the islands’ rights over the continental shelf but, 
                                               
82North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, supra note 66, para. 91. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid. para. 19.  
85 W. Friedman, “The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: A Critique”, 64 AJIL, 1970, p. 236. 
86 Ibid. See also G. Tanja, The Legal Determination of International Maritime Boundaries, 1990, p. 75.  
87 Dissenting Opinion of Vice – President Koretsky, ICJ Reports 1969, supra note 75, p. 166. See also Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Tanaka, ICJ Reports 1969, supra note 73, p. 196.  “It may be said also that the Court seems, by this 
decision, to be making a legislative consideration on the apportionment of the continental shelf which is not of 
declaratory but of constitutive nature contrary to the concept of the delimitation and which has been denied by it.”  
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it established the equitable principles not only as the desirable end – state, but also as a method 
for the maritime delimitations, relegating at the same time the median/equidistance line principle 
which had been constituting until then, a conventional and to a degree a customary rule law. It set 
a precedent which has been followed for many years by the courts, increasing thereby the 
subjectivity and the uncertainty of the delimitations and undermining the authority of the 
international tribunals. Finally, regarding the islands, although the court didn’t expressis verbis 
question their rights, it treated them as inferior to the continental lands.          
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3.2 Anglo – French Continental shelf Delimitation (Arbitration, 1977) 
 
After several years of unsuccessful negotiations, the governments of the United Kingdom 
and France agreed in 1975 that the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries 
should be submitted to an ad hoc Court of Arbitration. Accordingly, the court delivered an initial 
decision on June 30, 1977 and a second one on March 14, 1978 after the UK’s request to amend 
the initial decision. The former decision was unanimous while the latter had a dissenting 
opinion.88  
The court decided that in the English Channel should be adopted the median line giving 
full effect to all the islands, including the Eddystone Rocks,89 except for the Channel and Scilly 
Islands to which it gave limited and half effect respectively as discussed below.   
The study of the court’s decision is particularly interesting because it was the first 
decision specifically addressing the issue of the islands’ continental shelf. The decision of the 
court came in a period of intense discussions within the context of UNCLOS III and tried to 
compromise the divergent views regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf, moving 
between the limits of the equitable principles and that of the median/equidistance line.  
During the court hearings the UK supported that the GCCS and especially the article 6 
could be used by the court while France opposed to that, arguing that the delimitation should be 
done by applying the customary law and the equitable principles. Moreover according to France 
even if the GCCS was considered as the applicable law, then the special circumstances of the area 
                                               
88 Arbitration between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic on the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf. Decisions of the Court of Arbitration dated 30 June 1977 and 14 March 1978. 
American Society of International Law, International Legal Materials. Vol. 18, No 2 (March 1979), pp. 397 – 494. 
Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20692032. 
89 “…the Court concludes that it should treat the Rock [Eddystone] as a relevant base – point for delimiting the 
continental shelf boundary in the channel.” Ibid. para. 144. 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                                  Court Decisions 
 
36 
 
rendered the median/equidistance line as an inappropriate method for the delimitation. Both of 
them though had agreed that the median line could be adopted by the court as the first step of the 
delimitation process between the opposite continents, with the exception of the Channel Islands’ 
area.90 
The Channel Islands are an archipelago of British Crown Dependencies in the English 
Channel, off the French coast of Normandy.91 They are consisted of the populated islands of 
Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney, Sark, Herm, Jethou and a number of islets and rocks, with some of 
them being inhabited. The total area of the islands is 195 km² and they have a population of about 
160,000. The islands are not part of the United Kingdom, but rather are possessions of the British 
Crown with independent administrations, but still their inhabitants are British citizens.92 
On the one hand, the UK supported that not only the article 6 of the GCCS but also the 
customary law provides for the continental shelf of these islands and proposed the application 
strictly of the median/equidistance line. According to the UK the islands couldn’t be considered 
as special circumstances due to their size and their economic importance and moreover the 
median/equidistance line was the method that could produce an equitable result.93 In addition, the 
existence of a separate government, legislature and courts, made the islands being semi – 
autonomous.  
On the other hand, France insisted on the special circumstances of the area and objected 
to the median/equidistance line as it couldn’t lead to an equitable result because it would reduce 
the continental shelf appertaining to France with a corresponding gain to the UK, wholly 
disproportionate to the size of the Channel Islands and to the length of their coasts. Furthermore, 
                                               
90 “They [the Parties] are agreed that throughout the English Channel where the coasts of the French Republic and 
the United Kingdom are opposite each other the boundary should, in principle, be the median line. They are in 
radical disagreement as to the appropriate method of delimitation in the Channel Islands region”. Ibid. para. 87.     
91 See figure 3 of Annex D. 
92 Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/7515502.stm, accessed on January 3, 2011.  
93 Court decision, supra note 88, para. 153. 
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it would sever the continental shelf of France into two separate zones.94 France therefore 
proposed that the Channel Islands should be encircled with a six – mile enclave boundary: three – 
mile territorial waters and three – mile continental shelf. France also supported that the islands 
were located within its territorial waters so it didn’t recognize the authority the court for the area 
between the islands and the coast of France. 
The court deemed that the Channel Islands belonged to the UK95 and concluded that it 
should treat them “…only as islands of the United Kingdom, not as semi – independent states 
entitled in their own right to their own continental shelf vis–à–vis the French Republic.”96 So 
presumably the court was of the opinion that autonomous islands have more rights over the 
continental shelf than the islands which belong to a continental state. But if this is the case, then 
the reasoning of the court is totally unfounded because both the conventional and the customary 
law provide for the right of the islands to have a continental shelf of their own, irrelevantly of 
their political status. 
Furthermore, even though the court explicitly stated that the delimitation process couldn’t 
be “…a question of completely refashioning nature…”97 it seems that it proceeded contrary to its 
statements during the delimitation. It asserted that if the islands hadn’t existed the continental 
shelf of the area would have accrued to France,98 but the islands did exist and they had rights over 
the continental shelf. Moreover the court seems that tried to apportion the areas of the continental 
                                               
94 Ibid. para. 161.  
95 “…the legal position of the Channel Islands in regard to maritime jurisdiction appears to confirm that, in matters 
relating to the continental shelf, it is the United Kingdom Government which is the responsible authority, both 
internally and externally”. Ibid. para. 186.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid. para. 101.  
98 Ibid. para. 196.  
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shelf, trying to make equal what nature created unequal.99 If this isn’t distributive justice then 
what is it?  
It also stated that even if the delimitation had been done according to the GCCS and not 
according to the customary law, then again the islands would have been considered prima facie 
as constituting special circumstances because of their vicinity to the French coast.100 It failed 
though to explain how the islands can be deprived of their entrenched rights due to their location 
and why they don’t have prima facie a continental shelf and later in a second stage to be 
examined the existence of any special circumstance, hence maybe reducing their effect over this 
continental shelf. The approach of the court wasn’t fair for the islands and the judgment doesn’t 
seem to be impartial but rather it was an attempt from the court to find the “golden mean” 
between the claims of the two litigant parties.  
The court finally decided that the Channel Islands should be encircled with a twelve – 
mile enclave boundary to the north and north – west, respecting the previously established twelve 
– mile fishery zone of the islands and declared that it wasn’t competent under the Arbitration 
Agreement to delimit the boundary in the narrow belt east and south of these Islands.101 
The court didn’t explain the rationale of its judgment: why twelve and not for example 
fifteen – mile zone around the islands? In fact, the court didn’t recognize any continental shelf at 
all for the islands. The UK had stressed the possibility to extend its territorial waters from three to 
twelve miles and had asked the court to respect its right to do so.102 The twelve – mile territorial 
waters zone had started to be consolidated within the UNCLOS III and within the customary law 
                                               
99  Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. para. 202.      
102 Ibid. para. 179. 
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through the practice of various states103 and the court knew about this fact.104 So in practice, the 
court with its judgment deprived the Channel Islands of their right to have a continental shelf and 
gave them only a twelve – mile zone of territorial waters. 
The other part of the court decision that has to do with the islands, is that which refers the 
Scilly Isles. These Isles is an archipelago of five inhabited islands and numerous other small 
rocky islets (around 140 in total) 28 miles off the southwestern tip of the Cornish peninsula of the 
UK, with a total population of just over two thousand.105 In this case the court used the 
median/equidistance line giving half effect to the islands of Scilly as it considered that they 
constituted special circumstances. 
The characterization of the islands as special circumstances was done by the court not 
only because they were islands but also for the reason that they were related with the Cornish 
promontory which according to the court it had the “…tendency to distortion of the equidistance 
line, as the projection of an exceptionally long promontory, which is generally recognized to be 
one of the potential forms of special circumstance …[and which] constitute an element of 
distortion which is material enough to justify the delimitation of a boundary other than the strict 
median line”.106 These islands were then arbitrarily regarded as being the continuation of the 
Cornish peninsula into the sea and their effect over the median/equidistance line had to be 
reduced. 
The half effect came up from the comparison of two distances: the distance between the 
UK’s mainland and the Scillies and that between the French mainland and the island of 
                                               
103 “State practice would suggest that such a rule has emerged”. M. McRae, “Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
between the United Kingdom and France: the Channel Arbitration”, 15 CYIL, 1977, p. 189.  
104 Court decision, supra note 88, para. 187. 
105 Available at: http://www.scillyonline.co.uk/. Accessed on January 4, 2011.  
106 Court decision, supra note 88, para. 244. 
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Ushant107. Since the former is twice the latter the court considered that the half effect of the 
Scillies and the full effect of the Ushant would lead to an equitable result. The court again didn’t 
justify its rationale: so if twice the distance means half effect does four times the distance mean 
one fourth effect? Does it mean then that the remote islands have no effect at all? It seems that for 
the sake of “equity” the courts sometimes can think very creatively. 
In this case the court tried to marry the conventional and the customary law and to apply 
the median/equidistance line principle together with the equitable principles. Moreover, it tried to 
reconcile as much as possible the claims of the two states by apportioning equal shares to both of 
them. In general terms and compared with that of 1969, the 1977 court decision can be 
characterized as a positive step towards the restoration of normality and the establishment of a 
degree of predictability in the delimitation processes. The same though isn’t true for the islands 
which were treated as inferior to the continental lands. They came again in second place and 
deprived, either partially or even completely, of their rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
107 The island of Ushant (Quessant) located 14 miles off the Brest peninsula and has around 2500 inhabitants. See 
figure 3 of Annex D. 
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3.3 Continental Shelf Delimitation between Iceland and Jan Mayen (Conciliation   
      Commission, 1981) 
 
In 1979 Iceland established a 200 – mile exclusive economic zone around its country and 
in addition it asserted that it was also entitled to a continental shelf in Jan Mayen Ridge which is 
an underwater area south of the Norwegian island of Jan Mayen and beyond the 200 – mile limit 
of the Icelandic EEZ.  
Jan Mayen is a volcanic island, located in the North Atlantic Ocean, 513 miles west of 
Norway, 324 miles north of Iceland and 246 miles west of Greenland. It is 55 Km long, has a 
maximum width of 15 Km and its area is 377 Km2. It has no indigenous inhabitants but on the 
island stay a number of personnel who are running a navigation station and a meteorological 
station. Also on the island work the people who maintain the island’s infrastructure such as the 
buildings, roads, airstrip, power station and so on. Usually there are around 18 – 20 people who 
spend the winter on the island, but the population may double during the summer, when heavy 
maintenance is performed. Personnel serve either six months or one year, and are exchanged 
twice a year in April and October.108  
Jan Mayen Ridge is an area beyond the 200 – mile exclusive economic zone of Iceland, 
and back then there were indications that it might contain exploitable oil deposits. It’s worth 
noting that the Icelandic exclusive economic zone was already extending in a considerable area 
beyond the median/equidistance line between Iceland and Jan Mayen.109 Since no agreement was 
                                               
108 Available at: http://www.jan-mayen.no/ and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ 
jn.html, accessed on January 6, 2011.  
109 See figure 4 of Annex D. 
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reached between the two countries, they agreed to refer to a Conciliation Commission110 which 
was established under the Agreement of 28 May 1980.111 The Commission was set up on 16 
August 1980 and was asked to make its unanimous recommendations to the governments of the 
two states. These recommendations were not to be legally binding on the Parties.112  
The Conciliation Commission submitted its recommendations in May 1981. The 
Commission bearing in mind Iceland’s strong economic interests in these areas and the fact that 
Iceland was totally dependent on imports of hydrocarbon products,113 recommended that 
although no new boundary line might be established between Iceland and Jan Mayen as the 
continental shelf boundary beyond Iceland’s 200 – mile EEZ limit, a specific area for joint 
development should be established.  
The area proposed by the Commission comprises some 45,475 Km2, out of which the part 
north of the 200 – mile exclusive economic zone line comprises 32,750 Km2 and the area south 
of the line comprises 12,725 Km2.114 As a result, Iceland could be entitled to acquire a 25% 
interest in joint venture arrangements or other forms of exploitation in the area north of the 200 – 
                                               
110 The procedure provided for in article 33, para. 1, of the Charter of the UN: “The parties to any dispute, the 
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek 
a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies 
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” Available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/ 
charter/chapter6.shtml.  
111 The Conciliation Commission consisted of three members: one nominated by Iceland, another by Norway and the 
third, who was the chairman, was agreed upon between the Parties. Chairman was the then leader of the USA 
delegation to UNCLOS III and members were the leaders of the respective delegations of Iceland and Norway. P. 
Jagota, Maritime Boundary, 1985, p. 165.      
112 Report and Recommendations to the Governments of Iceland and Norway of the Conciliation Commission on the 
Continental Shelf Area between Iceland and Jan Mayen, p. 7. Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/ 
vol_XXVII/1-34.pdf. 
113 “…the Commission shall take into account Iceland’s strong economic interests in these sea areas, the existing 
geographical and geological factors and other special circumstances.” and “Iceland is totally dependent on imports of 
hydrocarbon products.” Ibid. p. 7 and p. 24.  
114 Ibid. p. 25.  
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mile EEZ line and more or less, the same was the case for Norway in the area which falls south of 
the 200 – mile EEZ line of Iceland.115 
The study of this case it’s interesting not only because it has to do with the delimitation of 
the continental shelf between a continental state and an island but also it is particularly interesting 
because of the nature of Jan Mayen as an island. Thus the first question that should be answered 
by the Commission was if Jan Mayen was indeed an island and if it could “sustain human 
habitation or economic life of its own”, according to the article 121 of the UNCLOS which at that 
time had almost been finalized. The case is also interesting for the inventive solution that the 
Commission proposed to the parties. 
As regards the first issue Iceland tried to relegate the island to the category of the rock 
stating that Jan Mayen “…was simply a small protuberance on the Iceland’s continental shelf”, 
but contrary to its arguments it had measured the breadth of its EEZ from its outlying, tiny 
islands such as Hvalbakur and Kolbeinsey, upgrading therefore for its own interests the status of 
the small islands.116 
In addition, the UNCLOS definition (article 121, para. 1) of the term “island” wasn’t 
something new in the international law; actually the very same definition had been existed in the 
article 10 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,117 and 
undoubtedly it was also part of the customary law. Regarding the paragraph 3 of the same article 
according to which “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own 
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”, there are two remarks opposing to 
Iceland’s arguments.  
                                               
115 Ibid. pp. 30 – 33. 
116 R. Churchill, “Maritime Delimitation in the Jan Mayen Area”, 9 Marine Policy, 1985, pp. 19 – 20. 
117 “An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.” Available 
at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_territorial_sea.pdf.  
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First, the aforementioned article states that only “rocks” with specific features can’t be 
entitled to a continental shelf, but can an island of such magnitude as Jan Mayen be described as 
a rock? Secondly, the fact that Jan Mayen didn’t sustain back then human habitation or economic 
life of its own, didn’t necessarily mean that wasn’t possible such a possibility. In fact there were 
many reports that in the past some groups of hunters had wintered on the island without outside 
support.118      
Consequently it wasn’t a surprise that the Commission turned down the argument of 
Iceland that the Jan Mayen Ridge was the natural prolongation of its landmass, concluding also 
that the article 121 of the UNCLOS draft “…reflects the present status of international law on 
this subject. …[so] Jan Mayen must be considered as an island. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 121 
are thus applicable to it. Therefore, Jan Mayen is entitled to a territorial sea, an economic zone 
and a continental shelf. … Articles 74 and 83 concerning delimitation are also applicable.”119 
The second interesting issue about this case has to do with the proposal of the 
Commission per se, which by the way, was totally accepted by the two states with their bilateral 
agreement that was signed in October 1981 and came into force in June 1982.120 Hence, Iceland 
established two identical maritime zones: the EEZ and that for the continental shelf, with a 
breadth of 200 – miles. In addition, the two states could jointly exploit a particular region on both 
sides of their common maritime boundary, potentially rich in oil reserves. This case therefore 
brought to the fore an alternative approach, highlighting the prospect of joint management and co 
– exploitation of the natural resources of a sea area, hitherto unprecedented in the international 
practice.      
                                               
118 H. Tzimitras, The Continental Shelf of Islands in International Jurisprudence, 1997, p. 70 (in Greek).  
119 Report, supra note 112, p. 10.  
120 The Agreement is available at: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/9/2/2438.pdf.  
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Here it should be stressed however the good neighborly relations of the two states and 
their dedication to find a mutually accepted solution to their dispute. One of the tasks of the 
Conciliation Commission was to promote the cooperation and the friendly relations between the 
two countries. In this respect it was free to apply not only legal criteria but also it could take into 
account other considerations such as the economic interests, in order to reach to a solution.121 
Nonetheless, this case can constitute a precedent for those countries that seek to solve their 
differences in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, but not for those that have fundamental 
different views as to the appropriate solution. There the recourse to the international judicial 
bodies appears to be the only feasible solution. 
As a final point, it should be noted the particular value of this case for the islands. It was 
confirmed the rule that the islands are entitled by definition to a continental shelf and this still 
applies even if they are uninhabited, desolate, barren or remote from the mainland. However, the 
particular characteristics of the islands may act in a second stage of the delimitation so as to 
reduce accordingly their effect on the continental shelf, in order to be achieved an equitable 
result. In this regard “the treatment of islands in the Jan Mayen case … seem to constitute a 
useful and persuasive precedent in other maritime delimitation disputes involving barren and 
remote islands, of which there are quite number.”122 
 
 
 
 
                                               
121 Ibid. p. 4.  
122 R. Churchill, supra note 116, p. 26. 
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3.4 Tunisia – Libya Continental Shelf Delimitation (ICJ, 1982) 
 
On February 24, 1982 the ICJ delivered its judgment by 10 votes to 4, for the case 
concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between Tunisia and Libya.123 Under the 
special agreement between the parties, the court had to decide on the principles and rules of 
international law applicable for the delimitation of the continental shelf appertaining to them. 
Moreover, the court according to the agreement had to take its decision according to the 
“equitable principles”, and the “relevant circumstances” of the area, as well as according to the 
hitherto accepted trends in the UNCLOS III. Also, the court was further requested to clarify the 
practical method for the application of these principles and rules in that specific situation, so as to 
enable the experts of the two countries to delimit the continental shelf without any difficulty.124 
As neither Tunisia nor Libya was a contracting party to the GCCS,125 the two states asked 
the court to apply in this case the customary law, adopting at the same time the interpretation that 
the ICJ had made to it in the case concerning the North Sea continental shelf delimitation. Thus, 
the litigant parties referred to the terms “equitable principles” and “relevant circumstances” of the 
area, which was the terminology that the court had used in 1969. Moreover they requested from 
the court to take into account the accepted trends in the UNCLOS III, most probably because the 
parties had understood that the almost complete convention would express the universally 
accepted Law of the Sea and it would actually crystallize all the existing customary law rules.126 
                                               
123 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18. Available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/63/6267.pdf.  
124 ICJ Pleadings, Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Vol. 1, article 1. Available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/63/9511.pdf.   
125 I.C.J. Reports 1982, supra note 123, para. 36.  
126 The Court declared that “…the Court would have had proprio motu to take account of the progress made by the 
Conference even if the Parties had not alluded to it in their Special Agreement; for it could not ignore any provision 
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Recognizing the value of the draft UNCLOS both states should have all together acknowledged 
therefore the islands’ right to have a continental shelf of their own, a right guaranteed by both the 
conventional and the customary law. It is noted that the ICJ in 1969 had confirmed the customary 
nature of the article 1 of the GCCS and therefore the islands’ right to have a continental shelf.  
Tunisia indeed stressed the fact that the presence of a number of islands was a factor that 
the court ought to take into consideration127 but Libya argued that the Tunisian islands were 
insignificant and therefore they shouldn’t play any role at all, to the delimitation process.128 
Moreover Libya quarreled with the application of the equidistance method saying that in that case 
that method would be “…inequitable and inappropriate.”129    
The court initially accepted that “…the presence of the island of Jerba and of the 
Kerkennah Islands and the surrounding low – tide elevations is a circumstance which clearly calls 
for consideration”130 but right after this statement it unexplained excluded the island of Djerba 
from the delimitation process stating that “…The practical method for the delimitation to be 
expounded by the court hereafter is in fact such that, in the part of the area to be delimited in 
which the island of Jerba would be relevant, there are other considerations which prevail over the 
effect of its presence; the existence and position of the Kerkennah Islands and surrounding low – 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the draft convention if it came to the conclusion that the content of such provision is binding upon all members of 
the international community because it embodies or crystallizes a pre – existing or emergent rule of customary law.” 
I.C.J. Reports 1982, Ibid. para. 24. See also the separate opinion of Judge Jimenez de Arechaga who in para. 32 
supports that the trends “…must be, or have become, rules of customary international law.” Available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/63/6275.pdf?PHPSESSID=5012316907cd0b81c9d4634f8331c408 
127 Memorial of Tunisia, pp. 12 – 13. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=c4& 
PHPSESSID=5012316907cd0b81c9d4634f8331c408&PHPSESSID=5012316907cd0b81c9d4634f8331c408&case=
63&code=tl&p3=90.  
128 “…in arriving at the general direction of the coastlines, the Island of Djerba invites omission, since it is clearly an 
exceptional feature and its inclusion would introduce irrelevant complications. Similarly, the Kerkennah Islands 
should be excluded since they occupy little more than 180 square kilometers". I.C.J. Reports 1982, supra note 123, 
para. 79. 
129 Memorial of Libya, para. 149. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/63/9517.pdf.  
130 I.C.J. Reports 1982, supra note 123, para. 79. 
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tide elevations, on the other hand, are material.”131 The court though didn’t clarify its reasoning 
and didn’t provide the considerations which prevail over the effect of the presence of such an 
important island as Djerba. This finding of the court was extremely unfortunate and its legality is 
very questionable. 
The court later on in its decision, considered the Kerkennah islands as relevant 
circumstances and concluded that they should been given partial effect. It stated that “The 
relevant circumstances…to be taken into account in achieving an equitable delimitation include 
the following:…the existence and position of the Kerkennah Islands.”132 They “constituting by 
their size and position a circumstance relevant for the delimitation, and to which the court must 
therefore attribute some effect.”133  
The Island of Djerba (or Jerba) has an area of 514 Km2 and it is the largest island of North 
Africa, with a population of around 60,000. The island is located very close to the mainland and 
between it and the mainland are shallow waters inappropriate for general navigation. During the 
law – tide the island almost unites with the promontory of Zarzis. The Kerkennah archipelago 
consists of two main islands and a number of smaller islands with a total area of 160 Km2 and a 
population of around 14,000. The Kerkennahs lie 11 miles to the east of the mainland but are 
virtually a continuation of the mainland by virtue of the extreme shallowness of the waters 
separating them from the mainland. Navigation in the passage between the islands and the 
mainland is difficult and only possible for small crafts.134 
Taking into account the geographical, demographical and the economical realities of the 
islands it is concluded that both, the island of Djerba and the Kerkennahs should have been given 
                                               
131 Ibid.  
132 Ibid. para. 133. 
133 Ibid. para. 128.  
134 Ibid. 
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full effect regarding the continental shelf. This was the usual practice between the states135 and in 
addition the fact that the islands were within the – would become – 12 miles Tunisian territorial 
waters, could have made them the outer edge of the straight baselines from which the breadth of 
the maritime zones should have been measured.136 This would be also in accordance with the 
international law and the jurisprudence of ICJ. For instance, for the Fisheries Case between the 
UK and Norway the ICJ had decided in 1951 that Norway could use straight baselines which 
were drawn at the outer edges of the islands and the small islets (skjaergaard) which were close to 
the coast of the mainland.137 Besides, this practice had already been incorporated in the article 4 
of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.138    
The court finally apart from completely disregarding the island of Djerba as if it hadn’t 
been existed, gave half effect to the Kerkennah islands. The exact wording of the court regarding 
the effect of the Kerkennahs on the demarcation line was as follows: “One possible technique for 
this purpose, in the context of a geometrical method of delimitation, is that of the “half – effect” 
or “half – angle”. Briefly, the technique involves drawing two delimitation lines, one giving to 
the island the full effect attributed to it by the delimitation method in use, and the other 
                                               
135 See for example the agreement on the maritime boundary in the gulf of Manaar and the bay of Bengal (India – Sri 
Lanka, 1976), the agreement concerning the delimitation of the CS between Iran and Oman (1974), the treaty 
concerning the delimitation of the CS under the North Sea (Netherlands – Germany, 1971), the treaty concerning the 
delimitation of the CS in the Baltic Sea (Poland – Germany, 1968) and the agreement on the delimitation of the CS 
between Italy and Yugoslavia (1968).    
136 “…an islet should be prima facie entitled to recognition of its own coasts as a component of a baseline for 
demarcation of seabed boundaries if any portion of the islet lies within 24 nautical miles of the coast of its owner’s 
mainland or major island. This is because the island’s 12 – mile contiguous zone merges with the 12 – mile 
contiguous zone of the larger land territory, the two thus forming an envelope encompassing both.” C. Ely, “Seabed 
Boundaries between Coastal States: the Effect to be given to ‘Islets’ as ‘Special Circumstances’”, 6 International 
Lawyer, 1972, p. 219. See also H. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International Law, 1990, p. 478: “…the 
general academic opinion indicates that islands within the 12 miles should be granted full weight”.     
137 “…it is the outer line of the "skjaergaard" which must be taken into account in delimiting the belt of Norwegian 
territorial waters.” Fisheries Case, Judgment of December 18th, 1951: ICJ Reports 1951, p. 166, p. 128. Available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/5/1809.pdf.     
138 “In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands long the coast in 
its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the 
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/ 
instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_territorial_sea.pdf.  
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disregarding the island totally, as though it did not exist. The delimitation line actually adopted is 
then drawn between the first two lines, either in such a way as to divide equally the area between 
them, or as bisector of the angle which they make with each other, or possibly by treating the 
island as displaced toward the mainland by half its actual distance therefrom.”139 In other words 
the court drew a line between the Kerkennahs and the mainland which was used as the baseline 
for the measurement of the continental shelf.140  
The rationale of the court is difficult to be understood. How it completely omitted from 
the delimitation process a whole island such as Djerba which is almost part of the mainland and it 
is nearly twice as big as Malta? Why did it give half effect to the Kerkennah Islands which are 
virtually located in the Tunisia’s territorial waters? Moreover, the fact that in the area there were 
the Italian islands141 which on the one hand were very smaller than the Tunisian islands and on 
the other hand they had been taken into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf 
between Italy and Tunisia,142 strengthen the argument that the Tunisian islands should have had a 
better treatment by the court.    
“Such a decision which issued without any reasonable justification, is certainly contrary 
to the equitable principles and the law itself…it is proved finally that the handling of the case by 
the court was contrary not only with the generally accepted principles of international law on the 
subject, but even contrary to its own findings.”143 Moreover, as another scholar commented on 
the court decision “…giving only half effect to the Kerkennahs…was an unwarranted 
                                               
139 I.C.J. Reports 1982, supra note 123, para. 129. 
140 See figure 5 of Annex D. 
141 These are the islands of Pantelleria, Lampedusa and the tiny islets of Linosa and Lampione. See the relevant map, 
I.C.J. Reports 1982, supra note 123, p. 36. 
142 Ibid. para. 20. 
143 M. Stavrinos, The Problem of the Aegean Continental Shelf, 1986, p. 156 (in Greek).   
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refashioning of the geography of the Tunisian coastline, the equity of which is surely 
questionable.”144    
The Judge Evensen in his dissenting opinion argued that “Disregarding completely these 
[promontory of Zarzis and island of Djerba] special characteristics of very relevant sections of 
the Tunisian coastline and only giving half effect to the Kerkennah Archipelago is in my 
respectful opinion a refashioning of nature which is neither warranted in law nor by the facts, nor 
is the disregard of such important geographical features equitable.”145 He concluded by saying 
that the court decision “…is not warranted in law and does not correspond to equity.”146 
The judge Gros in his dissenting opinion held that “Islands separated from the coast by an 
area of shoals less than 12 miles wide, which is the case of the Kerkennahs, are not an abnormal 
geographical feature and must be employed as base points for lines of delimitation.”147 
The ruling of the court has been characterized again by many scholars as distributive 
justice and as an effort to apportion the continental shelf of the area in both states. For example 
the professor Charney supported that “…it appears that the boundary line adopted by the court 
divides in half the water area between the claims of the parties. This fact, viewed in the context of 
the gap in the court’s analysis, gives the impression that splitting the difference was the court’s 
prime objective.”148 
It seems from the above analysis that in this case the islands were misjudged by the court. 
The fact that the islands belonged only to one Party confute the argument of the court that it 
wanted to achieve equity. Equity for example could have been achieved by the mutual exclusion, 
                                               
144 D. Hodgson, “The Tuniso – Libyan Continental Shelf Case”, 16 CWRJIL, 1984, p. 30.  
145 Dissenting opinion of Judge Evensen, para. 17. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/63/6281.pdf.  
146 Ibid. para. 18.  
147 Dissenting opinion of Judge Gros, para. 14. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/63/6277.pdf?PHPSE 
SSID=5012316907cd0b81c9d4634f8331c408 
148 J. Charney (ed.), “ICJ Decision in the Libya – Tunisia Continental Shelf Case”, 76 Proceedings of the ASIL, 1982, 
p. 155.  
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from the delimitation process, of all the relevant geographical features of both parties in an 
attempt to balance up a given situation. Besides, a decision based on equity is separated by a 
decision ex aequo et bono by a very thin line. It appears that in this case the court crossed this 
line and moved beyond the limits of the law. The exclusion of an island from the delimitation 
process as non – existent and the attribution of half effect to others is nothing more than a 
refashioning of nature and contradicts with the law, both customary and conventional.   
Another point to note is the stance of the court regarding the median/equidistance line 
principle. The court rejected the application of this principle without explaining in depth the 
reasons for that. It declared that the “…equidistance is not, in the view of the court, either a 
mandatory legal principle, or a method having some privileged status in relation to other 
methods”149 and concluded that the median/equidistance line is just a “factor” of the desirable 
equitable result.150 “The court went much further in this case to downgrade the equidistance 
method than had the tribunals in the North Sea and Anglo – French disputes.”151 “Thus, the 
equidistance ‘principle’, already relegated to the category of method by the Anglo – French 
Continental Shelf Arbitration, became, in 1982, no more than a ‘factor’.”152 
In this case the court had the opportunity to distance itself from the 1969 ruling. It had the 
chance to clarify the applicable law regarding the delimitation processes and to interpret the 
provisions of the UNCLOS in such a way as to be established clear and undisputed delimitation 
rules. The court though fell short of the expectations. It increased the subjectivity of the 
delimitations and decreased the possibility of predicting the outcome of any future case. This has 
been probably the most misguided court ruling concerning the maritime delimitations and has 
                                               
149 I.C.J. Reports 1982, supra note 123, para. 110. 
150 Ibid. para. 126. 
151 J. Charney, supra note 148, p. 163. 
152 L. Herman, “The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away: An Analysis of the Tunisia – Libya Continental Shelf 
Case”, 33 ICLQ, 1984, p. 835.  
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been harshly criticized by many scholars. It was the apotheosis of relativity and the “case by 
case” approach regarding the application of the law, for the delimitation of the continental 
shelf.153         
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
153 C. Rozakis, In Search of the Lost Time: The Law of the Continental Shelf in the Decision of the International 
Court of Justice for the Libya – Malta Case, 1989, p. 29 (in Greek). See also H. Tzimitras, supra note 118, p. 159.    
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3.5 Canada – USA (Gulf of Maine) Maritime Boundary Delimitation (ICJ, 1984) 
 
On October 12, 1984 the Chamber of the ICJ154 delivered its judgment by 4 votes to 1, for 
the case concerning the maritime boundary delimitation between Canada and the USA.155 The 
parties by their Special Agreement had asked the court to delimit a single maritime boundary that 
would divide the continental shelf and the exclusive fishery zone of the two Sates in the area of 
the Gulf of Maine. The parties requested therefore from the court not only to define the rules of 
the delimitation but also to draw the maritime boundary between the two states. Thus, in this case 
the court had to delimit a single boundary for two different zones, or in other words, a common 
marine and submarine boundary. 
The first problem that the court had to answer was that of the applicable law in this case. 
The two states had signed the GCCS and consequently its provisions could have been applied for 
the solution of their dispute, but this was true only for the part concerning the continental shelf. 
By signing the Geneva Convention the two states had recognized the right of the islands to have a 
continental shelf of their own, as well as the validity of the article 6 of the same convention 
regarding the delimitation method. Moreover as stated before, the customary nature of the articles 
1 – 3 of the GCCS was an unquestioned fact. Nonetheless, the issue here was primarily about the 
other half of the dispute, i.e. the delimitation of the exclusive fishery zone. The delimitation of a 
single boundary meant that the court had to take into account those criteria that were common for 
both zones.  So the court “…rule[d] out the application of any criterion found to be typically and 
                                               
154 This was the first time that a dispute of this kind was submitted to a Chamber of the ICJ, instead of the Plenary 
Court. The procedure provided for in the articles 26 – 31 of the Statute of the ICJ. According to article 27 “A 
judgment given by any of the chambers … shall be considered as rendered by the Court.” Available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_I.   
155 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246. 
Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/67/6369.pdf.  
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exclusively bound up with the particular characteristics of one alone of the two natural realities 
that have to be delimited in conjunction.”156 
The court clarified that if it had to delimit only the continental shelf between the two 
states and if there weren’t any special circumstances dictating the usage of another method, then 
there would be no doubt as to the mandatory application of the median/equidistance line 
method.157 So “had the dispute been limited to a continental shelf delimitation, however, the 
Chamber would have been under an obligation to apply the provisions of the article 6”158 of the 
Geneva Convention. The court therefore took a clear stance regarding the GCCS and by 
extension positioned itself for the rights of the islands.  
In the Gulf of Maine there are some islands and numerous islets and rocks. The most 
important of them, which are going to be discussed in the next paragraphs, are the Canadian 
islands of Cape Sable and Seal and the USA island of Nantucket.  
Nantucket Island is located 30 miles south of Cape Cod. The permanent population of the 
island is approximately 10,000 and it has an area of 124 km2. Cape Sable Island is located at the 
southernmost point of the Nova Scotia peninsula. In the past it was separated from the mainland 
by the narrow strait but it has been connected to it by a causeway since 1949. It covers about 40 
km2 and has a population of close to 4,000. It forms the eastern limit of the Gulf of Maine, 
opposite Cape Cod. The island of Seal is located some 13 miles south – west of the Nova Scotia 
peninsula. It is 2.5 miles long, has an area of around 4 Km2 and it is practically uninhabited.159  
Canada initially supported the application of the median/equidistance line, as it was 
depicted in the article 6 of the GCCS, but a year later, right after the decision of the Court of 
                                               
156 Ibid. para. 193.  
157 Ibid. para. 118. 
158 G. Tanja, supra note 86, p. 218.  
159 See figure 6 of Annex D. 
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Arbitration regarding the Anglo – French continental shelf delimitation, reneged on its thesis and 
proposed a median/equidistance line that wouldn’t take under consideration the Cape Cod, as 
well as the USA’s islands of Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard. It considered these geographical 
features as special circumstances which they shouldn’t have had any effect at all on the 
delimitation line, invoking again the ‘special circumstances’160 of the same article, as well as the 
equitable principles, as they had been outlined by the arbitral tribunal in the Anglo – French 
case.161 
It contended that if Cape Cod and Nantucket Island were taken into account, they would 
have a disproportionate and inequitable effect upon the course of a median/equidistance line 
boundary. These features would attract a sea area too large in comparison with their land 
territory. It further argued that the ratio between the land area of these features and the sea area 
that they would attract was 1 to 8.4.162 It seems therefore that Canada changed its attitude, not 
only because of its commitment to the law, but because of its ulterior motives. The decision of 
1977 gave it the opportunity and the law grounds to claim a broader area in the Gulf of Maine, at 
the expenses of the USA.  
The USA in contrast, didn’t refer to the conventional law (i.e. the GCCS) but put 
emphasis on the equitable principles163 and proposed a number of these principles that the 
delimitation process should be based on.164 According to these equitable criteria, a delimitation 
                                               
160 “The circumstances in question were the projections seawards of the exceptionally long peninsula of Cape Cod 
and the islands of Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard, added to the marked protrusion of the United States coastline 
southeast of Boston; the delimitation line should therefore be an equidistance line drawn without reference to these 
coastal projections.” Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, supra note 155, para. 71. 
161 Ibid. para. 71.    
162 Canada Counter – Memorial, para. 708. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/67/9599.pdf.  
163 “The cardinal principle in delimiting a single maritime boundary is that the delimitation shall be in accordance 
with equitable principles, taking account of the relevant circumstances in the area, to produce an equitable solution.” 
USA Memorial, para. 8. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/67/9597.pdf.  
164 “Among the equitable principles to be applied to produce an equitable solution in a single maritime boundary case 
are: (1) principles regarding the relationship between the relevant coasts of the parties and the maritime area lying in 
front of those coasts, including nonencroachment, proportionality, and (where applicable) natural prolongation; (2) 
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method that ignores the islands, yields the maritime area lying in front of their coasts to another 
state, which in practice is nothing more than the encroachment of one state over the area of 
another. The USA didn’t make any distinction between mainland and islands stating that “in the 
view of the United States, there is no justification in international law for discounting the effect to 
be given to Cape Cod and Nantucket Island in determining the maritime boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine area…[they are] of great historical, political and economic importance to the United 
States, [and they] do not constitute distorting projections.”165 Unlike its islands though, the USA 
disregarded the Canadian islands of Seal and Cape Sable and it went further and considered even 
the Nova Scotia peninsula as a special circumstance.166 
The court concluded as regards to the applicable law that the “…delimitation is to be 
effected by the application of equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable of 
ensuring, with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and other relevant 
circumstances, an equitable result.”167 Again, the court rejected the application of the 
median/equidistance line as unsuitable for this case.168 According to the court, the application of 
the equitable principles adapted to the relevant circumstances of the case, was consistent with the 
previous rulings of the courts and compliant with the UNCLOS.169 The court however failed to 
define those fixed rules and principles that govern the demarcation process, preserving once 
again the subjectivity and the uncertainty of the delimitations. 
                                                                                                                                                        
the principle of conservation and management of the resources of the area; (3) the principle of minimization of the 
potential for international disputes; and (4) the general principle that delimitation should take account of the relevant 
circumstances in the area.” Ibid. para. 238. 
165 Ibid. para. 160.  
166 Ibid. para. 286. 
167 I.C.J. Reports 1984, supra note 155, para. 112.  
168 Ibid. para. 209 – 211. The Judge Gros defends the median/equidistance line principle throughout his dissenting 
opinion. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/67/6375.pdf.   
169 I.C.J. Reports 1984, supra note 155, para. 91 – 96. 
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The court indeed accepted that “there has been no systematic definition of the equitable 
criteria that may be taken into consideration for an international maritime delimitation, and this 
would in any event be difficult a priori, because of their highly variable adaptability to different 
concrete situations. Codification efforts have left this field untouched.”170 The court therefore 
didn’t try to clarify the applicable law and proceeded just by adding some more criteria in the 
never – ending list of the equitable principles.    
In this case the court highlighted the importance of geography as an equitable criterion 
and especially its role as a common denominator for the dual delimitation. In this context the 
court underlined “…the necessity of granting some effect, however limited, to the presence of a 
geographical feature such as an island or group of small islands lying off a coast…”.171 But what 
was finally the ruling of the court, regarding the islands? 
The court accepted the USA’s island of Nantucket and the Canadian island of Cape Sable 
to be the two most advanced basepoints for the delimitation, giving therefore full effect to 
them.172 This was also in accordance with the final position of the parties, as both of them had 
accepted the rights of these two islands, before and during the court hearings. Furthermore, it 
gave half effect173 to the Seal Island (together with its smaller neighbor, Mud Island) because 
according to the court it couldn’t be totally ignored because of its dimensions and more 
particularly because of its geographical position.174  
Finally the court “…point[ed] out the potential disadvantages inherent in any method 
which takes tiny islands, uninhabited rocks or low – tide elevations, sometimes lying at a 
                                               
170 Ibid. para. 157. 
171 Ibid. para. 198. 
172 Ibid. para. 225. 
173 The delimitation line is constituted of three different parts. One part of it (i.e. delimitation of opposite coasts) 
coincides with the median line giving half effect to the island of Seal. See Ibid, Technical Report.     
174 Ibid. para. 222 and Technical Report.     
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considerable distance from terra firma, as basepoint for the drawing of a [demarcation] line…”175 
It went on saying that “If any of these geographical features possess some degree of importance, 
there is nothing to prevent their subsequently being assigned whatever limited corrective effect 
may equitably be ascribed to them, but that is an altogether different operation from making a 
series of such minor features the very basis for the determination of the dividing line, or from 
transforming them into a succession of basepoints for the geometrical construction of the entire 
line.”176 
Judging from the result, it seems that in this case the court was fair with the islands. It 
gave full effect to the relatively big, populated islands, half effect to the smaller, uninhabited 
islets and no effect at all to the tiny islets which actually can be characterized as rocks. However, 
the objection here is about the procedure, or to put it another way, the rationale of the court isn’t 
again convincing enough. Why for example did it give half effect and not let’s say one fourth 
effect to the island of Seal? Why the median/equidistance line couldn’t be used throughout the 
delimitation? Why the court selected to use these particular ‘equitable’ criteria for the 
delimitation and not some other?  
The ICJ failed to provide those clear – cut rules governing the delimitations, and in 
particular these of the continental shelf. Moreover, the right of the islands to have a continental 
shelf of their own should have been taken for granted by the court from the very first moment, 
without any vacillation or doubt, especially since the two states were contracting Parties to the 
GCCS. In addition, the median/equidistance line should have been used, at least, as the first step 
of the delimitation process and later on, in the light of any special circumstances, the importance 
of the islands could have been reassessed reducing if necessary their effect.  
                                               
175 Ibid. para, 201. 
176 Ibid. 
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Instead of following the safe path of the established law, the court opted to wander again 
in the realm of the equitable principles and sought to resolve the dispute applying ambiguous 
criteria. Was this due to the twofold objective of the delimitation? If that which affected all the 
process was the fact that the court had to delimit simultaneously two maritime zones, then the 
modus operandi of the court could be to some extent understood and justified.     
 
 
 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                                  Court Decisions 
 
61 
 
 
3.6 Guinea – Guinea Bissau Maritime Boundary Delimitation (Arbitration, 1985) 
 
On February 14, 1985, the ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal consisting of three members of the 
International Court of Justice issued its unanimous decision concerning the delimitation of the 
maritime boundary between Guinea and Guinea – Bissau.177 Since the Franco – Portuguese 
Convention of 1886178 didn’t establish a maritime boundary between the two adjacent states179 
and since the attempts to reach a negotiated settlement had proved unsuccessful, the two states 
agreed in 1983 to submit their dispute to a binding Arbitration Tribunal. As a result of the 
arbitration, Guinea and Guinea – Bissau were among the first African nations that settled their 
maritime boundaries. 
With their agreement the two states requested from the court to determine in accordance 
with “the relevant rules of international law”, the course of the boundary between the “maritime 
territories” appertaining to each of them.180 Both Parties invoked as “relevant rules of 
international law”, the customary law, the previous judicial and arbitral decisions and the various 
conventions concluded under the UN auspices. They also invoked the relevant provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1958, particularly those concerning the territorial sea and the continental 
shelf, though neither state was a contractual party to any of these conventions. As to the 
UNCLOS, although it wasn’t yet in force (Guinea – Bissau had signed it), both Parties mentioned 
                                               
177 Arbitration Tribunal for the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea – Bissau. Award 
of 14 February 1985. International Legal Materials, Vol. 25 No 2, March 1986, pp. 251 – 307. Available at: http://0-
www.jstor.org.library.bilgi.edu.tr/stable/20692951. 
178 Guinea was a French Colony till October 2, 1958 and Guinea – Bissau a Portuguese Colony till September 24, 
1973. Ibid. pp. 263 – 264.    
179 After a relevant question from the parties, the court indeed ruled that the Franco – Portuguese Convention of 1886 
didn’t establish a maritime boundary between the two states (Franco – Portuguese possessions at that time). 
According to the court, the line laid down in the aforementioned convention had no other purpose than to designate 
the Portuguese islands and not to determine the exact maritime boundary of the two former colonies. Ibid. p. 288. 
180 Article 2 of the Bilateral Agreement. Ibid. pp. 255 – 256. 
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several of its provisions which they considered to be consistent with the evolution of the 
international custom.181 It is concluded therefore that the dispute had to be resolved on the basis 
of the international customary law as neither party was bound by any Convention. The 
aforementioned conventions and treaties were the general guidelines for the court and their 
provisions could be applied as far as they were the crystallization of customary law rules.  
The court declared that its aim was to find an equitable solution in accordance with the 
spirit of the UNCLOS. It stated that “For the Tribunal, the essential objective consists of finding 
an equitable solution with reference to the provisions of Article 74, paragraph 1, and Article 83, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention of 10 December 1982 on the Law of the Sea. This is a rule of 
international law which is recognized by the Parties and which compels recognition by the 
Tribunal. However, in each particular case, its application requires recourse to factors and the 
application of methods which the Tribunal is empowered to select. This nevertheless does not 
mean that the Tribunal is endowed with discretionary powers or is authorized to decide ex aequo 
et bono. Its findings must be based on considerations of law.”182 
Furthermore, the term “maritime territories” that the Parties used, was referred to the 
delimitation of the territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The 
two states asked therefore the court to define a single maritime boundary that would include all 
these zones. This meant that the arbitral tribunal had to take into account those criteria that were 
common for the delimitation of the marine and submarine zones.183   
                                               
181 The tribunal concluded that it should also consider those rulings of the ICJ that were relevant to the case under 
discussion. It stated that “The tribunal must consider these factors, which the International Court of Justice took into 
account in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the Tunisia/Libyan case and the Gulf of Maine case, (I.C.J. Reports 1974, 
pp. 23, paragraph 53, and 192, paragraph 45; 1982, pp. 37 – 38, paragraph 23 – 24; 1984, p. 294, paragraph 94).” 
Ibid. p. 272.  
182 Ibid. p. 289.  
183 Ibid. p. 272. 
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For this delimitation the presence of numerous islands, the vast majority of which 
belonged to Guinea – Bissau, played a crucial role as they were one of the most distinctive 
geographical features of the region.184 The court distinguished three types of islands in order to 
determine their effect on the delimitation line. So according to the court, in the area there were 
the following categories of islands:  
“a) The coastal islands, which are separated from the continent by narrow sea channels or 
narrow water courses and are often joined to it at low tide, must be considered as forming an 
integral part of the continent.  
 b) The Bijagos Islands, the nearest of which is two nautical miles from the continent and 
the furthest 37 miles, and no two of which are further apart than 5 miles, can be considered, if the 
12 – mile rule accepted by the Parties is applied, as being in the same territorial waters as each 
other and as being linked to those of the continent.  
 c) There are also the more southerly islands scattered over shallow areas (Poilao, Samba, 
Sene, Alcatraz), some of which may be taken into account for the establishment of baselines and 
be included in the territorial waters. Although it cannot be denied that, somehow or other, the 
delimitation must leave to each state the islands over which it has sovereignty, it nevertheless 
remains that, in the search for the general criteria to be applied, it is above all the islands in 
categories (a) and (b) that are considered as relevant.”185 
The court concluded that a critical element that would determine the delimitation process 
was the configuration and the length of the coasts of the two states. It stated that for the 
evaluation of each country’s coastline, the coastal islands and the Bijagos Archipelago should be 
taken into account but not the scattered islands belonging to the third category above. It also 
                                               
184 See figure 7 of Annex D. See also a detailed description of all the islands in the region made by the court, Ibid. 
pp. 264 – 265. 
185 Ibid. pp. 291 – 292.  
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pointed out that the relevant islands must not be taken into account by merely adding together 
their perimeters, but as elements determining the general direction of the entire coastline of the 
country considered. The coastlines without the islands were 154 and 128 miles long for Guinea 
and Guinea – Bissau respectively, but the Tribunal ruled that the total coasts of the two states 
had, more or less, the same length because of the Guinea – Bissau’s islands, which were 
balancing the difference in the length of the mainland’s coasts.186 Thus, the court in this case took 
account of the islands and indisputably confirmed their importance. 
During the court hearings Guinea claimed that the maritime boundary should be delimited 
in a way that it would constitute roughly an extension of the land boundary of the two states into 
the sea. It opposed to the application of the equidistance line and stated that if an equidistance 
line was finally used then it shouldn’t take into account the Bijagos Archipelago. In contrast, 
Guinea – Bissau, in the written pleadings, supported the application of the equidistance line and 
later on, during the oral procedure it added that the equidistance method should take into account 
all the relevant circumstances so that to be achieved an equitable solution. Moreover, due to the 
fact that the proposed equidistance line was passing south of the Alcatraz Rock, leaving it to 
Guinea – Bissau side, Guinea – Bissau proposed that the Guinea’s islet should be encircled with a 
two – mile enclave boundary.187 
The court positioned itself for the method that should be applied stating that “The 
Tribunal itself considers that the equidistance method is just one among many and that there is no 
obligation to use it or give it priority, even though it is recognized as having a certain intrinsic 
value because of its scientific character and the relative ease with which it can be applied. The 
method of delimitation to be used can have no other purpose than to divide maritime areas into 
                                               
186 Ibid. pp. 292 – 293. 
187 Ibid. pp. 261 – 263 and 294 – 295. 
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territories appertaining to different states, while doing everything possible to apply objective 
factors offering the possibility of arriving at an equitable result. Such an approach excludes any 
recourse to a method chosen beforehand. On the contrary, it requires objective legal reasoning 
and the method to be used can come only as a result of this.”188 It stated also that there was no 
question of changing the nature and that as far as possible any cut – off effect or enclavement 
should be avoided.189 
Finally, the court decided to leave Alcatraz Islet to the Guinea side of the maritime 
boundary and to give it “…2.25 nautical miles of territorial waters to the north…”, as there 
wasn’t any reason, according to the court, to give it more extensive territorial waters in that 
direction, since the 2.25 miles marked the maximum claim of Guinea. In addition, the court 
considered it equitable to grant the islet the 12 miles provided for in the UNCLOS, at least 
towards the west.190  
The rest of the maritime boundary was delimited in a way giving full effect to the coastal 
islands and the Bijagos Archipelago. The court therefore in this case addressed the issue of the 
islands with an exemplary manner. Its ruling was in accordance with the international law and the 
international practice and at the same time it somehow redressed the injustice of the previous 
courts. As for the scattered islands which were disregarded during the delimitation process, it 
should be noted that they were actually uninhabited small islets or rocks. Moreover, if they had 
been taken into account their distortive effect on the delimitation line would have been too great 
in comparison with their importance. In addition, the court was fair to the litigant parties as it 
excluded mutually from the process the islands of both of them. 
                                               
188 Ibid. p. 294. 
189 Ibid.  
190 Ibid. p. 298. 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                                  Court Decisions 
 
66 
 
Another point that should be underscored is the fact that the court accepted the customary 
nature of the rule according to which the territorial waters of a state can be extended up to 12 
miles. This is proved by the fact that the court applied this rule even if the UNCLOS hadn’t come 
yet into force and moreover its provisions couldn’t in any way be binding upon the parties as 
Guinea hadn’t signed it. This rule applied even for Alcatraz islet which as stated before was an 
isolated, outlying rock. 
To end with, if someone wanted to find a weak point to the court reasoning, this wouldn’t 
be other than that of the application of the equidistance line method. As mentioned above, the 
court rejected the equidistance line as the primary method for the delimitation and by extension 
its mechanical application, but in its place, it extolled the equitable principles as the basis for any 
delimitation process. Yet it didn’t elaborate on those other methods that could be applied so that 
to be achieved the equitable result. With its stance, the whole delimitation process appeared more 
like an attempt by the court to apportion the “maritime territories” than an effort to delimit them. 
To this end, the arbitral tribunal, once again, didn’t manage to promote the objectiveness and 
improve the predictability of the future courts decisions.  
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3.7 Libya – Malta Continental Shelf Delimitation (ICJ, 1985) 
 
On June 3, 1985 the ICJ issued its decision for the case concerning the delimitation of the 
continental shelf between Libya and Malta, by 14 votes to 3.191 This case was different from the 
previous cases that the ICJ had tried, as it was the first time that the court had to delimit 
exclusively the continental shelf between states with opposite coasts. Besides, the Libya – Malta 
case is very interesting for this study because the ICJ delimited the continental shelf between a 
continental and an insular state, or to put it another way, between a mainland and a group of 
islands.192 
The two states agreed that the dispute had to be resolved on the basis of the international 
customary law, because on the one hand only Malta was a contractual Party to the GCCS and on 
the other hand, although both of them had signed the UNCLOS, it hadn’t come yet into force. 
Consequently, the court had to issue its decision under the umbrella of equity/equitable principles 
and to take under consideration all the relevant circumstances.193 
The court applied the median line (ignoring Filfla as a basepoint) as the first step of the 
delimitation. As a second step, and in the light of the relevant circumstances as they determined 
by the court, it transposed the provisional line northward in order to produce an equitable 
result.194 The circumstances and factors that were taken into account in achieving an equitable 
delimitation were the following:  
                                               
191 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 13. Available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf.  
192 Malta covers around 315 Km2 in land area and it is consisted of four inhabited islands (Malta, Gozo, Comino, 
Cominotto) and one tiny uninhabited islet (Filfla). Ibid. para. 15.   
193 Ibid. para. 29.  
194 Ibid. para. 73. See figure 8 of Annex D. 
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“(1) The general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, their oppositeness, and their 
relationship to each other within the general geographical context. 
 (2) The disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts of the Parties and the distance 
between them. 
 (3) The need to avoid in the delimitation any excessive disproportion between the extent 
of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal state and the length of the relevant part of 
its coast, measured in the general direction of the coastlines.”195 
The fact that the court applied the median line, even only as a provisional line, was a 
breakthrough for the jurisprudence. The court “…noted that the equitable nature of the 
equidistance method is particularly pronounced in cases where delimitation has to be effected 
between states with opposite coasts… But it is in fact a delimitation exclusively between opposite 
coasts that the court is, for the first time, asked to deal with. It is clear that, in these 
circumstances, the tracing of a median line between those coasts, by way of a provisional step in 
a process to be continued by other operations, is the most judicious manner of proceeding with a 
view to the eventual achievement of an equitable result… Thus, under existing law, it must be 
demonstrated that the equidistance method leads to an equitable result in the case in question.”196 
Although the court denied that the median line had a preferential status in international 
law, it undoubtedly upgraded it. The ICJ accepted that it could, at least, be the first step of the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between states which are geographically opposite. The 
provisional median line could be modified under the light of the special circumstances of each 
particular case, so that to be achieved finally an equitable result. Thus, the reasoning of the court 
doesn’t seem to be much different than the logic of the article 6 of the GCCS. It appears therefore 
                                               
195 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, op. cit. para.79. 
196 Ibid. para. 62, 63.  
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that after many years of wandering, the jurisprudence began to return back to the safe principles 
that the previous tribunals had rejected. The assumption of the court that the median line could be 
a starting point for the delimitation of the continental shelf was certainly a turning point in the 
international jurisprudence.  
The right of the islands to have a continental shelf of their own is closely related with the 
median/equidistance line principle. This principle as it has been stated before protects the islands 
from arbitrary decisions and safeguards their rights. The fact that one of the two opposite states 
was an island didn’t prevent the court to apply the median line method. Quite the opposite, the 
court’s argumentation about the median line was general and it didn’t discriminate against the 
islands. The consolidated right of the islands to have a continental shelf of their own was 
therefore reaffirmed by the court and the possibility to be characterized prima facie as special 
circumstances was avoided. On the contrary, the islands have prima facie a continental shelf and 
in a second stage is examined the existence of any special circumstance, so that the provisional 
median line may be adjusted accordingly. 
The court rejected the landmass argument of Libya as a relevant geographical 
consideration. Libya contended that a state with a greater landmass should have more rights over 
the continental shelf. The court though didn’t accept Libya’s argument and stated that “Landmass 
has never been regarded as a basis of entitlement to continental shelf rights, and such a 
proposition finds no support in the practice of states, in the jurisprudence, in doctrine, or indeed 
in the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.”197 It went on saying 
that “What distinguishes a coastal state with continental shelf rights from a landlocked state 
which has none, is certainly not the landmass, which both possess, but the existence of a maritime 
front in one state and its absence in the other. The juridical link between the state’s territorial 
                                               
197 Ibid. para. 49. 
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sovereignty and its rights to certain adjacent maritime expanses is established by means of its 
coast. The concept of adjacency measured by distance is based entirely on that of the coastline, 
and not on that of the landmass.”198 It should be noted that the rejection of Libya’s argument is 
very important for the islands, which are generally lacking in landmass and consequently a 
possible adoption of such an argument by the court would have brought them in a second place in 
comparison to the continental lands.  
Another issue that the court had to address was the establishment of the baselines that 
should be taken into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf. Malta had adopted a 
system of straight baselines which they included the islet of Filfla. The court however denied to 
take account of Filfla in the calculation of the provisional median line as it found it inequitable, 
stating that the court could in any case choose basepoints which were different from that of the 
coastal state. It concluded by saying that “…the equitableness of an equidistance line depends on 
whether the precaution is taken of eliminating the disproportionate effect of certain ‘islets, rocks 
and minor coastal projections’…”.199 The court repeated here the phrase ‘islets, rocks and minor 
coastal projections’ which it had firstly used in the 1969 decision. It failed though to explain 
cogently why it rejected the island of Filfla from the delimitation process. This island is less than 
5 Km away from the other islands and it is not totally detached from them. Was the fact that it 
was uninhabited? Or was the fact that it was too small to be considered an island and therefore 
the court considered it a rock? 
The court dealt also with the fact that Malta was an island state. The two countries agreed 
that the entitlement to a continental shelf should be in principle the same for an island as for a 
mainland. Libya however supported that although there should be no distinction between an 
                                               
198 Ibid.  
199 Ibid. para. 64. 
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island state and an island politically linked with a mainland state, when it comes to the 
continental shelf delimitation, all the islands might be treated in a particular way, as was the case 
for the Channel Islands. Malta quite the reverse stated that island states should have a privileged 
status in comparison to islands politically linked to a mainland state, but only for purposes of 
continental shelf delimitation. In Malta’s view, the international law gives full effect to island 
states – a right stemming from the principle of the equality of states – and varying effect to 
dependent islands, depending on such factors as size, geographical position, population or 
economy. The court took a clear stance on this issue stating that “…it is not a question of an 
‘island state’ having some sort of special status in relation to continental shelf rights”.200 
Another point that is going to be discussed in this study is the unprecedented finding of 
the court about the ‘general geographical context’. Instead of seeing the two states as they 
actually were and merely delimit the area between them, it looked into the wider region and 
considered them as parts of some broader geographical formations. The court saw Malta as part 
of Europe and Libya as part of Africa and ostensibly attempted to delimit the continental shelf 
between the two continents, seeing Malta as a small island or rock of Europe.  It characteristically 
stated: “In the present case, the court has also to look beyond the area concerned in the case, and 
consider the general geographical context in which the delimitation will have to be effected. The 
court observes that that delimitation, although it relates only to the continental shelf appertaining 
to two states, is also a delimitation between a portion of the southern littoral and a portion of the 
northern littoral of the Central Mediterranean. If account is taken of that setting, the Maltese 
islands appear as a minor feature of the northern seaboard of the region in question, located 
substantially to the south of the general direction of that seaboard, and themselves comprising a 
very limited coastal segment. From the viewpoint of the general geography of the region, this 
                                               
200 Ibid. para. 52 – 54. 
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southward location of the coasts of the Maltese islands constitutes a geographical feature which 
should be taken into account as a pertinent circumstance; its influence on the delimitation line 
must be weighed in order to arrive at an equitable result.”201  
It appears that the courts sometimes, due to their result – oriented approach, can be very 
inventive trying to justify their actions and make their final decision seem not as taken before – 
handed, but as being the output of a thorough and a well – based process. So in this case because 
‘there is to be no question of refashioning geography’ the court broadened it. In this general 
geographical context the islands of Malta appeared as a relatively small feature in a semi – 
enclosed sea. Thus, although the court didn’t deny the geographical realities, it integrated them in 
a greater geographical context, reducing therefore their importance. 
Perhaps due to its problematic reasoning the court tried to rationalize its decision so that 
not to be characterized as an ex aequo et bono, or even due to the lack of authorization, a contra 
legem decision.202 So the court tried to prove that it acted within the limits of the law highlighting 
once again the importance of the equitable principles and using them as a pretext for any possible 
criticism. The recourse though to equity leaves a lot of questions answered. For example, what 
criteria did the court apply in order to adjust the median line and move it to its final position? Did 
it really treat the same way the insular with the continental lands, or rephrasing it, did it treat the 
same way two sovereign states?  
In brief, the positive aspects of this case were definitely the shift of the court regarding the 
median line and the emphasis that it put on geography. The negative aspects continue to include 
                                               
201 Ibid. para. 69. 
202 The court wanting to prove that it acted within the limits of the law repeated the expression that it had used in 
1982: “the legal concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable as law”. Thus, no matter what criteria it 
may use, since they fall in the category of “equity” the court’s decisions can’t be characterized as ex aequo et bono 
or contra legem judgments. Ibid. para. 45. 
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the court’s decided views for the islands and its failure to contribute to the establishment of 
general and objective rules governing the maritime delimitations. 
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3.8 Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and France (Arbitration, 1992) 
 
On March 30, 1989 following a series of unsuccessful negotiations, Canada and France 
signed an agreement by which they established a Court of Arbitration to carry out the 
delimitation of the maritime areas appertaining to them, around the islands of St. Pierre and 
Miquelon, off the coasts of Canada. The two states by another agreement signed in 1972 had 
partially delimited their maritime areas but in view of the differences between them, the two 
states hadn’t completed the delimitation. The court had to keep the maritime boundary 
established by the aforementioned agreement and to continue the delimitation, by drawing a 
single boundary for all the maritime zones. The court issued its decision on June 10, 1992 by a 
narrow majority of 3 votes to 2.203 
St. Pierre and Miquelon is an archipelago of eight French islands in the North Atlantic 
Ocean. The main islands are St. Pierre (26 km2) and Miquelon, which in fact consists of two 
islands (Great Miquelon and Little Miquelon or  Langlade) that are connected with a narrow 
sandy strip (total 216 km2). Collectively the area of the islands is 242 km2 and the total coastline 
is 120 Km long. St. Pierre is separated from Miquelon by a 3.2 miles strait. Their distance north – 
south from Newfoundland is 32 miles. The islands are even closer to Burin Peninsula, which is 
situated just 13 miles to the east. In addition, Green Island, which belongs to Canada, is located 
about halfway between the southern part of Miquelon and Newfoundland at only 6 miles from 
                                               
203 Court of Arbitration for the Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and France: Decision in Case 
Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas (St. Pierre and Miquelon). International Legal Materials, Vol. 31, No 5, 
September 1992, pp. 1145 – 1219. Available at: http://0-www.jstor.org.library.bilgi.edu.tr/stable/20693736. 
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both Miquelon and St. Pierre. The population of the islands is around 6,000 inhabitants the vast 
majority of whom live in St. Pierre.204 
On the one hand, France based its arguments on two basic principles: the principle of 
equality of sovereign states and the principle of the equal capacity of islands and mainland to 
generate maritime areas. On these grounds it argued that the delimitation should take place on the 
basis of the equidistance line, as it was stipulated in the article 6 of the GCCS. Moreover, it 
invoked the article 121 (3) of the UNCLOS under which “rocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf” and asserted that in no way could these islands be classified as rocks, taking into account 
their size, population and economic activities. In contrast though to its arguments, France drew 
the proposed equidistance line ignoring almost completely the Canadian island of Sable, as it 
considered this inhabited, outlying island, a “Geographical accident” which had a 
disproportionate distortive effect upon the course of the equidistance line.205 In addition, the 
position of France appears in this case to be radically different from that it had supported a few 
years before in the Anglo – French case, where France had proposed that the Channel Islands 
should have been encircled with a six – mile enclave boundary.  
On the other hand, Canada contended that the dispute should be settled on the basis of the 
equitable principles and asserted that the French islands should be entitled only to a zone of 
territorial waters and they should be deprived of all the other maritime zones. It invoked a 
criterion according to which the delimitation should be based on the comparative coastal lengths 
in order to be avoided disproportionate results. It also tried to prove that the small isolated 
                                               
204 USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, available at: www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/geos/sb.html. See also Ibid. pp. 1159, 1160 and figure 9 of Annex D.  
205 H. Tzimitras, supra note 118, p. 181. See also G. Politakis, “The French – Canadian Arbitration around St. Pierre 
and Miquelon: Unmasked Opportunism and the Triumph of the Unexpected”, 8 IJMCL, 1993, p. 124, who states: “It 
is indeed surprising how similar it sounds the French reasoning a propos the island of sable with analogous remarks 
of the Canadian side concerning St. Pierre and Miquelon”.   
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depended islands, unlike the island states, should have partial effect and limited rights over the 
maritime zones and adduced the examples of the Anglo – French and the Libya – Malta cases to 
support its claims. Moreover, it argued that the international practice as well as, the previous 
courts decisions had given, in general partial effect to the islands but, due to the fact that the 
islands in question were too far from the continental France206 and for the reason that they were 
actually superimposed on the Canadian continental shelf, their effect should be reduced to zero.  
According to Canada, all the continental shelf off its coasts belonged to it and if any 
continental shelf was awarded to the French islands this would be actually done at the expenses 
of the Canadian continental shelf.207 It invoked the principle of non – encroachment which meant 
that the delimitation should leave to Canada the areas that constituted the natural prolongation or 
seaward extension of its coasts, avoiding therefore any cut – off effect of them. Canada’s position 
was though entirely unfounded in international law, since in reality Canada didn’t recognize the 
right of the islands to have a continental shelf of their own, an entrenched right in both the 
conventional and the customary international law. 
In general, Canada’s approach was degrading for the islands, but it seems that Canada 
actually refuted its own arguments which it had used in the Gulf of Maine case. There, Canada 
had rejected the USA’s argument according to which some coasts should be considered as 
‘primary’ and others as ‘secondary’, so that the former would be regarded as of greater 
importance than the latter for the delimitation purposes.208 
                                               
206 Canada characteristically stated that the French islands were actually not only at the wrong side of the median line 
but at the wrong side of the ocean. Canadian Memorial p. 172. 
207 Decision of the Court of Arbitration, supra note 203, p. 1164. 
208 I.C.J. Reports 1984, supra note 155, para. 36. See also ibid. p. 1200. 
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The court rejected the claims of both Parties as being “exaggerated”.209 In the view of the 
court there were no grounds for contending that the extent of the maritime rights of an island 
depended on its political status. It stated that no distinction in this respect had been made by 
Article 121 of the UNCLOS or by the corresponding provisions of the Geneva Conventions.210 
Moreover, it rejected the Canadian proposal according to which the islands should be confined in 
an enclave, giving them only territorial waters, by saying that “The French islands have a coastal 
opening towards the south which is unobstructed by any opposite or laterally aligned Canadian 
coast. Having such a coastal opening, France is fully entitled to a frontal seaward projection 
towards the south until it reaches the outer limit of 200 nautical miles, as far as any other segment 
of the adjacent southern coast of Newfoundland. There is no foundation for claiming that St. 
Pierre and Miquelon frontal projection in this area should end at the 12 mile limit of the territorial 
sea.”211 With the above statement the court actually answered also to the Canadian assertion that 
the French islands were superimposed on the Canadian continental shelf.212 
The court declared that all the coasts had an equal title, no matter if they were continental 
or insular and rejected the notion of ‘relative reach’ according to which the seaward projection of 
the coasts were relative to their length. Canada had claimed that coasts of limited length should 
have a correspondingly diminished prolongation as against longer coasts. The court answering to 
this argument stated that “…the difference in length of all the relevant coasts of the Parties is an 
important factor to take into account for an equitable delimitation, in order to avoid 
                                               
209 Decision of the Court of Arbitration, supra note 203, para. 49, p. 1165. 
210 Ibid. para. 64 – 65, p. 1169. See also para 52, p. 1165, 1166, where the court rebutted the argument of Canada 
which questioned the rights of the French islands. The court stated that “Without comparing and even less equating 
the economic or political significance of the territories involved in this case, it must be concluded, from a strictly 
legal point of view, that Newfoundland, although much larger in size than Saint Pierre and Miquelon, is equally an 
island which does not enjoy the status of a politically independent or semi – independent.” 
211 Ibid. para. 70, p. 1170. 
212 See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weil who states that even for the delimitation of the CS the geological 
or geophysical factors of the seabed should be excluded, in favor of the distance method. Ibid. pp. 1214 – 1215. 
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disproportionate results and, subsequently, to test the equitableness of the solution finally 
adopted…[but] the court cannot accept the contention that particular segments of coast may have 
an increased or diminished projection depending on their length. The extent of the seaward 
projections will depend, in every case, on the geographical circumstances; for example, a 
particular coast, however short, may have a seaward projection as far as 200 miles, if there are no 
competing coasts that could require a curtailed reach.”213 The criterion of proportionality could 
be therefore an equitable criterion, but the ratio of coastal lengths couldn’t be of itself 
determinative for the maritime delimitations.214 
The court concluded that the delimitation should be done in accordance with the equitable 
principles, taking into account all the relevant circumstances, in order to be achieved an equitable 
result.215 The court again put emphasis on geography but it neither determined what equitable 
criteria it would apply nor specified the relevant circumstances that were affecting the 
delimitation. Again in this case, the delimitation of a single boundary for all the maritime zones 
meant that the court had to take into account those criteria that were common for all the zones. 
Having regard to all these factors, the court proceeded with the delimitation. It divided the area 
around the islands in two different sectors: the western and the south sector, since according to 
the court’s view the islands had a varying effect over the delimitation line, depending on the 
sector.216 
For the western sector the court awarded to St. Pierre and Miquelon a 12 – mile territorial 
sea and an additional 12 – mile contiguous zone, noting that the seaward extension beyond the 
island’s territorial water, unavoidable involved some degree of encroachment and cutting off of 
                                               
213 Ibid. para. 44 – 45, p. 1164.  
214 Ibid. para. 63, p. 1168. 
215 Ibid. para. 38, p.1163. 
216 Ibid. para. 66 – 74, p. 1169. 
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the Canadian seaward projections. In the northwestern area of this sector, where the distance 
between the French islands and the Canadian coast was less than 48 miles, was adopted the 
median line. 
For the south sector which according to the court, was 10.5 miles in width, there was no 
obstruction to a full coastal projection of 200 miles and therefore the French islands were 
awarded with all the maritime zones, in their entirety.  Additionally, in the southeastern area the 
islands were awarded only with a 12 – mile zone of territorial waters.217 
Undoubtedly, the solution given by the court was in any case strange and unprecedented. 
It introduced the notion of the ‘frontal projection’ of the coasts which in turn produced a 
mushroom shape delimitation line. Consequently, it was severely criticized even by the very 
judges of the case. The judge Weil for example in his dissenting opinion referring to the ‘frontal 
projection’ said: “I fail to understand how the majority of the court could have endorsed this 
strange theory…A maritime projection…[is not only]…perpendicular to the general direction of 
the coastline… It radiates in all directions, creating an envelope of ocean around the coastal front. 
In a word, it is radial.”218  
The legality of the decision is also questionable. The aforementioned judge said that 
“…the delimitation in the strange form of a mushroom…does not seem to me a result achieved 
‘on the basis of law’.”219 In addition, the judge Gotlieb criticizing the court’s decision stated that 
according to him “…the judgment is not in accordance with international law... The solution 
…fails to employ equitable principles and fails to reach an equitable result.”220 Finally, another 
                                               
217 Ibid. 
218 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weil in Ibid. p. 1200. 
219 Ibid. p. 1197. 
220 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gotlieb. Ibid. p. 1181. 
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scholar commenting on the shape of the delimitation line, noted that “…the construction of a 
corridor, resembles more an ex aequo apportionment than the application of legal principles”221 
The court again in this case didn’t explain its reasoning and left many questions 
answered: how did the concept of the ‘frontal projection’ come up? Don’t all the coasts, 
including those of the islands, generate the same rights all around them, in a radial manner? Why 
did the court give a 24 – mile zone to the islands in the western sector and a 12 – mile zone to the 
southeastern area and not more or even less? Did the court give more weight to the applicable 
criteria (proportionality, non – encroachment, avoidance of cut – off) than the basic entitlement 
of the islands to maritime zones? 
At first sight though, the rights of the islands in this case were in principle recognized and 
reaffirmed by the court. The islands were awarded to some extent with all the maritime zones, as 
it happens with the continental lands. Even in this extreme case where some small islands were 
located far beyond of their mainland, to a very close distance with another state, these islands 
weren’t deprived of their entitlements, at least at the side of the open sea. Undisputedly their 
gains were limited as regards the actual marine areas that attributed to them, but they weren’t in 
principle discriminated, against the continental lands. Nowhere the court accepted the argument 
that some insular coasts can be classified as second class coasts with fewer rights than the 
continental coasts. Thus, in theory the rights of the islands were recognized, but the final 
delimitation line shows that the views of the court weren’t completely implemented in practice.      
However, the solution given by the court proved also another rule: the courts decisions 
can be imaginative and totally unpredictable. Nobody could have foreseen before the ruling of the 
court that such a strange delimitation could take place. After this decision though, everyone 
                                               
221 G. Marston, “St. Pierre – Miquelon Arbitration. Canada – France Maritime Delimitation Award”,17 Marine 
Policy No 3, May 1993, p. 170. 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                                  Court Decisions 
 
81 
 
understood how volatile the delimitation processes could be. Such is indeed the volatility, that it 
seems sometimes that the courts move beyond the limits of the law. The whole process 
sometimes appears to be more a political affair than a legal matter. “…all judicial bodies appear 
to have [been] engaged in a political operation of apportioning satisfaction, striving for innocuous 
compromises, instead of [issuing] rigid legal verdicts.”222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
222 G. Politakis, supra note 205, p. 134. 
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3.9  Maritime  Delimitation  in  the  Area  between  Greenland  and  Jan  Mayen  
       (ICJ, 1993) 
 
Norway delimited its maritime boundary with Iceland around the Jan Mayen Island in 
1981 after the proposals of the Conciliation Commission, as discussed in the section 3.3 above. 
The maritime dispute though between Norway and Denmark was settled by the ICJ, after a 
unilateral application of Denmark.223 The court delivered its judgment by 14 votes to 1, on June 
14, 1993 by which it was established a single maritime boundary for both the continental shelf 
and the fishery zones of Denmark and Norway, in the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen.224  
The distance between Jan Mayen and Greenland is 246 miles and therefore their full 
extended maritime zones would overlap each other. The two countries had radical opposite views 
as regards the appropriate settlement of their dispute. On the one hand, Denmark asserted that 
Greenland was entitled to a continental shelf and a fishery zone extending 200 miles from the 
baselines of Greenland leaving therefore to Jan Mayen merely the residual part, while on the 
other hand, Norway supported the application of the median line between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen, for both zones. 
The court stated that it would initially examine separately the two zones and it would 
draw two different lines, one for each zone, and in a second stage it might merge them into one. It 
                                               
223 Both Countries had accepted in general the authority of the ICJ and therefore according to article 36, para. 2 of 
the Statute of the ICJ, the court could try a dispute without the existence of a special agreement between the litigant 
parties. The aforementioned article is as follows: “The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare 
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting 
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. 
any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation.” Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_II.   
224 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38. 
Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/78/6743.pdf.  
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declared that for the delimitation of the continental shelf it would apply the conventional law, 
namely the article 6 of the GCCS, which was binding upon the two countries as both of them 
were contractual Parties to the Geneva Convention. For the fishery zone it would apply the 
relevant provisions of the international customary law.225  
It should be noted that this was the first time that a court explicitly stated that the 
delimitation of the continental shelf should be done on the basis of the article 6 of the GCCS. Till 
then, apart from the Anglo – French case where the provisions of this article were partially 
applied, in all the other cases either one or more of the litigant states hadn’t signed the GCCS or, 
even if they had signed it, the delimitation of a single boundary for all the zones had prevented its 
application. According to the court, the median line would have been used, even if the 
delimitation had taken place on the basis of the customary law. Thus, after years of controversy, 
the ICJ upgraded the median line principle and indirectly but clearly, tried to integrate it in the 
customary law.226 It is noteworthy that the court reused in this case, the term “equidistance 
principle”.227  So after a long period in which the equidistance/median line was considered as one 
of the methods of even a factor for the delimitations, it seems here that it was reinstated to its 
proper position. 
The fact that the court upgraded the median line didn’t necessarily mean that it would 
dogmatically apply it. This principle could have been applied in a mechanical manner, on the 
premise that there weren’t any special circumstances indicating another line as more appropriate. 
                                               
225 Ibid. para. 44. 
226 “Thus, in respect of the continental shelf boundary in the present case, even if it were appropriate to apply, not 
Article 6 of the 1958 Convention, but customary law concerning the continental shelf as developed in the decided 
cases, it is in accord with precedents to begin with the median line as a provisional line and then to ask whether 
‘special circumstances’ require any adjustment or shifting of that line.” Ibid, para. 51. The marriage of the 
conventional and the customary law by the court, seems also from the fact that it tried to assimilate the terms “special 
circumstances” with “relevant circumstances”, which had been used in the conventional and the customary law 
respectively. Ibid. para 56. 
227 Ibid. para. 55.  
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Thus the court declared that it would use the median line as a provisional one, and later on in the 
light of any special circumstances it might adjust it, so that to be achieved an equitable result. It 
stated that “…special circumstances are those circumstances which might modify the result 
produced by an unqualified application of the equidistance principle”228 and it identified two 
specific circumstances that should be taken into account: the difference of the coastal lenghts 
between Greenland and Jan Mayen and the access to the living resourses of the area.229 
The court took under consideration the disparity or disproportion between the lengths of 
the “relevant coasts”, which meant that it compared not the lengths of all the coasts but only 
those which were opposite to each other, or in other words the coasts that were within the 
specified area of delimitation (i.e. the coasts lying between points E and F on the coast of Jan 
Mayen and G and H on the coast of Greenland, as shown in figure 10 of Annex D). It calculated 
that the ratio between the coast of Jan Mayen and that of Greenland was approximately 1 to 9 and 
it concluded that due to the disparity of the coastal lengths the median line should be shifted 
closer to the coast of Jan Mayen. The court contended also that this adjustment of the median line 
was equitable for the continental shelf delimitation, as well as for the fishery zones.  It clarified 
though that “…taking account of the disparity of coastal lengths does not mean a direct and 
mathematical application of the relationship between the length of the coastal front of eastern 
Greenland and that of Jan Mayen.”230 
As for the second special circumstance, the court had to ensure that the delimitation 
should not entail any “catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well – being of 
                                               
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. para. 61, 72. 
230 Ibid. para, 69. 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                                  Court Decisions 
 
85 
 
the population of the countries concerned.”231 The ICJ had therefore to adjust the median line, in 
a way to make sure an equitable access to the fishery resources, for the fishing communities of 
both areas. For the reason that most of the fishery resources were in the south – eastern part of the 
area of overlapping claims, closer to Jan Mayen, the court decided that it would be equitable if 
the delimitation line was shifted eastward, allowing therefore Greenland to have access in a 
considerable part of these area.232 
Although the expressed intention of the ICJ was to examine separately the special and the 
relevant circumstances which were affecting the delimitation of the continental shelf and the 
fishery zones respectively, it appears finally that the court put all these factors together and came 
up with a modified median line, which was common for both zones. Otherwise how can be 
explained the fact that the court took into account the access to the fishery resources and adjusted 
the boundary related to the continental shelf, which is a factor totally irrelevant with the 
delimitation of the continental shelf? Consequently, the court examined the special/relevant 
circumstances or the provisions of conventional/customary law together as a whole and adjusted 
the provisional median line accordingly. 
It is important to be noted though that the two abovementioned reasons which dictated the 
shift of the median line were unrelated to the nature of Jan Mayen as an island. The court 
nowhere questioned the rights of the islands to have a continental shelf of their own, as well as an 
unobstructed access to the living resources of the area surrounding them and consequently it 
treated them in the same way as the continental lands throughout the delimitation process.233 It 
stated characteristically that “the coast of Jan Mayen, no less than that of eastern Greenland, 
                                               
231 Ibid. para, 75. The court here reiterated the phrase that the chamber of the ICJ had used for the Gulf of Main case 
(I.C.J. Reports 1984, supra note 155, p. 342, para. 237). 
232 Ibid. para. 76. 
233 Greenland as well is an island, but it has an area 21 times more than Iceland and 5,807 times the area of Jan 
Mayen. Due to its size therefore the delimitation should be considered as not being between two islands, but between 
an island and a continental land.   
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generates potential title to the maritime areas recognized by customary law, i.e., in principle up to 
a limit of 200 miles from its baselines.”234  
This statement of the court proves that the islands cannot be in any way considered as 
prima facie special circumstances and moreover it shows that the special features of an island 
such as its population, economy, political status, size and its distance from its mainland country 
shouldn’t be necessarily taken into account, in the process of establishing its maritime zones.   
According to the court, the delimitation line was to lie between the median line and the 
200 – mile line from the baselines of Greenland. For the purposes of the delimitation, the court 
divided this area of the overlapping claims into three zones. The southernmost zone was divided 
into two parts of equal area, one for each state. The northernmost zone was divided in a way as to 
give Greenland the one third of it and Jan Mayen the remaining two thirds. The middle zone was 
divided by drawing a line which connected the shares of the two other zones, giving therefore 
Greenland an area more than one third but less than half of it and leaving the remainder area 
(more than half but less than two thirds) to Jan Mayen.235 
The court again didn’t explain its rationale. “Like so many of the previous maritime 
boundary delimitation cases, the court’s judgment in the present case is poorly reasoned, and 
opaque and difficult to follow in places…”.236 Why for example the delimitation took place in the 
area between the median line and that of the 200 – mile line from the baselines of Greenland and 
not in the area between the overlapping maximum claims of the two states, i.e. the 200 – mile line 
from the baselines of Greenland and Jan Mayen? Why the area of delimitation was divided in 
three zones and why each zone was further divided in the way described above? A lot of scholars 
                                               
234 I.C.J. Reports 1993, supra note 224, para. 70. 
235 Ibid. para. 91 – 93. See also figure 10 of Annex D. 
236 R. Churchill, “The Greenland – Jan Mayen Case and its Significance for the International Law of Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation”, 9 IJMCL, 1994, p. 27. 
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and even the judges of the court disagreed with the final solution of the court. For example the 
vice – president Oda in his separate opinion said that “…in choosing this line rather than any 
other, the court seems to have taken a purely arbitrary decision.”237  
It appears that the court tried to split the difference between the two states by dividing the 
area of their overlapping proposals. “Had Norway pressed for a full 200 – mile zone for Jan 
Mayen vis – a – vis Denmark this area would have been considerably enlarged and an equal 
division of zone 1 [as well as of zone 2 and 3] would have produced a very different result. 
[So]…there is force in the point that the court is encouraging states to maximize their claims by 
adopting such an approach.”238 In the same spirit the judge Schwebel in his separate opinion said 
that “...the court’s judgment may tend to encourage immoderate and discourage moderate claims 
in future.”239    
Apart from its problematic reasoning and the adoption of a pretty much arbitrary 
boundary, the decision of the court was undoubtedly positive in all respects. It tried to clarify the 
law governing the delimitations and to this end it introduced unequivocal and generally accepted 
criteria. It reaffirmed the validity of the GCCS and tried to integrate the article 6 of this 
convention in the customary law, reinstating therefore the median line principle to its initial 
position. Finally the decision of the court was very important for the islands. The court treated a 
small, isolated, outlying and almost uninhabited island as equal to the continental lands. It 
accepted that all the islands can generate full extended maritime zones in the same way as the 
other land masses do, regardless of their geographical features or other special characteristics. 
 
                                               
237 Separate Opinion of Vice – President Oda, para. 91. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/78/6755.pdf.  
238 M. Evans, “International Court of Justice: Recent Cases”, 43 ICLQ, 1994. 
239 Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel, p. 127. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/78/6757.pdf.  
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3.10 Eritrea – Yemen Maritime Boundary Delimitation (Arbitration, 1999) 
 
On December 17, 1999 the Arbitral Tribunal convoked by Eritrea and Yemen, rendered 
the second award in a process that the two states had elected to conduct in two stages. In the first 
stage, the court addressed all the issues related with the sovereignty over some disputed islands 
lying between the two mainland countries, while in the second and final stage it delimited the 
maritime areas appertaining to each of these states.240 This case is very interesting for this study 
because the existence of the islands lying between the two opposite states was the court’s main 
concern during the delimitation process.  
Eritrea and Yemen have extensive coasts which they face each other across the Red Sea. 
Eritrea is located in the northeast Africa and Yemen is situated in the southwest part of the 
Arabian Peninsula. In the north, the continental coasts of the two states are approximately 150 
miles apart. In the south, where the Red Sea funnels down to the Bab el – Mandeb straits, their 
continental coasts are less than 24 miles apart. In the north therefore the delimitation had to 
divide the continental shelf and the EEZ of the two states while in the south the court had to 
delimit the territorial seas appertaining to them. 
Both countries have a lot of islands in the Red Sea. On the one hand, Eritrea has 
sovereignty over the Dahlak archipelago to the north, over a cluster of some small islands 
consisted of the Haycock islands, Mohabbakah islands and the Southwest Rocks to the south and 
also over the islands of Fatuma, Derchos and Ras Mukwar in the Assab bay. On the other hand, 
Yemen has sovereignty over a cluster of islands and rocks off its northern cost, the most 
                                               
240 Eritrea – Yemen Arbitration Award 1999, Phase II: Maritime Delimitation. Available at: http://www.pca-cpa.org/ 
upload/files/EY%20Phase%20II.PDF. 
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important of which are the islands of Kamaran, Uqban, Kutama and Tiqfash. It owns also the 
lone mid – sea island of Jabal al – Tayr and the mid – sea island group of Jabal al – Zubayr. 
Finally, it has sovereignty over the island of Zuqar and the Hanish group to the south of the 
delimitation area.241 
The article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement stipulated that in determining the maritime 
boundary the Tribunal was to take into account “the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, and any other pertinent factor”.242 So although Eritrea hadn’t become a party to the 
UNCLOS its provisions could be applied by the court for the resolution of the dispute.243 There 
was no reference in the Agreement to the customary law, but the court ruled that many of its 
relevant provisions had already been incorporated in the UNCLOS.244 In addition, the court 
interpreted the phrase “any other pertinent factors” as including all the aspects relevant to the 
delimitation process such as proportionality, non – encroachment and the presence of the 
islands.245 
Both Parties asked for the drawing of a single maritime boundary and proposed a median 
line, but their respective median lines followed very different courses and didn’t coincide. Yemen 
divided the proposed median line in three sectors. In the northern sector, the proposed Yemen 
line was calculated as being the median line between the Eritrea’s Dahlak islands and the 
Yemen’s mid –sea island of Jabal al – Tayr and Jabal al – Zubayr island group. It assumed that 
the Dahlak islands, a closely knit group of some 350 islands and islets, the largest of them having 
a considerable population, should be recognized as being part of the Eritrean mainland coast and 
                                               
241 See figure 11 of Annex D. The Arbitral Tribunal had adjudicated for the ownership status of a number of these 
islands in its first award, dated on October 9, 1998. Available at: http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/EY%20 
Phase%20I.PDF. 
242 Eritrea – Yemen Arbitration Award 1999, supra note 240, para. 6. 
243 Eritrea hasn’t signed the UNCLOS yet. Yemen signed it on December 10, 1982 and ratified it on July 21, 1987. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf. 
244 Eritrea – Yemen Arbitration Award 1999, supra note 240, para. 130. 
245 Ibid. 
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the waters within them as being internal waters. Yemen contended also that its mid – sea islands 
should be used as basepoints as well, because they were as important, or even more important, 
than the very small uninhabited outer islets of the Dahlak group. To this end, Yemen argued that 
there would be a “balance” in the treatment of the islands of both countries in the northern area, 
as “each Party possesses islands of a comparable size, producing similar coastal facades lying at 
similar distances from their respective mainlands”246. 
In the central sector the line proposed by Yemen was an equidistant between the Eritrean 
mainland and the Yemen’s Hanish island group. Yemen supported that the “small Eritrean islets 
in between” the Eritrean mainland coast and the larger Yemen islands were inappropriate to be 
taken into account for the delimitation. Thus, the proposed boundary ignored the Southwest 
Rocks, the Haycock and the Mohabbakah islands as being nothing more than small rocks. Yemen 
proposed that all these islands should be placed within limited enclaves. 
In the southern sector where the line entered the narrow sea which was free from 
complicating mid – sea islands, Yemen proposed a simple median line between the two opposite 
mainland coasts. Yemen however recognized the islands of Fatuma, Derchos and Ras Mukwar as 
basepoints, accepting that the Bay of Assab was an area of Eritrean internal waters.  
On the whole, Yemen proposed that all the islands should have full effect in the 
delimitation process, with the exception of the small Eritrean islets in the central sector. In 
addition it stated that there was no need for any adjustment of this median line as it was equitable 
and there weren’t any relevant circumstances calling for its modification. 
In contrast Eritrea’s proposed line was one drawn as a median between the opposite 
coasts and ignoring the existence of the mid – sea islands of Yemen, but taking into account only 
its own islands. It supported its rationale on the basis that the maritime boundary already had 
                                               
246 Ibid. para. 15. 
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been existed, calling it the “historic median line” boundary between the two countries and 
therefore the first award of the court by which certain islands were attributed to Yemen, shouldn’t 
result in changing this existing maritime boundary. Eritrea maintained that Yemen’s “recently 
acquired” sovereignty over these islands made them of less importance as factors to be taken into 
consideration for the purposes of the delimitation. Thus, Eritrea considered that “…the [mid – 
sea] islands come within the category of small uninhabited islands of recently acquired 
sovereignty and near the median line that should be recognized by the Tribunal to possess 
diminished maritime zones.”247 
It also proposed the establishment of “joint resource areas” or “shared maritime zones 
around the [mid – sea] islands”248 of Yemen. Eritrea further contended that the court should take 
full account of Southwest Rocks and the Haycock islands. It objected to the Yemen’s proposed 
enclaves because this would in practice mean that there would be no access corridor for Eritrea 
through the surrounding Yemen territorial sea, leaving therefore these islands “completely 
isolated”249. In addition Eritrea contended that the enclave solution would result in “inclusion of 
both of the main shipping channels within what would be Yemen’s territorial waters…”250 
making Yemen the ‘key – holder’ of the Bab el – Mandeb Strait. 
The court stated that both the state practice and the case – law indicated that the median 
line normally led to an equitable result in accordance with the requirements of the articles 74 and 
83 of the UNCLOS. However, the court perceived the median line as one between the two 
opposite mainland coasts. It proceeded therefore to the maritime delimitation with a mainland – 
to – mainland approach. The Tribunal characteristically declared that “…the international 
                                               
247 Ibid. para. 32. 
248 Ibid. para. 27. 
249 Ibid. para. 26. 
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boundary shall be a single all – purpose boundary which is a median line and that it should, as far 
as practicable, be a median line between the opposite mainland coastlines”251. The coastal islands 
thought were deemed by the court as being integral parts of the coasts and were taken into 
account for the construction of a straight baselines system. The effect however that had to be 
given to the mid – sea islands was an issue which assessed by the court on a second stage. For 
this reason the court divided the area into sectors and examined the role of each particular island 
or island group on the boundary line.  
More specifically, in the northern sector the court accepted that the Dahlak islands were a 
group of islands that were an extension of the general costal configuration of Eritrea. Thus, the 
waters inside this island system were internal or national waters and the baselines should be 
found at the external fringes of this cluster of islands. In addition, the Dahlak islands formed an 
appropriate situation for the establishment of a straight baseline system as provided in article 7 of 
the UNCLOS. The court though didn’t accept to include in the delimitation process the outlying 
Negileh Rock because it considered it rather a reef than an island. 
Likewise the court ruled that “the relatively large, inhabited and important island of 
Kamaran”252 off the Yemen coast, together with the smaller islands close to the mainland such as 
the Kutama, Uqban and Tiqfash were part of an intricate system of islands and islets which 
should be taken into account and therefore should constitute the basepoints of a straight baseline 
system. Quite the opposite though, the Tribunal decided that the single island of al – Tayr and the 
island group of al – Zubayr should have no effect at all upon the boundary between the two 
countries due to “their barren and inhospitable nature and their position well out to sea”253.  
                                               
251 Ibid. para. 132. 
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253 Ibid. para. 147. 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                                  Court Decisions 
 
93 
 
In the middle sector the court rejected the enclave solution which had been proposed by 
Yemen for the small Eritrean islands of Southwest Rocks, Haycock and Mohabbakah islands and 
stated that “there is no doubt that an island, however small, and even rocks provided they are 
indeed islands proud of the water at high – tide, are capable of generating a territorial sea of up to 
12 miles ... It follows that a chain of islands which are less than 24 miles apart can generate a 
continuous band of territorial sea.”254 In this area therefore the court deemed that the median line 
between these islands and the Yemen Hanish group was the appropriate solution.  
In order to connect the median line boundary of the northern sector with that of the 
middle sector, the court drew a line by which not only it deprived the west coasts of the Greater 
Hanish and Zuqar islands of their continental shelf and their EEZ, but also it curtailed their 
territorial sea. Thus the west facing coasts of the Yemeni islands in this area received nothing 
more than a truncated zone of territorial waters. Finally, in the south sector, where there weren’t 
any islands other than those in the Bay of Assab, the maritime boundary followed the median line 
between the two mainland coasts. There, the Bay of Assab with its islands was considered as part 
of the coast of Eritrea. 
The court then examined the equitableness of the delimitation. The Tribunal calculated 
the ratio of the lengths of the relevant coasts and the ratio between the water areas it had 
attributed to the Parties. The ratio of the coastal length of Yemen compared to Eritrea was 1 to 
1.31. The ratio of the water areas, including the territorial seas, of Yemen compared to Eritrea 
was 1 to 1.09. The Tribunal concluded that the line of delimitation it had decided upon resulted in 
no disproportion. 
It seems though from the last finding of the court that the intention of the Tribunal was to 
divide in approximately equal parts the sea area between the two mainland countries and to this 
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end the islands were treated accordingly. The court compared the ratio of the coastal lengths with 
the ratio of the sea area appertaining to each country and concluded that since these ratios were 
around the same then the delimitation was equitable. But if the criterion of proportionality is 
applied in this way, then what is the role of geography? How can the special geographical 
features such as the islands affect the maritime boundary? Is it right to ignore those islands that 
considerably affect the course of the demarcation line for the sake of proportionality? Isn’t then 
the whole process an apportionment rather than a delimitation? Didn’t the court try in this case to 
make equal what nature had made unequal? Isn’t it a refashioning of nature? 
The fact that the court unquestionably accepted that the median line was a method which 
in general produced an equitable result was in itself a positive development. The question here is 
for which exactly median line are we talking about? That which is automatically constructed by 
the geographical realities of a given area or that which serves a predetermined decision? 
Depending on the coasts that are chosen to be taken as basepoints and the effect that are given to 
some special characteristics such as the islands, the final median line can take a variety of shapes 
and can be positioned in many different places. This is affirmed by the fact that although the two 
states and the court constructed a median line, their versions didn’t coincide. So it isn’t enough to 
declare that the median line principle is going to be applied, if the fundamental rules of 
constructing it aren’t followed. 
The court placed the basic right of the islands to have a continental shelf of their own in a 
second place and put emphasis on their geographical position. Thus as far as the islands served 
the court’s notion of equity their rights were protected, but when they were located in a “wrong 
place” they were deprived of their rights without explanation. The Tribunal ruled that the island 
of Jabal al – Tayr and the Jabal al – Zubayr island group couldn’t generate maritime zones around 
them because of “their barren and inhospitable nature and their position well out to sea”, but this 
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reasoning is totally unfounded in international law. Did the court classify these islands as “rocks 
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own”? Is it possible that, islands 
of such magnitude255 to be classified as rocks? And if it is so why the court didn’t say it but left 
the impression that the rights of the islands can be viewed on a case by case basis? Additionally, 
while even rocks are entitled to a full zone of territorial sea why the court awarded the Yemeni 
islands with a limited one? Finally, how can the location of the islands prevail over their basic 
entitlement to a continental shelf and to an EEZ? 
This case is therefore typical of the court’s distributive justice approach and can be 
characterized as a decision ex aequo et bono. The UNCLOS provided for the rights of the islands 
but the court seems to have acted beyond the limits of the applicable law and deprived the mid –
sea island of their rights. Instead of drawing a median line taking into account all the islands and 
then in a second phase adjusting it if it was necessary, the court began by considering a median 
line between the two opposite mainland coasts and then examined the proportionate or 
disproportionate effect of the mid – sea islands. This approach speaks volumes about the 
intentions of the court. 
At least the court didn’t question the rights of the coastal islands. All the Dahlak islands, 
the islands in the Assab Bay and the Kamaran, Uqban, Kutama and Tiqfash islands were given 
full effect and their outer edges were used as basepoints for the straight baselines system. The 
court therefore treated them as being a continuation of the mainland even if some of them located 
many miles away from the coast of their mainland. The outer islands of the Dahlak group for 
example are some 50 miles away from the mainland of Eritrea. 
 
                                               
255 Jabal al – Tayr is 4.3 Km long and 3.1 Km wide while the biggest island of the Jabal al – Zubayr group is 5.5 Km 
long and 3.3 Km wide. 
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3.11 Qatar – Bahrain Maritime Boundary Delimitation (ICJ, 2001) 
 
On March 16, 2001 the ICJ delivered its judgment by which it settled a long – running 
dispute between Qatar and Bahrain relating to the ownership status of the area around the city of 
Zubarah and the islands lying between the two mainland countries. In addition, it delimited the 
maritime areas of the two states.256 
On the one hand, the court found that Qatar had sovereignty over the Zubarah region, 
Janan Island and the low – tide elevation257 of Fasht ad Dibal and on the other hand it concluded 
that Bahrain had sovereignty over the Hawar Islands and Qit’at Jaradah Island. The court also, by 
13 votes to 4, drew a single maritime boundary that divided the territorial waters, the continental 
shelf and the EEZ of the two countries.258 
Qatar and Bahrain are both located in the southern part of the Persian Gulf. Qatar is a 
peninsular country which projects northward into the Persian Gulf, while Bahrain is composed of 
a number of islands, islets and shoals situated off the eastern and western coasts of its main 
island. The Hawar islands are located in the immediate vicinity of the central part of the west 
coast of the Qatar peninsula, to the south – east of the main island of Bahrain and at a distance of 
approximately 10 miles from the latter. The island of Janan is located off the south – western tip 
of Hawar Island. Fasht ad Dibal and Qit’at Jaradah are two maritime features located off the 
                                               
256 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 
2001, p. 40. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/7027.pdf?PHPSESSID=b423c056409aa111aa4d0 
2938569f048. 
257 “A low – tide  elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but 
submerged at high tide.” Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Article 11, para. 1 and 
UNCLOS, Article 13, para. 1. 
258 See figures 12 and 13 of Annex D. 
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north – western coast of the Qatar peninsula and to the north – east of the main island of 
Bahrain.259 
After deciding for the sovereignty over the abovementioned islands and the low – tide 
elevations the court turned to the question of the maritime delimitation. Both states had agreed 
that their dispute had to be resolved on the basis of the international law. As neither Bahrain nor 
Qatar was party to the Geneva Conventions and for the reason that Bahrain had ratified the 
UNCLOS but Qatar was only a signatory to it, the court concluded that the international 
customary law was the applicable law for the case. Both Parties however agreed that most of the 
provisions of the UNCLOS were reflecting customary law rules.260 
The two states had requested from the court “to draw a single maritime boundary between 
their respective maritime areas of seabed, subsoil and superjacent water”.261 In the southern part 
of the delimitation area the coasts of the two states were opposite to each other and the distance 
between these coasts was nowhere more than 24 miles. Thus, the boundary there would 
exclusively demarcate the territorial waters of the two countries. More to the north however, 
where the coasts of the two states were no longer opposite to each other but were rather 
comparable to adjacent coasts, the court had to carry out the delimitation of the continental shelf 
and the EEZ of both countries. The court pointed out that the delimitation of a single boundary 
for different jurisdictional zones “can only be carried out by the application of a criterion, or 
combination of criteria, which does not give preferential treatment to one of these…[zones] to the 
                                               
259 I.C.J. Reports 2001, supra note 256, para 35. 
260 Ibid. para. 167. 
261 Ibid. para. 168. 
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detriment of the other and at the same time is such as to be equally suitable to the division of 
either of them.”262 
The court concluded that the delimitation of the boundary in the area where the two states 
were opposite to each other had to be carried out in accordance with the median line principle. As 
regards the delimitation of the territorial waters both countries had agreed that the median line 
principle accompanied by the special circumstances clause was, apart from a conventional law 
rule,263 a part of the customary law. The court accepted that the most logical and widely practiced 
approach was first to drew a provisional equidistance line and then to consider whether that line 
should be adjusted, in the light of the existence of any special circumstances. 
The court followed the same approach for the delimitation of the continental shelf and the 
EEZ.264 It drew a provisional equidistance line and then it considered adjusting it according to the 
needs of the special circumstances, so that finally to be achieved an equitable result. The court 
further noted that the equidistance/special circumstances rule and the equitable 
principles/relevant circumstances rule as it had been developed in the case law and the practice of 
the states, were closely interrelated.265 
The drawing of a median/equidistance line wasn’t though an easy task. This line could 
only be drawn if the baselines were known, but neither Party had specified these baselines before 
submitting the case to the court. The court therefore concluded that it would determine the 
                                               
262 Ibid. para. 173. The Court reiterated the finding of the Chamber of the ICJ, in the Gulf of Maine case (I.C.J. 
Reports 1984, op. cit., para. 194). 
263 Article 15 of the UNCLOS stipulates: “Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, 
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea 
beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, 
where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two 
States in a way which is at variance therewith.” This article is virtually identical to article 12, para. 1, of the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 
264 I.C.J. Reports 2001, supra note 256, para 230. 
265 Ibid. para. 231. 
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relevant coasts of the Parties, from which it would determine the baselines and the pertinent 
basepoints, enabling therefore the equidistance line to be measured. The existence of many low – 
tide elevations and shoals made the whole process very complex. 
On the one hand, Qatar argued that for the construction of the median line should be 
applied the mainland – to – mainland method. The notion of mainland included also the main 
islands of both countries but not the small islands, islets, rocks and the low – tide elevations. In 
addition in Qatar’s view the equidistance line had to be constructed by reference to the high – 
water line.266 
On the other hand, Bahrain contended that it was an archipelagic state, and as that, it 
couldn’t be reduced to a limited number of so – called ‘principal’ islands, as this would be a 
distortion of reality and a refashioning of geography. It supported therefore that it could draw 
“straight archipelagic baselines joining the outmost points of the outmost islands and drying reefs 
of the archipelago.”267 Bahrain further contended that according to the law, it was the low –water 
line which was determinative for the breadth of the territorial sea and for the overlapping 
territorial waters.268 
The ICJ ruled that under the international law the breadth of the territorial waters are 
measured from the low – water line269 but rejected the claim of Bahrain that it belonged to the 
category of the archipelagic states and that it could use therefore the method of the straight 
baselines for the delimitation of its maritime zones.270 It also rejected Qatar’s proposal about the 
mainland – to – mainland method and stated that all the islands could be taken into account for 
the construction of the median/equidistance line. Furthermore, it concluded that Fasht ad Dibal 
                                               
266 Ibid. para. 179. 
267 According to article 47 of the UNCLOS. 
268 I.C.J. Reports 2001, supra note 256, para. 180. 
269 Article 5 of the UNCLOS. Ibid. para. 184. 
270 I.C.J. Reports 2001, op. cit. para. 201, 208, 212 and 215. 
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was a low – tide elevation and stated that when such features were not part of the coastal 
configuration but were lying in a distance from the coast, then they neither could have a territorial 
sea of their own nor they could “generate the same rights as islands or other territory.”271 The 
court here therefore clearly recognized the rights of the islands to generate maritime zones in the 
same way as the continental lands. 
For the drawing of the median/equidistance line, the court indeed took into account all the 
islands using them as basepoints, no matter how small they were, with the exception of two 
islands which it ruled that they constituted special circumstances and therefore they should be 
totally disregarded during the delimitation process.272  
It identified that the island of Fasht al Jarim was a special circumstance that shouldn’t be 
taken into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ. Fasht al Jarim is 
actually a remote, isolated projection of Bahrain’s coastline and of which at most a minute part is 
above water at high tide. According to the ICJ, if this island was given full effect, it would 
“distort the boundary and have disproportionate effects” on it. In the view of the court such a 
distortion would not lead to an equitable solution and therefore it decided to give no effect at all 
to this feature.273 
The other island which the court regarded as a special circumstance and gave it no effect 
at all was the Bahraini island of Qit’at Jaradah.274 The court observed that Qit’at Jaradah was a 
                                               
271 Ibid. para. 207. 
272 The fact that the court gave full effect to all the islands (with the exception of Fasht al Jarim and Qit’at Jaradah), 
even to the very small ones, and used them as basepoints was a reason for criticism by many scholars and by some of 
the judges of the case. See Separate opinion of Judge Oda para. 21, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bedjaoui, 
Ranjeva and Koroma, para. 188, and Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Torres Bernardez, para. 505. See also J. 
Charney and R. Smith (eds), “International Maritime Boundaries”, Volume IV, ASIL, 2002, pp. 2851, 2852.    
273 I.C.J. Reports 2001, supra note 256, 247. 
274 Many of the Judges however contested the court’s finding that Qit’at Jaradah was actually an island. They 
supported that Qit’at Jaradah was a tiny, sandy maritime feature which was constantly changing its physical 
condition and therefore it should have been treated like the islands of the deltas. See Joint Dissenting Opinion of 
Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma, para. 194 - 201. See also the Declaration of Judge Vereshchetin, para. 13, 
and Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Torres Bernardez, para. 524 – 528. 
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very small island, uninhabited and without any vegetation. This tiny island was situated about 
midway between the main island of Bahrain and the Qatar peninsula. Consequently according to 
the court, if its low – water line were to be used for determining a basepoint in the construction of 
the equidistance line, “a disproportionate effect would be given to an insignificant maritime 
feature.”275 The court thus found that there was a special circumstance in this case warranting the 
choice of a delimitation line passing immediately to the east of Qit'at Jaradah, depriving it of all 
the maritime zones to this direction, even the zone of the territorial waters. 
Another issue that requires special mention is the position of the court as regards Fasht al 
Azm. The court dithered about the status of this geographical feature. Should it be regarded as a 
part of Sitrah Island or a separate low – tide elevation? If this feature was to be regarded as part 
of the island of Sitrah, the basepoints for the purposes of determining the equidistance line would 
be situated on Fasht al Azm’s eastern low – water line. If it was not to be regarded as part of the 
island of Sitrah, Fasht al Azm could not provide such basepoints. The court in order to determine 
whether this feature was part of the island of Sitrah drew two equidistance lines reflecting each of 
these hypotheses: one giving full effect to Fasht al Azm, and another giving no effect at all to it. 
It finally ruled that a third line passing between the two aforementioned lines would lead to an 
equitable solution. From this practice of the court can be inferred the following: first the rights of 
the islands were again reaffirmed, and secondly, the decision of the court wasn’t based on 
geographical criteria but was an apparent attempt to equally divide the sea area and satisfy both 
states. 
                                               
275 I.C.J. Reports 2001, supra note 256, para 219. The court gave also some examples from its jurisprudence, in order 
to support its assertion that some small islands can be disregarded during the delimitation process. It stated: “In 
similar situations the Court has sometimes been led to eliminate the disproportionate effect of small islands (see 
North Sea Continental Shelf; I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 36, para. 57; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab JamahiriyalMalta), 
Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1985, p. 48, para. 64)”. 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                                  Court Decisions 
 
102 
 
All in all, the Two – Step Approach or Corrective Equity Approach that the court applied 
throughout this case was by all means a positive development.276 The ICJ unquestionably 
accepted that the median/equidistance line principle was the most appropriate method for the 
delimitation of the maritime boundary and it didn’t involve in the process the ambiguous 
equitable principles. Hence, it started with a provisional median/equidistance line and then in a 
second stage it adjusted it, so that to reach an equitable result. 
In addition, the court recognized in principle the rights of the islands and accepted that 
they can generate all the maritime zones, in the same way as the continental lands. These rights 
were irrelevant to their individual characteristics, such as their size or population. It should be 
underlined that Bahrain itself is a multiple – island state and the ICJ didn’t treat it in a different 
way than Qatar which is a continental state.  
The geographical position of some island was though for the court a reason to deviate 
from the general rule. As far as the islands served the notion of equity as it had been conceived 
by the court their rights were confirmed, but when they considerably affected the line that had 
been destined to approximately divide equally the disputed area, then their rights were curtailed 
without explanation. Hadn’t the court taken as special circumstances the two Bahraini islands and 
hadn’t it apportioned the area near Fasht al Azm, then it would have been an exemplary 
delimitation. 
For the abovementioned reasons this case is indicative of the court’s distributive justice 
approach. How else can be characterized a judgment which disregarded completely two Bahraini 
islands? or a judgment which wasn’t based merely on geographical criteria near Fasht al Azm, 
but it obviously apportioned the sea area between the two states? a judgment that didn’t even give 
a zone of territorial waters towards the east, to the island of Qit’at Jaradah? It appears therefore 
                                               
276 The court used the term “Adjusted Equidistance Line”. Ibid. para. 220, 249. 
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that in this case the ICJ tried ‘to make equal what nature had made unequal’. Hence, it seems that 
the intension of the court was to apportion the disputed area in a way that it would satisfy as 
much as possible both countries and for this reason some islands were sacrificed on the special 
circumstances altar. 
If this case is to be contrasted to the Eritrea – Yemen Arbitration, as both of them dealt 
with the maritime boundary between states with opposite coasts and with a considerable number 
of islands lying between them, then we will realize how different the approach of the ICJ was in 
comparison with the approach that the arbitral tribunal had adopted a few years earlier. The court 
which dealt with the Eritrea – Yemen case approached the maritime delimitation with a mainland 
– to – mainland equidistance approach, which reflected the macro – geographical dimension of 
the delimitation. In contrast the court in this case used a micro – geographical approach, 
addressing minor geographical features, giving them effect and only adjusting the equidistance 
line when it deemed it to be necessary. It is remarkable though that both awards reached to the 
same result: the islands that could considerably affect the course of the median line and therefore 
could produce a boundary other than that which approximately divided the disputed area in equal 
parts, were deprived of their rights for the sake of a misconceived notion of equity. 
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3.12 Cameroon – Nigeria Maritime Boundary Delimitation (ICJ, 2002) 
 
On October 10, 2002 the ICJ delivered its judgment on the case concerning the 
delimitation of the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, by which it was 
fixed the course of the boundary line between the two adjacent, West African countries.277 
Although Cameroon and Nigeria have no considerable islands, the delimitation process was 
affected by the islands of third states, namely by the Equatorial Guinea’s island of Bioko and the 
islands of Sao Tome and Principe which lie opposite the parties’ coastlines.278 
Bioko is an island which belongs to Equatorial Guinea and it is located 32 Km off the 
coast of Cameroon. It has an area of 2,017 Km2 and its population is around 124,000. It is 70 Km 
long and 32 Km wide. Sao Tome and Principe is an island nation in the Gulf of Guinea. It 
consists of two islands: Sao Tome and Principe, located about 140 Km apart. With an area of 964 
Km2 and a total population around 176,000 inhabitants, it is the second – smaller African country 
(the Seychelles being the smallest). Sao Tome is 50 Km long and 32 Km wide, while Principe is 
around 30 Km long and 6 Km wide.279 
Since the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria would 
have affected the rights of the islands in the Gulf of Guinea, Equatorial Guinea requested to 
intervene as a non – party intervener, but Sao Tome and Principe chose not to intervene on any 
basis. The ICJ accepted the request of Equatorial Guinea and ruled that in fixing the maritime 
                                               
277 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea 
intervening), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2002, p. 303. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/94/7453.pdf.  
278 See figure 14 of Annex D.  
279 Available at: https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ tp.html, accessed on February 7, 
2011. 
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boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, the court had to ensure that it didn’t adopt any position 
which might affect the rights of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. 
Cameroon contended that the maritime area between the two states had been partially 
delimited by earlier agreements280 and it asked the court to establish the boundary for the 
continental shelf and the EEZ beyond that area. It proposed the adoption of an ‘equitable line’281 
and rejected the equidistance principle as being a principle of customary law that was 
automatically applicable in every maritime boundary delimitation between adjacent states. 
Nigeria in contrast denied the existence of any maritime boundary and maintained that the whole 
delimitation had to be undertaken de novo. Finally, Equatorial Guinea requested that the 
boundary to be fixed by the court should nowhere encroach upon the median line between the 
coasts of Bioko Island and those of Cameroon and Nigeria. It added that this was “a reasonable 
expression of its legal rights and interests that must not be transgressed in proceedings to which 
Equatorial Guinea is not a party.”282 
Both Cameroon and Nigeria were parties to the UNCLOS283 and they had agreed that the 
single boundary delimitation for the seabed and the superjacent waters had to be carried out in 
accordance with the international law. Thus, the court emphasized the importance of the articles 
74 and 83 of the UNCLOS and reiterated that the aim of the court was to “achieve an equitable 
solution”. It said that the equitable principles/relevant circumstances method was similar to the 
equidistance/special circumstances method, when a line covering several zones of coincident 
                                               
280 These agreement were the Anglo – German agreement of 11 June 1913, the Yaoundé II Declaration, signed on 
April 4, 1971, by which the two states accepted a ‘compromise line’ passing through 12 numbered points and the 
Maroua Declaration, signed on June 1, 1975, by which it was established an additional 8 points boundary line (A, 
A1, B…G). See figure 15 of Annex D. 
281 I. C. J. Reports 2002, supra note 277, para. 241, 272, 275 and 279. 
282 Ibid. para. 284. 
283 Cameroon signed the UNCLOS on December 10, 1982 and ratified it on November 19, 1985. Nigeria signed it on 
December 10, 1982 and ratified it on August 14, 1986. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/ 
status2010.pdf.  
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jurisdictions was to be determined.284 This method involved first drawing an equidistance line 
and then considering whether there were factors calling for the adjustment of that line in order to 
be achieved an ‘equitable result’. The court ruled that it would apply the same method in the 
present case. 
The court however stressed that delimiting with a concern to achieving an equitable 
result, as required by the international law, wasn’t the same as delimiting in equity. It stated that 
according to the court’s jurisprudence, equity wasn’t a method of delimitation, but solely an aim 
that should be borne in mind in effecting the delimitation. It went on saying that the geographical 
configuration of the maritime areas that the court was called upon to delimit was a given. It 
wasn’t an element open to modification by the court but a fact on the basis of which the court had 
to effect the delimitation.285 
Cameroon however supported that the presence of Bioko Island, which was closer to its 
own coast than to that of Equatorial Guinea, was a relevant circumstance which had to be taken 
into account by the court. It drew an analogy with the case concerning the delimitation of the 
Anglo – French continental shelf, and proposed that Bioko Island had to be given partial effect 
and had to be confined in an enclave within Cameroon’s continental shelf. It further contended, 
that the delimitation regime wasn’t identical for an island state and for a dependent, isolated 
island and it argued that Bioko Island shouldn’t be given therefore full effect. Moreover it 
contended that it should be avoided a “radical and absolute cut – off of the projection of 
[Cameroon’s] coastal front” and in this regard it referred to the case concerning the delimitation 
of the maritime areas between Canada and the France (St. Pierre et Miquelon), in which the 
arbitral tribunal stated that “the delimitation must leave to a state the areas that constitute the 
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285 Ibid. para. 294. 
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natural prolongation or seaward extension of its coasts, so that the delimitation must avoid any 
cut – off effect of those prolongations or seaward extensions”.286 
Nigeria from its part took the view that Bioko Island couldn’t be treated as a relevant 
circumstance. It argued that this island was a major part of an independent state, which generated 
its own maritime areas, on which the court wasn’t entitled to encroach. In Nigeria’s view this was 
also true for the archipelago of Sao Tome and Principe. It stated that it wasn’t for the court to 
compensate Cameroon for any disadvantages suffered by it as a direct consequence of the 
geography of the area and that it wasn’t the purpose of the international law to refashion 
geography.287  
The court pointed out the fact that Bioko Island was subject to the sovereignty of 
Equatorial Guinea, a state which wasn’t a party to the proceedings. Consequently the effect of 
Bioko Island on the seaward projection of the Cameroonian coastal front was an issue between 
Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea and not between Cameroon and Nigeria, and wasn’t relevant to 
the issue of delimitation before the court. The ICJ didn’t therefore regard the presence of Bioko 
Island as a circumstance that would justify the shifting of the equidistance line as Cameroon had 
claimed.288 
The court concluded that the earlier agreements, by which it had been established a 
maritime boundary between the two states, were valid and the court had only to delimit the 
continental shelf and the EEZ by extending southwards the existing boundary along the 
equidistance line. It ruled that there weren’t any reasons for deviating from the equidistance line 
as this line represented an equitable result. However, the equidistance line adopted by the court 
couldn’t be extended very far. The ICJ stated that it could take no decision that might affect the 
                                               
286 Ibid. para. 274. 
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rights of Equatorial Guinea’s Bioko Island. In these circumstances the court considered that it 
could do no more than indicate only the general direction of the boundary between the parties’ 
maritime areas. 
To sum up, there are two conclusions arising from this case: first the value of the 
equidistance line principle was reaffirmed and secondly the rights of the islands were fully 
respected by the court. Thus the court in this case started with a provisional equidistance line and 
in the absence of any significant special/relevant circumstance it didn’t adjust it. Although the 
parties had proposed a number of special/relevant circumstances, such as the oil concessions, the 
configuration of the coasts (concavity of Cameroon’s coastline), the existence of the islands, etc, 
the court rejected all of them and kept the equidistance line as the advisable maritime boundary. 
The ICJ respecting the rights of the islands in the region didn’t establish a boundary 
beyond the median line which separated the sea area between the continental states of Cameroon 
and Nigeria on the one side and the island of Bioko on the other side. Although this island was 
located right off the coasts of Cameroon, significantly restricting therefore its seaward projection 
and although it lied away from its mainland country the ICJ didn’t question its rights. In addition, 
the rights of Sao Tome and Principe weren’t also in any case violated by the court. 
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3.13 Barbados – Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
        (Arbitration, 2006) 
 
On April 11, 2006 the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)289 rendered its unanimous 
award for the case concerning the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago.290 This case is quite interesting because it was the first time that an arbitral 
tribunal delimited the maritime boundary between two island countries and at the same time it 
applied the provisions of the UNCLOS.291 
Trinidad and Tobago is an island nation lying just off the coast of Venezuela, in South 
America. It is made up of the islands of Trinidad, with an area of 4,828 km2 and an approximate 
population of 1,210,000, the island of Tobago with an area of 300 km2 and an approximate 
population of 54,000 and a number of much smaller islands that are close to those two main 
islands.292 The distance between Trinidad and Tobago is 19 miles. Around 70 miles to the 
                                               
289 The Permanent Court of Arbitration was established in 1899 as one of the acts of the first Hague Peace 
Conference, which make it the oldest global institution for settlement of international disputes. Its creation was a 
landmark in the history of institutionalization of the third party mechanisms of peaceful resolution of disputes 
between states. The court however provides arbitration also in disputes between international organizations and 
between states and international organizations. The PCA facilitated the subsequent conception and creation of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, of which the present ICJ is the successor. Today the PCA and the ICJ are 
complimentary institutions, each having its own unique role to play in the global network of mechanisms of third 
party dispute resolution. The PCA is considered to be more flexible than the ICJ because of the adjudicatory nature 
of the latter. The PCA share the premises of the Peace Palace in The Hague, together with the ICJ. Many members of 
the ICJ, past and present, were or are members of the PCA. This was the second maritime boundary delimitation case 
that was resolved under the umbrella of the PCA, the first being the Eritrea – Yemen case.   
290 Decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Areas 
between Barbados and Trinidad – Tobago. Available at: http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Final%20Award.pdf.  
291 Barbados signed the UNCLOS on December 10, 1982 and ratified it on October 12, 1993. Trinidad and Tobago 
signed it on December 12, 1982 and ratified it on April 25, 1986. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ 
reference_files/status2010.pdf. 
292 See figure 16 of Annex D. 
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northwest, starts a chain of rugged volcanic islands known collectively as the Windward Islands, 
made up of Grenada, the Grenadines, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Martinique, Dominica, and others.293 
Barbados is also an island country and it is situated around 115 miles northeast of 
Tobago. It consists of a single island with a surface area of 430 km2 and a population of 
approximately 285,000. It is 80 miles east of St. Lucia, the closest of the Windward Islands and it 
is the easternmost island in the Lesser Antilles.294 
On February 16, 2004 Barbados initiated the arbitration proceedings concerning its 
maritime boundary with Trinidad and Tobago and asked the court to draw a “single unified 
maritime boundary line, delimiting the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf between it 
and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, as provided under Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS”.295 
 Barbados contended that the case law clearly prescribed that the tribunal should start the 
process of delimitation by drawing a provisional median line between the coasts of the two states. 
This line according to Barbados should be adjusted in a second stage, so as to give effect to the 
special circumstances and thus lead to an equitable solution. Barbados maintained that in this 
case there was only one special circumstance that was calling for the modification of the median 
line: the established traditional artisanal fishing activity of Barbadian fishermen south of the 
median line, close to the island of Tobago.296 The equitable solution to be reached therefore was 
one that would give to Barbados the area of traditional fisheries enjoyed by Barbadian fishermen, 
                                               
293 Decision of PCA 2006, supra note 290, para. 42, 44 and 45. See also USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
The World Factbook, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html#top, 
accessed on February 18, 2011.  
294 Decision of PCA 2006, supra note 290, para. 43. See also USA’s CIA, The World Factbook, available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bb.html, accessed on February 18, 2011. 
295 Decision of PCA 2006, supra note 290, para. 57. 
296 In November 1990 two states concluded the “Fishing Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago and the Government of Barbados” (the “1990 Fishing Agreement”), regulating, inter alia, 
aspects of the harvesting of fisheries resources by Barbadian fishermen in Trinidad and Tobago’s EEZ, and 
facilitating access to Barbadian markets for Trinidad and Tobago’s fish. Ibid. para. 52. 
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by shifting the west part of the median line in a way leaving to Tobago only a 12 – mile zone of 
territorial waters.297 
Trinidad and Tobago was too in favor of the “median line corrective equity approach”, 
but the special circumstances it invoked were different from that of Barbados. It contended that in 
the western sector, where the coasts of the two states were opposite to each other, there was no 
basis for deviating from the median line. In the eastern sector however, where the coasts of the 
Parties were in a situation of adjacency rather than oppositeness, Trinidad and Tobago claimed 
that the equidistance line wasn’t anymore an equitable solution. It invoked three principal 
relevant circumstances that in its view justified the adjustment of the equidistance line: the 
avoidance of any cut – off effect or encroachment on the projection of its relevant coasts; the 
regional considerations of the delimitation; and the proportionality of the relevant coastal 
lengths.298  
The court agreed that the determination of the line of delimitation normally followed a 
two – step approach. First, a provisional line of equidistance was posited as a hypothesis and a 
practical starting point. This convenient starting point however couldn’t in many circumstances 
ensure an equitable result in the light of the peculiarities of each specific case. The second step 
therefore required the examination of this provisional line in the light of the relevant 
circumstances, which were case specific, so as to determine whether it was necessary to adjust 
the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result. The court said that this 
approach was usually referred to as the “equidistance/relevant circumstances” principle and went 
on saying that “there will rarely, if ever, be a single line that is uniquely equitable. The Tribunal 
must exercise its judgment in order to decide upon a line that is, in its view, both equitable and as 
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practically satisfactory as possible, while at the same time in keeping with the requirement of 
achieving a stable legal outcome. Certainty, equity, and stability are thus integral parts of the 
process of delimitation.”299 
The court indeed drew the equidistance line and then examined in detail the relevant 
circumstances of the case. It rejected the argument that the alleged historic artisanal fishing 
practice of Barbados was a sufficient reason to affect the course of the boundary of the 
continental shelf and the EEZ. It stated that the fishing regime in the disputed area could be 
determined later, by an agreement between the two countries. According to the court, the 
previous tribunals hadn’t applied in general any resource – related criteria as a relevant 
circumstance. It stated that the case of Jan Mayen was an exception to the general rule and said 
that the application of this criterion should be restricted to circumstances in which catastrophic 
results might follow from the adoption of a particular delimitation line.300  
It also rejected the argument of Trinidad and Tobago about the avoidance of any cut – off 
effect or encroachment on its coastal projection. Trinidad and Tobago contended that the median 
line in the eastern sector of the delimitation area would confine the projection of its eastwards – 
facing costal frontage and therefore it should be adjusted and follow an eastward direction so that 
to leave the coastal frontage of Trinidad and Tobago to project unimpeded towards the Atlantic 
Ocean.301 It further argued that the coasts of a state project frontally in the direction in which they 
face, as held by the arbitral tribunal in the case of St. Pierre and Miquelon. The line delimiting the 
competing claims, should be therefore drawn so as to avoid “cutting – off” any state from its 
                                               
299 Ibid. para 244. 
300 Ibid. para, 241, 271, 293. 
301 Ibid. para. 62, 63. 
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maritime projection under the principle of non – encroachment.302 The court however ruled that 
the orientation of Trinidad and Tobago’s coasts and therefore the direction of their projection was 
a very relative issue and in addition it stated that a coast could project in all directions in a radial 
manner.303 
The court rejected also the argument that the regional considerations could constitute a 
relevant circumstance for the delimitation process. Trinidad and Tobago had argued that the court 
should see this delimitation in a broader framework and in connection with the already existed 
agreements. As the tribunal in Guinea – Guinea Bissau case held that an equitable delimitation 
cannot ignore other delimitations already made or still to be made in the region,304 Trinidad and 
Tobago asserted that the already existed delimitations in the region, needed to be considered in 
this dispute as they entailed a departure from the equidistance line in order to be avoided a cut – 
off effect for Trinidad and Tobago. The court stated that the existed agreements of Trinidad and 
Tobago were res inter alios acta in respect of Barbados and as a result it ruled that the regional 
circumstances didn’t have any role to play in the delimitation.305 
The Tribunal concluded that the lengths of the relative coastal frontages were a 
circumstance relevant to delimitation and that their considerable difference required an 
adjustment of the provisional equidistance line. The court reiterating the finding in Greenland – 
Jan Mayen case said that “the differences in length of the respective coasts of the Parties are so 
significant that this feature must be taken into account during the delimitation operation …”306. It 
also referred to the Libya – Malta case in order to support its view. Due to this relevant 
                                               
302 Trinidad and Tobago brought as examples the North Sea Continental Shelf case, the Libya – Malta case and the 
Cameroon – Nigeria case. Ibid. para. 321. 
303 Ibid. para. 239. 
304 Arbitration Tribunal for the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea – Bissau. Award 
of 14 February 1985, supra note 177, para. 104. See also ibid. para. 340. 
305 Decision of PCA 2006, op. cit. para. 346.  
306 I.C.J. Reports 1993, supra note 224, para. 68. 
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circumstance the court adjusted the equidistance line giving to Trinidad and Tobago a small 
portion of the area it had claimed. 
The Tribunal noted however that proportionality didn’t in any case mean a mathematical 
application of the relationship between the coastal lengths or that proportionality could be used as 
an independent method of delimitation, hence producing by itself a boundary line. It argued that 
proportionality could only be used as a final check upon the equity of the delimitation. 
Proportionality “…serves to check the line of delimitation that might have been arrived at in 
consideration of various other factors, so as to ensure that the end result is equitable and thus in 
accordance with the applicable law under UNCLOS.”307 
The arbitral tribunal in this case moving to the right direction attempted to maintain 
consistency with the judicial precedents in the field of maritime delimitations. In order to reach to 
an equitable result the court resorted to the safe principle of equidistance line and didn’t employ 
at all in the process the vague equitable principles. Moreover, the court accepted the 
predominance of the geographical factors, a view that echoed the recent trend of the case law. 
The fact however that the outcome of the delimitation process looks again as if the court not only 
delimited the disputed area, but also split the difference between the claims of the two states 
make someone have second thoughts. Did the court keep the equidistance line almost unchanged 
due to the fact that there weren’t any significant relevant circumstances calling for its adjustment, 
or did it so because the equidistance line served the court’s notion of equity, from the moment 
that it divided in almost equal parts the area of the overlapping claims? Although the tribunal 
declared that it wouldn’t resort to any form of “splitting the difference” and that it wouldn’t 
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attribute to one Party what as a matter of law might belong to the other,308 the final delimitation 
line isn’t convincing enough for these declarations of the court. 
Furthermore, the criterion of proportionality as a relevant circumstance is of great 
importance for the islands which are generally lacking in coastal length in comparison with the 
other land territories. Hence, upgrading and accepting in general this criterion as a relevant 
circumstance, the basic entitlement of the islands to a continental shelf is curtailed and their 
rights are subjected to a case by case interpretation of the term “proportionality” by the courts 
that will be called to settle a maritime dispute. This situation definitely isn’t contributing to the 
establishment of some objective, fixed rules governing the delimitations and to the creation of a 
degree of predictability for the future cases. The court indeed accepted that there are no “magic 
formulas”309 for reaching to an equitable result, stressing once more the subjectivity of the issue. 
It is concluded therefore that a maritime delimitation can be a very subjective process. 
The court in this case accepted only the proportionality of the coastal lengths as a relevant 
circumstance and it rejected a number of other factors as being relevant circumstances, although 
they had been regarded as such by the courts in the past. It is certain therefore that nobody can 
predict which criteria are going to be employed in the next cases. Moreover, the fact that the 
courts have upgraded the median/equidistance line with their latest decisions is surely a positive 
development, but it is apparent that the final line can be adjusted in any possible way, according 
to the relevant circumstances and the weight that the courts may give to them.  
Apart from the abovementioned concerns regarding the subjectivity of the delimitations, 
in the present case the rights of the islands were again confirmed by the arbitral tribunal. The 
court undertook to delimit the maritime areas of the islands, which in itself is a proof that they 
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can generate maritime zones around them, with the same way as the continental lands. In fact the 
court nowhere showed that the delimitation of the maritime areas of the islands was something 
different from a delimitation between two mainland countries. It also respected the rights of the 
other islands in the region and it didn’t, by any means, transgress their rights. 
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3.14 Honduras – Nicaragua Maritime Boundary Delimitation (ICJ, 2007) 
 
On October 8, 2007 the ICJ issued its decision for the case concerning the territorial and 
maritime dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea.310 The court decided 
for the ownership status of a number of islets and by 14 votes to 3, it delimited the maritime area 
appertaining to both countries. This case is studied because first of all the maritime delimitation 
was affected by the presence of a number of small islands and secondly because it is indicative of 
the court’s distributive justice.  
The coasts of Honduras and Nicaragua roughly form a right angle that juts out to sea. The 
convexity of the coast is compounded by the cape Gracias a Dios, which is formed at the mouth 
of river Coco. This cape marks the point of convergence of both states’ coastlines. It abuts a 
concave coastline on its sides and has two points, one on each side of the margin of the river 
Coco, separated by a few hundred meters. The continental margin off the coast of the two states 
has the form of a relatively flat triangular shaped platform, with depths around 20 m. In this 
shallow area close to the mainland there are numerous reefs, some of which reach above the 
water surface in the form of cays. 
Cays are small, low islands composed largely of sand derived from the physical 
breakdown of coral reefs by wave action and subsequent reworking by wind. Larger cays can 
accumulate enough sediment to allow for colonization and fixation by vegetation. The insular 
features present in front of cape Gracias a Dios include Bobel Cay, Savanna Cay, Port Royal Cay, 
                                               
310 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. 
Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 659. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf.  
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South Cay and Edinburgh Cay, located between 30 and 40 miles east of the mouth of the River 
Coco.  
The delta of the river Coco and even the coastline north and south of it show a very active 
morpho – dynamism. The result is that the river mouth is constantly changing its shape and 
unstable islands and shoals form in the mouth where the river deposits much of its sediment.311 
On December 8, 1999 Nicaragua asked the court to determine the course of a single 
maritime boundary between the areas of territorial sea, continental shelf and EEZ appertaining 
respectively to Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea. It proposed a method of 
delimitation consisting of the bisector of the angle formed by two straight lines that were deemed 
to represent the entire coastal front of both Parties. These lines were constructed as straight lines 
through a process of “planing” or “smoothing” the coastal geography of both countries. As 
regards the islands off the coasts of both states, Nicaragua didn’t dispute that they could generate 
a territorial sea of up to 12 miles but argued that, were they to be “attributed to Honduras and 
were thus to be located within Nicaraguan territory”, their “size” and “instability” would act as 
“equitable criteria” justifying their being enclaved within only a 3 – mile territorial sea.312 
Honduras in contrast contended that the single maritime boundary between the two states 
had already been delimited and claimed that it was coincided with the 15th parallel. It claimed 
that this line represented the equidistance line measured from the coasts of the two states but, in 
case that the court didn’t accept the 15th parallel as the established maritime boundary, Honduras 
proposed alternatively an adjusted equidistance line. Honduras maintained that the construction 
of a provisional equidistance line was possible and that there was no reason to depart from “the 
practice almost universally adopted in the modern jurisprudence, both of this court and of other 
                                               
311 See figure 17 of Annex D. 
312 I.C.J. Reports 2007, supra note 310, para. 83, 263, 300. 
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tribunals, that is to begin with a provisional equidistance line”.313 In addition, concerning the 
islands it contended that, due to the fact that the breadth of the territorial sea of both Parties was 
12 miles, there was “no justification ... for employing a different standard with regard to the 
islands”. 314 
Although Nicaragua wasn’t Party to the UNCLOS at the time it filed the application in 
this case, the parties were in agreement that UNCLOS was then in force between them and that 
its relevant articles were applicable in their dispute.315 The court therefore had the opportunity to 
apply the provisions of the conventional law and at the same time to clarify and consolidate them 
in a manner contributing to the establishment of clear and objective rules.  
Both parties agreed that the four islands in dispute north of the 15th parallel, which the 
court attributed finally to Honduras, as well as Nicaragua’s Edinburgh Cay south of the 15th 
parallel, were entitled to generate their own territorial sea, but no claim was made by either Party 
for other maritime areas. The court accepted the position of the litigant parties and ruled that the 
islands were only entitled to a 12 – mile zone of territorial waters but not to a zone of continental 
shelf or an EEZ. It didn’t explain however the reason why the islands couldn’t have rights over 
the other maritime zones.316 Were the islands deprived of their rights because of the will of the 
parties? Was it because they were too small and the court classified them as rocks which couldn’t 
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own? Was it because their distortive effect on 
the delimitation line would have been too great in comparison with their importance? The ICJ 
didn’t justify its reasoning and left all these questions unanswered. The court ought to have 
                                               
313 Ibid. para. 91. 
314 Ibid. para. 86 – 91, 263. For a graphic display of the positions of the parties see figure 17 of Annex D. 
315 Honduras signed the UNCLOS on December 10, 1982 and ratified it on October 5, 1993. Nicaragua signed it on 
December 9, 1984 and ratified it on May 3, 2000. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/ 
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf.  
316 I.C.J. Reports 2007, supra note 310, para. 137, 302. 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                                  Court Decisions 
 
120 
 
explained why these features, for which it had previously ruled that they were indeed islands,317 
couldn’t generate a zone of continental shelf and similarly an EEZ. Avoiding doing so, one can 
easily generalize and conclude that all the islands in general may have different treatment in 
comparison with the continental lands. 
At least, the ICJ accorded a 12 – mile zone of territorial sea to these islands as it accepted 
that the right of a state to extend its territorial waters up to 12 miles was stemming from both, the 
conventional and customary law, the islands being no exception to this.318 In addition, the court 
ruled that where there were overlapping zones of territorial waters then the drawing of a 
provisional equidistance line would be the most advisable solution as the first step of the 
delimitation. The court indeed drew an equidistance line between the islands of Honduras and 
that of Nicaragua and kept it as the final boundary between them, as it saw no special 
circumstances requiring the adjustment of this equidistance line.319 
Although the court applied the equidistance principle for the delimitation of the territorial 
sea around the islands, it didn’t do the same for the delimitation of the continental shelf and the 
EEZ. Instead of applying the equidistance principle which seemed that it had been established in 
its latest jurisprudence as the most appropriate method for the maritime delimitations, the ICJ 
opted for another method, that of the bisector line. The court however accepted that the 
equidistance line had “a certain intrinsic value because of its scientific character and the relative 
ease with which it can be applied”320 but it also said that “the equidistance method does not 
automatically have priority over other methods of delimitation and, in particular circumstances, 
                                               
317 Ibid. 
318 Article 3 of the UNCLOS: “Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not 
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.” 
319 I.C.J. Reports 2007, supra note 310, para. 302 – 305. See also article 15 of the UNCLOS and article 12 of the 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which provide for the delimitation of the 
territorial sea between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. 
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there may be factors which make the application of the equidistance method inappropriate.”321 It 
further stated that the bisector method like equidistance was a geometrical approach and “in 
instances where, as in the present case, any base points that could be determined by the court are 
inherently unstable, the bisector method may be seen as an approximation of the equidistance 
method. …”322 
The court maintained that the difficulty in identifying reliable basepoints, due to the 
unstable nature of the area of the cape Gracias a Dios and the concavity of the coasts of both 
countries, rendered the application of the equidistance line unsuitable in this case. Thus, the 
existence of “special circumstances” precluded the application of the equidistance principle. The 
court though didn’t explain why it didn’t use the method of “straight baselines” so that to 
overcome the aforementioned problems. In fact, the method of “straight baselines” is advocated 
in the article 7 of the UNCLOS for cases where due to “the presence of a delta and other natural 
conditions the coastline is highly unstable”. 
“The efforts of recent years to make judicial decisions in this field more objective by 
firstly drawing a provisional equidistance line, even if this subsequently has to be adjusted in the 
light of “special” or “relevant” circumstances, have thus been set aside. There is thus a return to 
the idea of sui generis solutions for each delimitation, in other words a relapse into pragmatism 
and subjectivity.”323 The geographical configuration of the coastline as well as the instability of 
the delta of the river Coco couldn’t “justify abandoning the equidistance method in favour of one 
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such as the bisector, which creates far more serious problems of law and equity than 
equidistance.”324 
It seems that the criteria that the court applied once again weren’t totally based on law 
principles. It appears that the intention of the court was to approximately divide in equal shares 
the area of the overlapping claims of the Parties satisfying therefore as much as possible both of 
them.325 Otherwise how can be explained the fact that the court drew the maritime boundary not 
only as the bisector of the angle formed by the coasts of the two countries but also as the almost 
bisector of the angle formed by the lines of maximum claims of the states? Why the ICJ didn’t 
use the safe and objective method of the equidistance principle but it engaged the bisector 
method, which is totally subjective? Depending on the relevant coasts that someone chooses to 
employ in order to draw the straight lines representing the coastal front, the result can be totally 
different. For instance in the present case, had the court used a more limited part of the coasts so 
that to form the angle of the coastlines, the result would have been very different in favor of 
Honduras. The court indeed extended the relevant coasts beyond those directly concerned by the 
area of delimitation in order to produce its version of the bisector. It should be noted that 
although Nicaragua too proposed the bisector method, the boundary line it produced was 
different from that of the court because it took into account as relevant coasts the entire coastal 
front of both countries and not a part of them as did the ICJ. The inherent dangers of this method 
weren’t however unknown to the court. It characteristically stated: “where the bisector method is 
to be applied, care must be taken to avoid ‘completely refashioning nature’.”326 
                                               
324 Ibid. para. 128. See also Separate Opinion of Judge Ranjeva, para. 7. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
docket/files/120/14079.pdf?PHPSESSID=a55e96f370f1f9bb85e5ef4d6c6f3b10. 
325 See Separate Opinion of Judge Ranjeva who states for example in para. 9:  “The bisector is used in apportionment 
or division of the area concerned...the Court was requested to carry out a maritime delimitation and not an 
apportionment or division.” 
326 Ibid. para. 289. The court repeated the phrase it had initially used in the first decision of this kind in 1969. See 
also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Torres Bernardez, supra note 323, para. 128 – 130 and P. Weil, Perspectives du 
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Regarding the islands there are two conclusions that come up from this case. First, the 
court should have explained in detail why it didn’t give the islands under discussion a zone of 
continental shelf (and an EEZ). Since it had ruled that they were indeed islands they should have 
generated all the maritime zones in exactly the same manner as the other land teritory. 
Presumably the court did so because it considered them as rocks which couldn’t sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own, but in any case, it ought to have clarified it in a way not 
open to speculations. The ICJ obviously avoided addressing the controversial question of what 
exactly distinguishes a ‘rock’ from a full – fledged island and its decision is therefore 
questionable. Secondly, the fact that the court gave a full zone of territorial sea to these small 
islands can be seen as a positive sign: the islands are entitled to a full maritime zone no matter 
their size or importance. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
droit de la délimitation maritime, 1988, p. 65 and also P. Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation — Reflections, 
1989, p. 59: “The bisector method is possible only where two clearly distinguished coastlines form a sharply defined 
angle; if not, it rests on artificially reconstructed coastal directions.” 
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3.15 Romania – Ukraine Maritime Boundary Delimitation (ICJ, 2009) 
 
On February 3, 2009 the ICJ delivered its unanimous decision for the case concerning the 
maritime boundary delimitation between Romania and Ukraine.327 After six years of unsuccessful 
negotiations, Romania initiated proceedings in September 2004 and asked the court to establish 
“…a single maritime boundary between the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones 
of the two states in the Black Sea”328 so that to be ended a long standing dispute between the two 
neighboring nations. Romania and Ukraine disagreed on the course of the maritime boundary to 
be established, and in particular on the role in this respect of Serpents’ Island. 
Romania and Ukraine are situated in the northwestern Black Sea region. Because of the 
particular nature of the delimitation area, the Romanian coast is both adjacent and opposite to the 
Ukrainian coast or in other words, the Ukrainian coast consist of two portions: one adjacent to the 
Romanian coast and another opposite to it. Serpents’ Island is an Ukrainian island located 
approximately 20 miles east of the Danube delta. It is the only island in the region and it has a 
surface area of approximately 0.17 Km2 and a circumference of around 2,000 m. On the island 
live a small number of people consisted of some frontier guard servicemen, technical and 
research personnel.329  
On the one hand, Romania argued that Serpents’ Island was actually a rock incapable of 
sustaining human habitation or economic life of its own, and therefore it shouldn’t have a 
continental shelf or an EEZ, as provided for in the UNCLOS. Moreover, it asserted that under the 
                                               
327 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 6. Available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf?PHPSESSID=28d0f9aff72e7a6570ff46225255df8b.  
328 Ibid. para. 11. 
329 See figure 17 of Annex D. 
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international jurisprudence and the state practice, small islands, irrespective of their legal 
characterization, had frequently been given very reduced or no effect in the delimitation of the 
continental shelf, EEZ or other maritime zones due to the inequitable effect they would produce. 
Finally, it contended that according with the 1949 agreement between Romania and the USSR, 
Serpents’ Island was entitled only to a 12 – mile zone of territorial sea and it shouldn’t be given 
by the court any effect at all beyond this limit.330 It proposed therefore that the course of the 
maritime boundary should follow the 12 – mile arc of the island’ territorial sea, continue along 
the equidistance line between the adjacent Romanian and Ukraine mainland coasts and then 
follow the median line between the opposite coasts of the two countries. 
On the other hand, Ukraine argued that Serpents’ Island was indisputably an island rather 
than a rock and it contended that the evidence showed that Serpents’ Island could sustain human 
habitation and an economic life of its own. In particular, it asserted that the island had vegetation, 
a sufficient supply of fresh water, buildings and accommodation for an active population. Thus in 
Ukraine’s view, the coast of the island constituted part of Ukraine’s relevant coasts and it 
couldn’t be reduced to just a relevant circumstance as Romania had supported. Ukraine therefore 
contended that the Serpents’ Island could generate all the maritime zones around it and proposed 
as a maritime boundary between the two states a line which was produced by giving full effect to 
the island in question.331 
                                               
330 The court rejected the argument of Romania that the USSR had forfeited its entitlements beyond the 12 – mile 
limit of its territorial sea with respect to any other maritime zones. Consequently, the court said that there was no 
agreement in force between Romania and Ukraine delimiting the EEZ and the CS around the Serpents’ Island. 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, supra note 327, para. 76. 
331 For a graphic illustration of the parties claims see figure 17 of Annex D. 
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Both Romania and Ukraine were parties to the UNCLOS.332 The court stated that this 
convention, as it had been interpreted in its jurisprudence, was therefore the applicable law 
between the Parties and more specifically the paragraph 1 of the articles 74 and 83 of it. 
However, when Romania had become party to the UNCLOS it had made a declaration according 
to which “…the uninhabited islands without economic life can in no way affect the delimitation 
of the maritime spaces belonging to the mainland coasts of the coastal states”333. The court ruled 
that according to article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Romania’s 
declaration as regards the uninhabited islands had no bearing on the present case.334 The court 
therefore clearly positioned itself and accepted that, unless they were rocks, the uninhabited 
islands without economic life could have a continental shelf (and an EEZ) of their own. 
Thereafter the ICJ followed the methodology which it had developed in its previous 
jurisprudence. It held that for the drawing of a single maritime boundary, the case law up to then 
had established a well – defined process consisting of three specific and distinct stages. First, the 
court had to draw a provisional line, using geometrically based methods. In the vast majority of 
the cases the equidistance line method had been used between states with adjacent coasts and the 
median line had been applied when the parties had opposite coasts.335 For the construction of this 
provisional equidistance/median line the court didn’t have to be concerned about the existence of 
any relevant circumstances and the line had to be plotted on strictly geometrical criteria on the 
basis of objective data.  
                                               
332 Romania signed the UNCLOS on December 10, 1982 and ratified it on December 17, 1996. Ukraine signed it on 
December 10, 1982 and ratified it on July 26, 1999. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/ 
status2010.pdf.  
333 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, supra note 327, para. 35. 
334 Ibid. para 42. 
335 The court said that there might have been some deviations from the equidistance/median line method when there 
were compelling reasons that made this method unfeasible in a particular case. It referred the example of the 
Honduras – Nicaragua case where the geographical realities of the area rendered this method inappropriate to be 
applied. Ibid. para. 116. 
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In the next stage of this process the court had to consider whether there were factors 
calling for the adjustment or shifting of the provisional equidistance/median line in order to 
achieve an equitable result. In the third and the last stage, the court had to apply the criterion of 
proportionality in order to verify that the provisional equidistance line which may or may not had 
been adjusted by taking into account the relevant circumstances, led to an equitable result. The 
purpose of this final stage was therefore to make sure that there was no significant 
disproportionality between the ratio of the coastal lengths and the ratio of the marine areas 
attributed to each party. The ICJ clarified though that the delimitation process shouldn’t in any 
case be the outcome of a mathematical application of the relationship between the lengths of the 
coastlines, because “the sharing out of the area is therefore the consequence of the delimitation, 
not vice versa”336. 
Hence, the court followed this three – step process for the case under discussion. In the 
first stage, it ruled however that the Serpents’ Island couldn’t serve as a basepoint for the 
construction of the provisional equidistance/median line between the coasts of the parties, since it 
didn’t form part of the general configuration of the coast. The court characteristically said: “To 
count Serpents’ Island as a relevant part of the coast would amount to grafting an extraneous 
element onto Ukraine’s coastline; the consequence would be a judicial refashioning of 
geography, which neither the law nor practice of maritime delimitation authorizes. The court is 
thus of the view that Serpents’ Island cannot be taken to form part of Ukraine’s coastal 
configuration…For this reason, the court considers it inappropriate to select any base points on 
                                               
336 The court reiterated its finding in the Greenland – Jan Mayen case. I.C.J. Reports 1993, supra note 224, para. 64. 
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Serpents’ Island for the construction of a provisional equidistance line between the coasts of 
Romania and Ukraine”337. 
Then, the court proceeding at the second stage of the delimitation considered if the 
presence of Serpents’ Island constituted a relevant circumstance calling for an adjustment of the 
provisional equidistance/median line. It ruled though that any possible entitlements generated by 
Serpents’ Island were fully subsumed by the entitlements generated by the western and eastern 
mainland coasts of Ukraine itself and concluded that the presence of Serpents’ Island wasn’t an 
adequate reason for adjusting the provisional equidistance/median line. 
When later the court applied the test of proportionality it found that the coast of Serpents’ 
Island was so short that it made no real difference to the overall length of the relevant coasts of 
the parties and therefore it wasn’t also taken into account in the third stage of the delimitation 
process. Thus the court concluded that the Serpents’ Island should have no effect on the course of 
the maritime boundary, other than that stemming from the role of the 12 mile arc of its territorial 
sea. The ICJ said that as its jurisprudence had indicated, “…the court may on occasion decide not 
to take account of very small islands or decide not to give them their full potential entitlement to 
maritime zones, should such an approach have a disproportionate effect on the delimitation line 
under consideration”338. 
The court refrained from considering whether Serpents’ Island fell under paragraph 2 or 3 
of the Article 121 of UNCLOS and once again it avoided to address the question of what exactly 
distinguishes a rock from an island. Moreover, although the law provides that even rocks are 
entitled to a full zone of territorial waters the court hinted that the 12 – mile territorial sea was 
                                               
337 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, supra note 327, para. 149. The court in order to support its argument referred to 
the Libya – Malta case where the court hadn’t accepted that the islet of Filfla was relevant for the choice of the 
basepoints.  
338 Ibid. para. 185. The court brought as examples the Libya – Malta case, the Qatar – Bahrain case and the Honduras 
– Nicaragua case. 
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attributed to Serpents’ Island due to the previous agreements between the Parties and not because 
of its legal entitlement. 
The rationale of the court is difficult to be understood. The court ruled that due to the 
reason that the Serpents’ Island wasn’t part of the mainland coastal configuration it couldn’t 
provide any basepoint for the construction of the provisional equidistance/median line. It argued 
that to count Serpents’ Island as a relevant part of the coast would be a refashioning of 
geography, but wasn’t a refashioning of geography the total disregard of the unique island in the 
region? Since when and which convention provides that only the coastal islands which are 
included within the coastal system of baselines, can provide the basepoints for the delimitation? 
What then is the role of geography and how can the special characteristics of an area be taken 
into account? 
The court declared many times in its judgment that the “delimitation is a function which is 
different from the apportionment of resources or areas”339, but disregarding Serpents’ Island from 
the delimitation process it didn’t prove it in practice. The codification of the delimitation process 
and the strengthening of the role of the equidistance/median line principle was in all respects a 
positive outcome of this case, but again only the declaration that the equidistance/median line is 
going to be used doesn’t entail an objective delimitation if in reality this line doesn’t take into 
account all the geographical features of a given area. The selected basepoints can fundamentally 
influence the location of the equidistance/median line and their objective selection is therefore of 
utmost importance. A fact that shows how subjective it may be the process of applying the 
equidistance/median line principle is that the provisional equidistance/median line drawn by the 
court didn’t coincide with the provisional lines drawn either by Romania or Ukraine. Hence, 
                                               
339 Ibid. para. 163. 
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apart from the codification of the delimitation process, the courts should also systematize the 
method of drawing the equidistance/median line.    
The decision of the court would have been acceptable if the court had specified the legal 
status of Serpents’ Island and if it had clearly classified it as a rock. Then, on the one hand, the 
whole delimitation process would have been both equitable and exemplary since the court 
applying the equidistance/median line principle would have given to the “Serpents’ Island Rock” 
a full 12 – mile zone of territorial waters, and on the other hand the rights of the islands in general 
wouldn’t have been questioned. Avoiding doing so, the court implied that the rights of the 
islands, can be viewed on a case by case basis and their basic entitlements to maritime zones can 
be put in a second place after their characteristics such as size, importance, habitation and 
geographical position. 
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 Chapter 4 
Conclusions 
 
Undoubtedly the 1969 decision of the ICJ was decisive for all the later jurisprudence. The 
court back then introduced the notion of the equitable principles/relevant circumstances and 
actually distanced itself from the equidistance/median line/special circumstances conventional 
provision, setting a precedent which has been followed for many years by the courts. Since then 
the jurisprudence has been wandering without having yet established those fixed rules governing 
the delimitations of the maritime boundaries as it hasn’t yet completed the seems to be endless 
list of the equitable principles. 
The equidistance/median line principle is very important for the islands because it 
automatizes the delimitation process, making it a mechanistic procedure and if it is applied 
correctly (i.e. if all the geographical features, such as the islands, are taken into account) it can 
safeguard the rights of the islands with regard to their maritime zones. Up to now, the importance 
that the courts have given to it has undergone many changes. From a law principle, it was 
relegated to the category of method by the Tribunal in 1977, became a factor in 1982 and much 
later it was gradually reintroduced under the general umbrella of the equitable principles 
enunciated by the ICJ and the requirements of the UNCLOS for an equitable result. The 
international Tribunals have started lately to recognize its equitable nature, its practical 
convenience and its certainty of application. In addition, the fact that all the recent disputes 
required the drawing of a single maritime boundary for all the maritime zones, made a distance 
related criterion such as the equidistance/median line much more appropriate and at the same 
time arguments such as the natural prolongation became obsolete.  
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Today, the equidistance/median line principle is usually applied by the courts through a 
three – step process: application of a provisional equidistance/median line, possible 
corrections/adjustments of it according to the relevant circumstances of a given case and finally 
the ex post facto proportionality test in order to be verified whether this provisional line as 
modified or not is equitable. If the proportionality test implies that the adopted maritime 
boundary doesn’t lead to an equitable result then it is further amended. 
Even today though the rights of the islands are not guaranteed as long as the process of 
plotting the equidistance/median line isn’t systematic, based on objective data and also since the 
relevant circumstances are not limited to geographical factors but they can potentially include 
almost everything. Moreover, the test of proportionality is unfair for the islands which are 
generally lacking in coastal length in comparison with the other land territories. Hence, the basic 
entitlement of the islands to a continental shelf is subjected to a case by case interpretation of the 
ambiguous relevant circumstances and in addition their rights can be further curtailed by the 
application of the proportionality criterion. The study of the case law shows that there were many 
cases where the basic entitlement of the islands to a continental shelf came in second place after 
the court had weighed more than that, other factors such as their geographical location, distance 
from their mainland country, size, economic importance, political status, population and coastal 
length. 
The international Tribunals have avoided addressing so far the question of what exactly 
distinguishes a rock from an island. In many cases they didn’t attribute a zone of continental shelf 
to some small islands presumably because the courts considered them as rocks which couldn’t 
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own, but in any case, they ought to have 
clarified it in a way not open to speculations. Avoiding doing so, someone can easily generalize 
and conclude that all the islands in general can be treated differently than the continental lands. 
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Although the UNCLOS defined what should be regarded as a rock, it seems that the courts in 
many cases interpreted the law in a way that was detrimental to the rights of the islands. 
Nonetheless, although both the conventional and the customary law provides that even rocks are 
entitled to a full zone of territorial waters, there were cases in which the courts deprived some 
islands even from this entitlement. 
The judgments of the courts were in many cases poorly, if at all reasoned. Failing to 
explain their rationale the courts increased the subjectivity and the uncertainty of the 
delimitations and undermined the authority of the international judicial bodies. The islands were 
those most affected by this obscure situation. The delimitation of their maritime zones was done 
on a case by case basis, exacerbating thereby the confusion about their rights. These subjective 
and at times arbitrary rulings neither have helped the establishment of general rules of broad 
application nor have consolidated a degree of predictability and certainty in the delimitations of 
the maritime boundaries and by no means have they secured the rights of the islands. 
The ICJ declared in the 1969 landmark case that the delimitation of the maritime 
boundaries couldn’t be a process of “completely refashioning nature” or “totally refashioning 
geography” but inconsistent to these declarations the later courts didn’t give geography the 
importance it deserved. In fact, geography should have been the common denominator of every 
case brought before the courts and the special geographical features such as the islands should 
have played a more active role on the course of the boundary line. Quite the opposite though, the 
courts not only didn’t take into account the geographical particularities of some areas, but they 
tried in many cases to compensate a state for its geographical disadvantages and attempted to 
refashion the geography of some regions by disregarding those islands that could considerably 
affect the final demarcation line. 
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In most of the cases the Tribunals tried to conciliate as much as possible the demands of 
the litigant states by dividing approximately in half the water area between their maximum 
claims. However, by adopting such an approach the courts have encouraged the states to have 
excessive demands and have discouraged moderate and reasonable claims. In many cases the 
parties didn’t hesitate to contest the entrenched rights of the islands in an apparent attempt to gain 
as much sea area as possible from the delimitation process. The courts therefore by their practice 
failed to foster a climate conducive to the resolution of the international maritime disputes 
without the need to resort to a third – party assistance. 
The international tribunals seem that have been engaged in a political operation of 
apportionment and compromise and the delimitation process in most of the cases appeared to be 
rather a political affair than a legal issue. The courts never awarded a total victory to one state but 
instead they tried to split the difference and find the “golden mean” between the claims of the 
litigant parties so that to satisfy all of them as much as possible. In most of the cases the whole 
process appeared more like an attempt by the courts to apportion the maritime territories than an 
effort to delimit them. The islands were the easy victims of the courts’ distributive justice. Most 
of the times they were deprived either partially or totally of their rights as an easy solution for the 
courts which tried to allocate almost equal shares to both states in an effort to make equal what 
nature had made unequal, apparently forgetting the fundamental principle that justice doesn’t 
necessarily mean equality. 
The ICJ as well as the other arbitral Tribunals seems to have adopted a result – oriented 
approach and they weren’t always consistent with the legal principles that they ought to have 
followed. They highlighted the importance of equity and they used it as a scapegoat for any 
possible criticism. Thus, in many cases they moved beyond the limits of the applicable law and 
their judgments can be characterized as decisions ex aequo et bono or even due to the lack of 
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authorization as contra legem decisions.340 Typical examples of such decisions are those where a 
number of islands were totally disregarded from the delimitation process as non – existence. 
From the above analysis it is obvious that in many cases the decisions of the courts were 
unfair for the islands as they were discriminated against the continental lands. In most of the 
cases they were considered as prima facie relevant/special circumstances something which is 
totally unfounded in the international law. The courts ought to have clearly acknowledged that 
the islands can generate all the maritime zones around them in the same way as the continental 
lands do and that their basic rights over the continental shelf exist ipso facto and ab initio no 
matter if they are small, uninhabited, desolate or remote from their mainland. On the contrary, the 
courts put the basic right of the islands to have a continental shelf of their own in a second place 
and laid emphasis on their characteristics.  
The decisions of the courts have been inconsistent with each other as regards the 
continental shelf of the islands and therefore they haven’t created a specific dynamic in this field 
that would enable someone to safely predict the outcome of a future case. What is certain is the 
fact that the continental shelf, as well as the other maritime zones of the islands will continue to 
be the “apple of discord” for many states and this for the most part is due to these vague decisions 
of the courts. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
340 H. Tzimitras, supra note 118, pp. 216, 217. 
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                                       Graphic Display of the Continental Shelf  
 
 
                                                                      Figure 1341 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
341 Available at: http://www.google.com/images?q=Continental+Shelf,+pictures&rls=com. Accessed on December 6, 
2010. 
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To Date:342 
161 States and the European Union have ratified the convention. 
18 Countries have signed, but not yet ratified it:  Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Central African Republic, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iran, North Korea, Libya, 
Liechtenstein, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and the USA. 
16 Countries have not signed it: Andorra,  Azerbaijan,   Ecuador,   Eritrea,   Israel,   Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Peru, San Marino, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor – Leste, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Venezuela. 
                                               
342 Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm and 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf, accessed on December 9, 2010.  
                         Signature and Ratification Status of the 1982 UNCLOS 
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North Sea Continental Shelf Delimitation 
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The Islands of North Sea  
 
 
 
Figure 2 
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Anglo – French Continental Shelf Delimitation 
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Continental Shelf Delimitation between Iceland and Jan Mayen 
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Tunisia – Libya Continental Shelf Delimitation 
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Canada – USA (Gulf of Maine) Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
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Guinea – Guinea Bissau Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
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Libya – Malta Continental Shelf Delimitation 
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Figure 8 
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Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and France 
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(Newfoundland) 
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1972 Agreement Boundary:  
French Claim: 
Canadian 200 – mile Fishing Zone: 
Possible Limit of French EEZ:  
12 – mile Zone: 
Court’s Decision: 
 
 
Figure 9 
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Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen 
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Figure 10 
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Eritrea – Yemen Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
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Court’s Decision: 
 
Figure 11 
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Qatar – Bahrain Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
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Figure 12 
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Qatar – Bahrain Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
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Court’s Decision: 
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Figure 13 
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Cameroon – Nigeria Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
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Cameroon – Nigeria Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
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Court’s Decision: 
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Barbados – Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
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Court’s Decision: 
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Figure 16 
VENEZUELA 
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Honduras – Nicaragua Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HONDURAS 
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Court’s Decision: 
Auxiliary Lines Forming the Angle of the Coasts: 
Honduras’s Claim: 
Nicaragua’s Claim: 
 
 
Figure 17 
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Romania – Ukraine Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 – mile Arc: 
Romania’s Claim: 
Ukraine’s Claim: 
Court’s Decision: 
 
Figure 18 
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The Judges of the Courts  
 
Judge Nationality 
Case 
19
69
 
19
77
 
19
81
 
19
82
 
19
84
 
19
85
 
19
85
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
99
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
09
 
Abraham, Ronny   France              √ √ 
Ago, Roberto   Italy    √ √  √  √       
Aguilar-Mawdsley, Andrés   Venezuela         √       
Ajibola, Bola Adesumbo   Nigeria         √   √    
Al-Khasawneh, Awn Shawkat   Jordan           √ √  √ √ 
Ammoun, Fouad   Lebanon √               
Andersen, G. Hans  Iceland   √             
Arangio-Ruiz, Gaetano  Italy        √        
Bedjaoui, Mohammed   Algeria       √  √  √     
Bengzon, César   Philippines √               
Bennouna, Mohamed   Morocco      √        √ √ 
Briggs, Herbert  USA  √              
Brownlie, Ian   UK             √   
Buergenthal, Thomas   USA           √ √  √ √ 
Bustamante y Rivero, José Luis   Peru √               
Castrén, Eric  Finland  √              
Cohen, Maxwell   Canada     √           
Cot, Jean-Pierre   France               √ 
De Lacharrière, Guy Ladreit   France       √         
Elaraby, Nabil   Egypt            √    
Elias, Taslim Olawale   Nigeria    √   √         
El-Khani, Abdallah Fikri   Syria    √   √         
El-Kosheri, Ahmed Sadek   Egypt          √      
Evensen, Jens   Norway   √ √     √       
Fischer, Paul Henning   Denmark         √       
Fitzmaurice, Gerald Gray   UK √               
Fleischhauer, Carl-August   Germany           √ √    
Forster, Isaac   Senegal √   √            
Fortier, L. Yves   Canada           √     
Gaja, Giorgio   Italy              √  
Gotlieb, E. Allan  Canada        √        
Gros, André   France      √ √  √ √           
Guillaume, Gilbert   France         √  √ √    
Herczegh, Géza   Hungary           √ √    
Higgins, Dame Rosalyn   UK          √ √ √  √ √ 
Highet, Keith   USA          √      
Jennings, Robert Yewdall   UK       √  √ √      
Jessup, Philip c.   USA √               
Jiménez de Aréchaga, Eduardo   Uruguay    √   √ √        
Keith, Kenneth   New Zealand              √ √ 
Kooijmans, Pieter H.   Netherlands           √ √    
Koretsky, M. Vladimir   USSR √               
Koroma, G. Abdul   Sierra Leone           √ √  √ √ 
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Judge Nationality 
Case 
19
69
 
19
77
 
19
81
 
19
82
 
19
84
 
19
85
 
19
85
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
99
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
09
 
Lachs, Manfred   Poland √   √  √ √         
Lowe, Vaughan   UK             √   
Mbaye, Kéba   Senegal      √ √     √    
Morelli, Gaetano   Italy √               
Morozov, Platon Dmitrievich   USSR    √   √         
Mosler, Hermann   Germany √   √ √  √         
Nagendra, Singh  India    √   √         
Ni, Zhengyu  China         √       
Oda, Shigeru   Japan    √   √  √  √ √    
Onyeama, D. Charles   Nigeria √               
Owada, Hisashi   Japan              √ √ 
Oxman, H. Bernard   USA               √ 
Padilla, Nervo Luis   Mexico √               
Parra-Aranguren, Gonzalo   Venezuela           √ √  √  
Petrén, Sture   Sweden √               
Ranjeva, Raymond   Madagascar         √  √ √  √ √ 
Rezek, Francisco   Brazil           √ √    
Richardson, L. Elliot  USA   √             
Ruda, José Maria   Argentina       √         
Schachter, Oscar  USA        √        
Schwebel, M. Stephen   USA    √ √  √  √ √   √   
Sepúlveda-Amor, Bernardo   Mexico              √ √ 
Sette-Camara, José   Brazil    √   √         
Shahabuddeen, Mohamed   Guyana         √       
Shi, Jiuyong  China           √ √  √ √ 
Simma, Bruno   Germany              √  
Skotnikov, Leonid   Russian Fed.              √ √ 
Sørensen, Max   Denmark √               
Tanaka, Kotaro   Japan √               
Tarassov, Nikolai Konstantin.   Russian Fed.         √       
Tomka, Peter   Slovakia              √ √ 
Torres Bernárdez, Santiago   Spain           √   √  
Ustor, Endre  Hungary  √              
Valticos, Nicolas   Greece       √         
Vereshchetin, Vladlen Stepan.  Russian Fed.           √     
Vicuña, Francisco Orrego   Chile             √   
Waldock, Humphrey  UK  √              
Watts, Arthur   UK             √   
Weeramantry, Chr. Gregory   Sri Lanka         √       
Weil, Prosper  France        √        
Zafrulla, Khan Muhammad   Pakistan √               
Total Judges per Case 17 5 3 14 5 3 17 5 15 5 17 16 5 17 15 
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Aggregated List with the Nationality of the Judges 
Nationality of Judge Number of Judges* 
 
USA 16 
 
UK 13 
 
France 12 
 
Japan 8 
 
Germany 
7 
 
Italy 
 
China 
5  
Madagascar 
 
Nigeria 
 
Senegal 
 
Brazil 
4 
 
Jordan 
 
Poland 
 
Russian Federation 
 
Sierra Leone 
 
Venezuela 
 
Algeria 
3 
 
Canada 
 
Hungary 
 
Mexico 
 
Morocco 
 
Norway 
 
Uruguay 
 
USSR 
 
Denmark 
2 
 
Egypt 
 
India 
 
Netherlands 
 
New Zealand 
 
Slovakia 
 
Spain 
 
Syria 
 
Argentina 
1 
 
Chile 
 
Finland 
 
Greece 
 
Guyana 
 
Iceland 
 
Lebanon 
 
Pakistan 
 
Peru 
 
Philippines 
 
Sri Lanka 
 
Sweden 
* Each Judge is counted as many times as the number of the cases he participated to. Thus for example the first line 
of the list doesn’t imply that 16 different judges from the USA were members of the courts, since some of them 
participated to more than one case, as indicated in the first list of this Annex. 
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